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ABSTRACT
This project utilized a mixed methods research design consisting of a case study
of Nevada to explain the state’s reliance on company-based government incentives to
attract new businesses to the state. Additionally, the project applied a comparative
analysis of Brazil’s and Tennessee’s use of company-based government incentives, and
a more detailed comparative analysis of Virginia’s people-based government incentive
approach to economic development incentives to explore policy alternatives available to
decision makers. This project used the historical institutionalism approach to show how
policymakers have certain institutionally dominated predispositions impacting policy
outcomes leading to a path dependency where rational choice theory’s credit seeking
behavior further reinforces the desire to provide company-based incentives over peoplebased incentives. Additionally, this project discussed how the creative class theory
provides an alternative approach to help channel policy preferences toward people-based
incentives for policymakers prone to rent seeking corporations pursuing company-based
incentives.
The concept and definition of workplace is changing. The connectedness of global
markets and supply chains combined with advanced technology are disconnecting
companies from specific geographic locations giving them an increasing ability to more
freely expand or relocate. Business closures, realignments, and work from home
protocols associated with the COVID-19 global pandemic have further transformed, if not
destroyed, the notion of workplace and corporate commitment to local. The comparative
analysis of this project informs policymakers facing this new reality by evaluating whether

iii

prospective companies prefer government investments in company-based economic
development or investments in people-based economic development.
This project used a case study of Tesla’s September 2014 decision to build its first
Gigafactory for manufacturing batteries in Sparks, Nevada. The project also compared
Amazon’s September 2017 decision to build its HQ2 corporate headquarters in Arlington,
Virginia. More specifically, the project highlighted the lessons Nevada and other state’s
beginning to establish and implement economic development tools, designed to attract
new enterprise to their state, can learn from states more experienced and successful in
economic development endeavors. The primary units of analysis for this project were the
metro areas of Reno, Nevada; Las Vegas, Nevada; Washington, D.C. Metro Region; and
the surrounding areas impacted by the project, and the state. The case study of Nevada
offered a unique perspective and contribution to existing literature in urban affairs and
public policy, if not a laboratory for study, as a state with a rich tradition of reliance on
stable historic rent seeking enterprises suddenly pivoted and realigned state law and
institutions to diversifying its economy following the Great Recession. As one of the least
diverse states in the Nation, Nevada provides a blank canvas to analyze the evolution of
government institutions, public policy, and the effectiveness of incentives designed to
attract new diversification. The comparative analysis of Amazon in Virginia provided
strong comparative value to understanding policy evolution and the value businesses
place on people or company-based economic incentives. Additionally, the Amazon
analysis looked at the company’s bifurcated decision to locate in Virginia and New York
and how those states used company- and people-based approaches to attract their part
of the opportunity. Following a more traditional incrementalism approach where inherently
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stable institutions of policy subsystems develop over time, Virginia made significant
historical investments in people and utilized smaller company-based incentives to attract
business.
This project utilized content analysis, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and
document analysis of legislative records. This study adds to existing literature on
company-based and people-based economic development by highlighting the key
metrics most likely to attract economic development and what a state needs to do to
overcome structural deficiencies within the key metrics to determine how steady and
historical investments in people-based economic development impact the need to come
to the table with aggressive company-based incentives to attract new economic
development. The study also provides guidance for state and local governments creating
public policy to diversify their economies and compete at the national level for businesses
looking to expand or relocate. In light of the more frequent migration practices of business,
it is important for policymakers to understand that the world, especially a post-pandemic
world, does not have the same historical necessity to stay in place, meet in place, or
manufacture next door; businesses can move and relocate. Policymakers, unaware of
this growing reality, will get caught up in a never-ending reshuffling of businesses moving
into a state until the government subsidy runs out and then simply relocate to another
state chasing the next big subsidy. In light of this new reality, the project highlights the
need for policymakers to invest in their people now or pay for it later at a much higher
cost in both dollars and lost opportunity.
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PREFACE
In 2011, reeling from the devastating financial impact of the Great Recession, state
officials in Nevada commissioned Brookings Mountain West and SRI International to
evaluate the state’s economic development activities. Regarding the economy,
policymakers were beginning to believe that the “current slump has not been just a
temporary reversal but a challenge to the state’s traditional growth model—one that has
revealed an economy over-dependent on consumption sectors, prone to booms and
busts, and too little invested in innovation and economic diversification (Muro et al., 2011,
p. 3). This realization began changing policymaker’s dialogue and lead to the ultimate
transformation of policy and makeup of state institutions engaged in economic
development.
In short, state policymakers began orienting the state toward diversifying its
gaming, tourism, and hospitality dependent economy. This assiduous effort to not repeat
the lessons from the Great Recession compelled Nevada policymakers to contract
Brookings Mountain West and the SRI International to begin the undertaking with a data
driven effort to diversify the state’s economy. The recognition of Nevada’s vulnerability
was coupled with a newly adopted state economic development plan to diversify the
state’s economy. Within this policy vacuum, best practices were adopted around investing
in people, leveraging core economic and natural strengths, and building compatible and
complimentary industries to lower the cost of diversification. However, as is often the
case, once these deliberate and purposeful actions were operationalized and deployed
to attract economic development opportunities, the policy outcomes deviated from the
predetermined plan.
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German field marshal Hermuth von Moltke, aka Moltke the Elder, famously
proclaimed, “No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with
the enemy’s main strength.” Or as often quoted more succinctly, “no plan survives first
contact with the enemy.” To some it appears that Nevada’s nascent efforts to
operationalize its new plan did not survive first contact with an economic development
opportunity, and their first real foray into the economic development space resulted in
abandoning their meticulous plan for the perceived desires of the new business
opportunity. To others, Nevada’s efforts to diversify the state’s economy were rewarded
by attracting Tesla- one of the biggest economic development opportunities in the Nation.
They found strength in the state’s nimble ability to alter its new economic development
plan to attract new enterprise provides a new model for successful economic
development.
Where Nevada relied on company-based incentives to attract Tesla, Virginia used
people-based incentives to attract Amazon. Virginia’s creative class environment
provides good comparative insight into state investment approaches in economic
develop. Virginia provides both empirical comparative value to the case study of Nevada,
as well as practical considerations for newcomers creating economic development policy
schemes on how steady commitment to a data driven plan can ensure that the ‘tail does
not wag the dog.’ This project seeks to inform policymakers caught up in trying to attract
new economic development opportunities to prevent them from being easily lured away
from their data driven plan. While the dynamics of real-life economic development
opportunities can, and should, inform policymakers with new information that can alter
previous plans, Virginia demonstrates how long-term success can come by remaining
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committed to high level priorities and simply, patiently, and painstakingly following their
plan to develop and support a creative class. In many ways, policymakers in Virginia
chose the economic development opportunity (instead of the other way around); by
consistently following state plans to invest in their people from higher education to quality
transportation, Virginia was able to leverage these investments to attract companies that
valued the state’s investments.
While Nevada has not made people-based investments to the same degree as
Virginia, there are many other drivers that attract new business opportunities to its desert.
Nevada’s low tax, low regulation environment provides a solid ecosystem for new
businesses to thrive, and the recent addition of state company-based economic
incentives provides many tools for policymakers to attract new business; however, these
advantages are also enticing to sophisticated, multinational firms with a history of thriving
by exploiting low regulation, low tax, and anti-labor environments.
The long-term ‘stickiness” of a company’s residency taking advantage of Nevada’s
incentives that expire in ten to twenty years could be problematic when the tax incentives
sunset in the future. As with any rent seeking scheme, once the free rents dry up the
tenants tend to rent seek elsewhere. This business migration could be even more
disruptive and frequent in a post COVID-19 world. The hyper-connected global markets
already decoupling the concept of ‘physical place’ are combining with the emerging
technology facilitating a new construct of the world’s business environment resulting in a
technological transformation of the concept and realities of workplace. Policymakers must
be even more diligent in constructing incentives with benefits that outlive the timeframe
that a company is abated, because it is increasingly more likely that after the company-
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based incentives dry up, the company will reenter the relocation market and search the
horizon for new incentives.
Although not always as politically expedient as company-based investments,
people-based investments are more durable and have a positive compounding effect on
the underlying community. For elected officials, the fruits from people-based investments
take too long to ripen, and are often not ready for immediate and impactful electoral gain
or credit seeking opportunities. However, company-based investments quickly attract
enterprise for instantaneous political gain while at the same time are extremely politically
appealing because negative consequences are often delayed and hidden for others to
deal with long after decision makers have climbed to new political heights. Out of
necessity, Nevada’s policymakers have been extremely successful at attracting new
enterprise with company-based economic incentives and now have the opportunity to
engage in using more durable people-based economic incentives.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
On May 9, 2020 at 12:44PM (PST) Elon Musk shocked the world by tweeting that
Tesla was suddenly moving its headquarters from California to Texas (Heller, 2021). On
Twitter, the social media platform that restricts communications to less than 280
characters, the world’s most valuable auto manufacturer (Stevens, 2020) and the fastest
growing company on the planet (DeVore, 2020) announced their transition from California
to Texas. This simple text-initiated events capable of fundamentally changing the
landscape within the two largest economies in the U.S. and 5th and 9th largest economies
in the world, respectively (Perry, 2020).
Today’s

technological

based

dynamic

global

market

already

creates

unprecedented flexibility for businesses and supply chains to relocate, and adding
government incentives could dramatically increase corporate migration even more.
Yesterday’s “company town” of the industrial or Fordist days can be more quickly
abandoned by today’s multinational corporations chasing balance sheet enhancements
through direct government subsidies, i.e., corporate welfare. The process, frequently
repeated, begins with the company announcing a desire to expand by either growing in
place or relocating to a new site. This then kicks off a highly competitive site selection
competition among different states bidding for the new business. Competition drives up
the cost of government incentive packages created by policymakers and allows
businesses to cherry pick states with the most lucrative economic development incentives
to relocate or expand their operations. Although this “smokestack chasing” model is
nothing new, the increasingly interconnected global economy combined with
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technological advancements create an environment where the practice will likely become
more frequent and persistent. Policymakers, today more than ever, need to be prepared
to make good policy decisions when using economic development tools and incentives
to support and grow their local economies.
The post pandemic world has further altered the traditional concept of the physical
location of a business.1 The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic began with a near shutdown of
the global economy as workers were categorized as essential or nonessential,
businesses were closed, corporate headquarters and government institutions were
shuttered, and droves of workers were commissioned to “work from home” or forced out
of the workforce.2 This created unprecedented rates of unemployment around the world
(Pantelimon et al., 2021). New technologies also challenged and disrupted the traditional
norms of close physical proximity and redefined business relationships to virtual
relationships decoupling workers and businesses from physical spaces (Khalifa et al.,
2021). Businesses operating in this new “zoomnomics” marketplace have an inherent
wanton disregard toward physical location resulting in decoupling the business from
traditional notions of physical work place and their connectedness to a particular
community.3 Company-based government incentives to induce relocation could unleash
a new kind of smokestack chasing, of “smokestack hyper-chasing,” where unsuspecting

As almost everything in the world, this project was impacted by the worldwide pandemic. The pandemic
not only interrupted the completion of this project, but more importantly the new realities of the post
pandemic world could accelerate the decision dynamics of companies as even more traditional strings
attaching companies to specific areas have been severed.
2 In the U.S., essential workers continued working if they could whereas new government programs
provided support for those leaving the workforce- essential workers unable to work because of fear or
vulnerability and nonessential workers.
3 The pandemic mandated work-from-home transitioned workforces entered virtual conference rooms
where remote workers could avoid commutes and allow them to work from any location, or beach, in the
world.
1

2

policymakers looking for long-term economic impacts could only attract temporary,
incentive connected partners. Communities built around existing businesses once viewed
as stable stakeholders are now as vulnerable as communities competing for them to
relocate and expecting a more permanent return on their investments in a less permanent
world.
This project utilizes a case study of Nevada’s 2014 efforts to attract Tesla to its
northern desert through the use of primarily company-based economic development
tools. It will identify the role institutions play in economic development policy preferences
and examine what types of incentives should be preferred by policymakers. For some
comparative insight, the project looks at Virginia’s use of people-based economic
development tools in 2017 to attract Amazon’s HQ2 headquarters to its northeast suburbs
in the Washington metropolitan region and explores how New York used company-based
incentives to attract Amazon to its less creative class rich state. The incentive package
Nevada offered Tesla was the largest in the small state’s history and incredibly one of the
15 largest in American history (Lecher, 2016), whereas Amazon was seen as the “biggest
economic development prize in a generation” (McCartney, 2018). Representing two of
the largest economic development projects in the Nation’s history, Amazon and Tesla
generated international attention as states across the county competed to attract the
company to locate their newest economic development opportunity into their respective
state. While both projects represented thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in
projected direct and indirect economic impact for the surrounding areas, Nevada and
Virginia used very different approaches and incentive packages to attract their respective
prize.

3

The political strategy of government involvement in economic development is here
to stay. Post-World War II industrialization efforts have swept the globe, and the
postbellum popularity of economic development has persisted since the 1970s, often
taking center stage on policy and political agendas of state and local governments
(Clarke, 1986; Herzik, 1983; Vaughn et al., 1984). Frequently, cities or states defined by
specific boundaries have historically preferred company-based investment within their
incorporated territorial boundaries, due to its more tangible and causal direct connection
to the economic development project over more elusive people-based investments
subject to the migratory whims of its residents. This reality is particularly appealing to
credit seeking elected officials who strongly favor company-based incentives, due to the
direct causal connection between the immediate government give and the announcement
of the economic development opportunity with its promised jobs.
Government policies toward company-based economic development tools have
evolved over time from tax abatements, investment credits, low-interest loans, land writedowns, and labor-training grants (Cobb, 1982; Turner, 2003, p. 272), to the more
entrepreneurial approach used in the 1980s of investing in capital funds, research and
development funds, business incubator and business startup programs, export
promotion, and technology transfers (Eisinger, 1988; Turner, 2003, p 272). Despite these
changing approaches, various forms of company-based investment strategies have
persisted as a central component of state and local economic development policy (Grant
et al., 1995; Leicht & Jenkins, 1994). Nationally, these company-based approaches have
been strongly favored since they were successfully used regionally in large public works
projects across the country as government responded to the Great Depression (Selznick,
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1949; Spencer, 2002, p. 13). Locally elected officials making decisions on economic
development will likely favor the perceived security of company-based investments,
especially during times when policy-makers feel pressure to quickly create jobs (Eisinger,
1995), as was clearly the case for Nevada following the Great Recession of 2008.
States should consider the highest return on investment for the state as a whole
when employing company-based economic investment. In the case of Tesla, when
considering the return on investment, many argue that locating Tesla in Northern Nevada
ignored a more scalable and natural alignment with the workforce and resources in
Southern Nevada.4 The initial project’s scalability, as well as the scalability of future
expansion and growth, must be considered by the state when making a billion-dollar
investment. Southern Nevada provides a more stable and scalable opportunity for large
economic development opportunities from housing, labor, support services, social
services, entertainment, higher education, transportation networks, etc. The rush to
create new policies based on the urgent demands of Tesla is contrary to the U.S. system
and its states which were governmental systems explicitly designed “to be inefficient in
translating demands into policies” (Baumgartner et al., 2009, p. 604).
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this project is to provide understanding about using government
incentives to attract economic development. Economic diversification, creating better
jobs, decreasing unemployment, improving economic conditions, etc., are constant and
persistent objectives for political and policymaking actors across the world. Increasingly,
governments are engaging in competitive bidding wars to use government economic
As the author, who was engaged in recruiting Tesla to Nevada, it is very important that this project be
strictly factual and data driven.
4

5

incentives to attract new businesses to their area (Bartik, 2018). This study seeks to
highlight how government investments in their people today creates a climate to attract
future businesses and reduces the dollars of direct incentives they will have to provide in
future competitive bidding wars.
The case study of Nevada’s recent experience with economic development helps
explain governments policy preferences for a company-based incentive structure.
Virginia’s experience with Amazon provides a comparative analysis of how historic
investments in people can offset the dollars needed for direct incentives to a business to
attract them; thereby, offering a contrasting model for guiding researchers and informing
policymakers of alternative incentive structures and outcomes. The historical examples
of the pros and cons of people-based vs company-based investments are clearly seen
throughout the auto industry. However, policymakers continue to repeat mistakes from
the past. The failures of Brazil in the 1950s did not prevent Tennessee from repeating
similar mistakes three decades later, and incredibly, the lessons learned by officials in
Tennessee did not prevent them from repeating the same mistakes again a decade later
and then again for a third time in 2020.
Unfortunately, history continues to repeat itself as lessons from the past are not
transferred to new elected officials destined to repeat the same mistakes. The time
separating the success of securing a promising economic development opportunity and
the consequences of the decision creates one of the biggest issues. In other words, the
individuals holding the ceremonial shovels and oversized scissors are often long gone by
the time the idle factories, mothballs, and pink slips arrive. When a quick win is the central
focus, history becomes irrelevant, because those seeking immediate electoral gain will
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be long gone by the time the consequences arrive. These dynamics push a policy
preference toward company-based direct economic incentives, despite their abysmal
track record of creating true economic gain for rate payers (Bartik, 2018).
Often, a combination of people- and company-based government incentives are
necessary to win a bidding war between competing states. The question becomes the
proportion of people to place base incentives. It follows that people-based investments
are made in the decades and years prior to the arrival of the new business opportunity,
and states with a history of making long term investments in their people attract future
economic opportunities as companies relocate or expand based on the value the
company places on these investments. However, even robust long-term investments in
people can result in deficiencies in specific unpredictable areas which may require states
to overcome with immediate company-based investment or tax incentives to overcome
the deficiency in order to attract the new economic opportunity. For example, investments
in the latest technology infrastructure may be needed to attract a business. This study
analyzes how Nevada paid a hefty price to overcome its historic lack of people-based
investments to attract Tesla, highlighting a central contention of this project being that a
balanced approach to long-term people-based investments and real time company-based
investment could lead to better policy outcomes.
Government Incentive Structures- The Devil is in the Definition
One central problem for this project is that researchers have left the distinction
between people- and company-based, also referred to as ‘place-based’ in early literature,
incentives allusive and undefined (Spencer, 2002, p. 5). The absence of clear definitions
for the two distinct incentive structures can create confusion within the policy arena and
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frustrate a targeted approach to creating and tracking precise and reliable incentive
packages created to entice economic development opportunities. For purposes of this
project, people-based economic incentive policies target people or households (Spencer,
2002, p. 31); whereas, company-based economic incentive policies- often in the form of
direct financial incentives (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2021, p. 1) - target specific needs of a
business.5 In early economic development literature, company-based economic
incentives are often referred to loosely as “place-based’ incentives making it difficult to
distinguish whether investments made in a place are for residents or for the company.
Recent research has focused on the location as a tool for economic development,
emphasizing the importance of the characteristics of a city, region or community in
attracting economic development (Florida, 2019a; Glaeser, 2012; Kelly, 1998). Although
there is much disagreement about what ultimately attracts talented labor, recent literature
encourages governments to invest in the “place,” or the environment where people live
and companies locate. For the most part, government policies designed to stimulate
economic diversification by attracting new enterprise generally fall into people- or
company-based policy preferences, or a combination of the two.6
Company-based Incentives
The case study of Nevada highlights several examples of company-based
incentive approaches to economic development. To attract economic development
opportunities and the jobs they proport to create, policymakers often have to make

People-based incentives are a supply-side approach of labor markets where enhancements in the living
environment attract busines, and company-based incentives are largely a supply-side approach of
geographically-targeted or direct enterprise-targeted investments to attract economic development.
6 Think of these as investing in the immediate needs of the business to facilitate its relocation or expansion
(place) vs long and near term investing in citizens to build a better business climate to attract businesses
(people).
5
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specific company-based investments. These can be direct subsidies to businesses
including such things as state and local tax breaks, holidays, or deferment; free land,
equipment or buildings; new infrastructure in the form of utilities, roads, bridges, etc.; and
any other government created incentive directly to the company. Ultimately, the longterm success company-based investments play in recruiting and attracting new business
to a region depends on several factors, and ultimate results have not always ended in
long-term success for the community when compared to the promises the incentives were
based on.
People-based Incentives
People before companies, or more specifically people-based investment vs
company-based investment, will be at the center of this project. For many scholars,
governments should first invest in the people then invest in the place in the final push to
attract business. People-based investment focuses on basic welfare services such as
education, affordable housing, health, safety from crime, clean water, diversity, and
sanitation. People-based policies “ensure that peoples’ life changes do not depend on
their place of birth and that they are equipped to take advantage of economic
opportunities wherever they arise” (Turok, 2012, p. 5).
Virginia’s historic use of people-based incentives provides a contrasting view of
the Nevada case study. Decades of robust local and state people-based investments
central to Virginia’s approach to economic development provides a great comparison to
Nevada’s nascent state engagement in the economic development arena in an effort to
diversify its mining, hospitality and tourism reliant economy. In Nevada, the economic
crisis induced the rapid creation of an entirely new set of policymaking and policy
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implementing institutions, offering researchers unique insight into outcomes resulting
when crisis provides decision makers a break from the past which allows them to
implement more robust policy and programs to alleviate the crisis. In Virginia we see
institutions display a more deliberate and robust long-term approach to economic
development emphasizing a commitment to government support for people-based
economic incentives.
The project will identify the interplay between how a deficiency of historic peoplebased investments impact the need for a state to compensate for the deficiency by using
company-based incentives to attract a business. The project will discuss how a more
deliberative and consistent practice of people-based investments can ultimately reduce
the number of company-based investments needed to win the high-pressure bidding war
as competing states rush to win the contest to attract the latest economic development
opportunity. Both people-and company-based incentives and investments are important
tools economic development professionals need in their toolbox to successfully compete
in the highly competitive arena of economic development; however, Virginia
demonstrates that states with institutions aligned around a long-term strategy of investing
in its residents are creating better lives for their residents while also creating an attractive
creative class environment for new enterprise.
People before Companies
While most law school professors are professionally dressed in their faculty
portraits, this researcher’s contracts professor at the University of Iowa College of Law
wore a bright red shirt that proudly touted in large white lettering: “People Before Profit.”
As an unapologetic Marxist, this professor lived his beliefs by riding a bike to school every
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day, wearing the same tattered and patched up sweatshirt, and donating most of his
salary to various student groups and causes in the law school. While uncertain whether
his shirt was an acknowledgement of the electoral alliance in Ireland bearing the same
name, or a manifest expression of his personal views, its simplicity and impact remains
with me to this day. For purposes of this project, his definitive statement will be revised to
“People Before Companies” in this effort to analyze and compare the utilization of peopleand company-based economic development investments in Nevada and Virginia.
Research Questions
Using existing research on drivers of economic development and public
institutional formation, this project seeks to determine if the predicted outcomes of these
important research contributions to understanding economic development align with the
applied realities experienced in the case study of Nevada using a comparative analysis
from Virginia. If not, the project seeks to identify new insights to inform future policymakers
engaged in using public resources to successfully attract new economic development
opportunities while building and investing in their communities.
Focusing on Nevada in particular and through comparison with Virginia, this study
asks the following questions:
RQ1: What role does the historical evolution of Nevada’s public institutions
have in the policy preferences for people- or company-based investments?
RQ2: Do companies prefer company-based more than people-based
economic incentives, and which did Tesla prefer?
RQ3 Why does Nevada pursue company-based incentives despite the
empirical research suggesting their ineffectiveness?
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RQ4: Do these observations recommend a particular investment strategy
for policymakers seeking to attract new enterprise?
Significance of the Study
This project seeks to inform policymakers engaged in economic development on
best practices when using the public’s money to attract new businesses. At the most basic
level, policymakers view company-based investments as a cycle of using revenues
collected from existing businesses to attract new enterprise, thereby growing the existing
tax base and decreasing the tax burden on everyone. Both people- and company-based
investments can be politically expedient and achieve shared priorities cutting across most
ideological divides. Scarcity of resources require governments to prioritize which social
programs and proposals to implement, and the political leanings and party affiliation of
those in power influence which social programs and proposals are favored. In many
states, as the electorate evolves, the party in power changes and funding is redirected to
new priorities and proposals. Highly partisan states, where the levers of government are
bright red or bright blue, are not as susceptible to this cycle of changing priorities and are
able to develop more robust and durable social programs.
Virginia and Nevada are two states where historically balanced power shifts have
resulted in more volatile state investment in social programs. However, regardless of
political affiliation, job creation- with some nuisance- is a populist position resonating with
voters across the spectrum. While there may be extreme positions within each party, as
highlighted by New York Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s opposition to
Amazon locating the second part of H2Q in her Queens district, economic diversification
is something that often unites and brings both parties together as evidence by bipartisan
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efforts in Virginia and Nevada.7 Despite this reality, many liberal social programs favored
by democrats are not seen by republicans as current investment in future economic
development opportunities.
Nevada- a Laboratory of Study
Following the Great Recession of 2009, the economic conditions in Nevada forced
government to study and act, creating a scenario where new policies could be tried and
tested and outcomes measured- a laboratory of study if you will. Nevada was one of the
states most adversely impacted by the Great Recession, due in part to its rapid population
growth, state budget’s overreliance on Southern Nevada’s historic and robust hospitality,
tourism and gaming sector, and national leading high unemployment rate. These factors
decimated Nevada’s economy, compelling the state to rapidly and aggressively seek
ways to diversify its economy. Nevada, reacting to a sharp spasm of economic change,
where political processes generally characterized by stability and incrementalism produce
large-scale departures from the past (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) as the state rapidly
adopted new policies to deal with an immediate crisis, and then quickly pivoted as
economic development opportunities presented themselves.
The new and heightened concern for diversification and immediate economic
challenges influenced policymakers as their efforts to craft an incentive package to bring
Tesla to Nevada collided with historical and deep-rooted geographical tensions and
policymaking institutions which had been shaped gradually over time as seen through

The Nevada legislature unanimously passed the incentive packages with the 11 Democratic Senators and
10 Republican Senators in the senate joining the 27 Democratic and 15 Republican members of the
Assembly to vote in favor of the bill. (S.B. 1, 2014 Nevada Legislature). In Virginia, after only 9 min of
debate the Virginia House, by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 83 to 16 in favor of the bill which has
passed the senate by a vote of 35 to 5 (McCartney, 2019).
7
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historical institutionalism (Thelen, 1999). As one of the least economically diverse states
in the Nation, Nevada provides a blank canvas to analyze economic diversification where
unique policy voids provide opportunity for input and measurement. A September 2010
study conducted by Moody’s Analytics for the Nevada Vision Stakeholder Group “found
that Nevada’s economy is significantly less diverse than the national average and less
diverse than all other states except Alaska and the District of Columbia” (Muro, et al.,
2011, p. 19). Recognizing Nevada’s overreliance on its consumption-oriented sectors,
policymakers sought to rein in the historic volatile economy created by this overreliance
through economic diversification (Muro, et al., 2011, p. 19).
Historically, Nevada was created by two main forces- Californians seeking to
protect their mining interests in the mineral rich territorial land and President Lincoln
looking to secure additional slave free territory to further shift the electoral balance of
power away from the south. From this early foundation, Nevada evolved as a state with
mining as the principal industry in the north and gaming as the principal enterprise in the
south, both reliant on the geographic boundaries of the state where mines were located
and gaming permitted, despite being largely illegal in the rest of the Nation. Experience
with these distinct geographically located industries impacted the evolution of government
institutions within Nevada and provided the framework for future conversations on
economic development.
Although this study looks at the states of Nevada and Virginia, the metropolitan
regions of Washington, D.C., Las Vegas, and Reno are the primary areas of comparison.
Much of the existing research on company-based economic investments focuses on the
state or federal level. State and national governments “play a central role in company-
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based development efforts helping to administer major federal economic and community
development programs, designing their own initiatives, and writing laws that dictate how
local government programs may operate” (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2021, p. 1). However,
recent scholarship is recognizing the power of metropolitan regions that cut across state
boundaries often incorporating multiple states (Katz & Bradley, 2013; Katz & Nowak,
2017) and recognizing the politically unique interactions occurring between states and
cities within metropolitan regions (Atherton & Lehman, 2011; Burns & Gamm, 1997; Burns
et al., 2009; Saladino, 2020).
Using Reno, Las Vegas and Washington, D.C., as units of analysis, this study
follows the definition of metropolitan regions as set out by Jennifer Brady, as “areas
explicitly recognizes the connections between cities and their surroundings- it’s built into
the definition. A metro consists of one or more principal cities, the surrounding county,
and other counties linked by substantial commuting flows” (2009). As one of the fastest
growing states in the Union, Nevada, aided by explosive growth in Las Vegas, not only
offers a unique perspective, but can serve as a blank canvas where good policy
implemented today can have significant long-term ramifications on the state’s future. Las
Vegas is located within the Southwest metropolitan cluster which is predicted to represent
the nation’s largest amount of growth among all metropolitan clusters, expecting to swell
to “nearly 13 million new residents expected between 2010 and 2040” (Nelson & Lang,
2011, p. 143). As a laboratory, policymakers have the opportunity to strike the appropriate
balance of company- and people-based investments to attract economic development by
investing in their citizens and building a stronger community.
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Combining Nevada’s need to dramatically realign its tax base through economic
diversification and its predicted explosion in future growth offers opportunity that can be
channeled, redirected, and reshaped through purposeful public policy. Nevada provides
a unique example of a state that needs to change, and has incredible tools at the disposal
of policymakers to effect change.
Theoretical Framework
Rent Seeking
Derived from the field of economics, rent-seeking “includes all of the various ways
by which individuals or groups lobby government for taxing, spending and regulatory
policies that confer financial benefits or other special advantages upon them at the
expense of the taxpayers or of consumers or of other groups or individuals with which the
beneficiaries may be in economic competition” (Dustin, 1999, p. 151). While the private
sector seeks these rents, governments willingly signal and engage in the rent seeking
behavior through their approach to economic development.
The case study of Nevada provides examples of rent-seeking behavior and
illustrates a unique example of a state and its institutions that were designed by rentseekers for rent-seeking. Nevada’s very formation by individuals and groups for the
purpose of protect their mining interests can be seen as the beginning of the state’s long
rent-seeking relationships with individuals and groups seeking special government
advantages to promote their interests. Drawing from this rich historical connection and
familiarity with rent-seeking, the state’s institutions evolved to accommodate and promote
Nevada’s economic development approach of favoring company-based investments to
further the history of encouraging rent-seeking by corporate entities.

16

Historical Institutionalism
Winston Churchill said, “the farther backward you can look; the farther forward you
are likely to see.” History matters, and understanding the context of the past helps
understand where we are, and more importantly where we are headed. Too often policy
decisions are understood through the realities of today's world; thereby, ignoring the
purpose behind legislative intent and its impact on the future. At its core, historical
institutionalism is an approach of study that attempts to illuminate how political and policy
struggles are mediated by the institutional settings in which the endogenous decisions
take place (Thelen, 1999).
As an approach to studying policy preferences in Nevada, historical institutionalism
is a relatively recent social science approach emphasizing how timing, sequences, and
path dependence affect the creation and evolution of institutions as well as steer political
and social change within an institution (Voeten. E, 2019, p. 149). Historical institutionalism
can be used as a model to better understand the impact of the institutional setting that
structures make on forming public policy (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 2). For this project, the
historical context of how institutions in Nevada and Virginia evolved play a determining
factor in the bottom-up, moving from bureaucrats up to elected officials, to gradual policy
tendencies created within the path-dependent institutions.
As discussed more below, Nevada was created - for the most part- by profit
seeking enterprise who looked to create a government to accommodate, protect and
promote their business interests. This reality shaped the state’s constitution, every entity
created by the constitution and all subsequent government entities created by the
constitutionally created entities. This path was reinforced by the 28th (2014) Special
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Session. This special session became a contemporary model for subsequent special
sessions centered on economic development opportunities. Compared to Virginia,
Nevada and its recent population booms and financial busts have focused the state on
new questions regarding economic diversification and development to transition the state
away from its hyper reliance on gaming and mining. Despite the economic diversification
Tesla brought to Nevada, the state did not transition away from its rent-seeking history
when creating the incentive package to lure Tesla.
Virginia has a rich history of making people-based investments in a wide variety of
areas. These investments successfully position Virginia to attract enterprise including
Amazon H2Q by aligning with corporate cultures creating workforce readiness and high
livability standards for employees of the new enterprise. Early investments in people
decrease the need for Virginia to offer large incentive packages to overcome decades of
inadequate investments in people. However, New York’s proposal to Amazon
demonstrates the deferred costs of failing to invest in people.
Clearly, a state's approach to economic development and the specific economic
development abatements offered have evolved differently within each state depending on
the institutional structures of each state. The comparative analysis provided in this project
could produce significant outcomes when studying the historical formation of institutions
and Nevada’s experience with rapid institutional realignment occurring in response to the
economic crisis in Nevada- where new policies and institutions were rapidly created, as
compared to Virginia’s more incremental approach.
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Path Dependency
Path dependency is a central element embedded within the historical
institutionalism model. That is to say, common history tends to shape institutions and
future policy decisions in a similar way with predictable outcomes where the history sets
in motion a particular direction that is difficult to deviate from. History is made up of
unchanging past events which are fixed in time and impact different institutions in the
same way resulting in the shared history tending to shape similar policy outcomes across
differently situated institutions.
Creative Class Theory
Since Adam Smith, economists and social scientists have framed economic
development around the three key factors of production- land, labor, and capital. The
presence of these three factors served as the foundation for the industrial or Fordist
models of economic organization that guided early scholars in economic development
thought (Florida, 1991; Florida, 2014, p. 196; Florida, 1995). Florida sought to tackle this
grand topic of the shift from the older industrial models of economic thought by framing
around the concept of the geography of innovation which transitions from being
“exclusively fixated on firms and industries to one that also paid due attention to people
and places.”8
Influenced by Robert Lucas (1994), Florida saw place as significant to innovation
in that place represents “clusters of talented and creative people that concentrate in cities
which ultimately power economic growth” (Florida, 2014, p. 197). Florida’s early research

When considering “place,” Florida is considering the geographical location as a specific place constructed
by people, not to be confused with the use of “place- based” incentives used in earlier research- for Florida
‘place’ is people.
8
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into the individual contributions of intelligence looked at how the Japanese production
system tapped into the mental labor of factory workers as evidence of an advancement
beyond the traditional Fordism of industry (Florida & Kenney, 1990, 1991). In developing
the creative class theory, Florida focused on three specific factors that drove economic
development which he labeled the 3Ts including technology, talent (workforce), and
tolerance (community’s openness and acceptance of diversity). He later added territorial
assets to the list of factors. For the creative class theory, these 3Ts are critical to regional
economic growth and are central to private sector decisions of economic development
where firms are looking to relocate or expand focus on the presence of the factors.
Summary of Subsequent Chapters
The current chapter provides the purpose of this research project presented in the
research questions and outlines the goals and aspirations of the project. Chapter two
reviews existing literature explaining policymaker’s approach to using company- and
people-based economic development incentive tools. Chapter three provides the
theoretical framework of this project by outlining an overview of the historical
institutionalism approach to understanding why rent seeking behaviors persist in Nevada
and how the creative class theory supports people-based incentives. Chapter four
describes how the mixed methods design of this project utilizes quantitative methods to
support the qualitative case study and semi-structured interviews conducted for this
project. Chapter five is a case study of Nevada analyzing how the state’s history shapes
the decisions being made today and how the creative class theory provides new insight
for policymakers operating within institutions on a path-dependent trajectory influenced
by the past. Chapter six provides a comparative analysis using Virginia’s contemporary
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approach to economic development and a detailed content analysis comparing how
Nevada and Virginia approached their respective economic development opportunities.
Chapter seven contains the analysis of the findings from the quantitative semi-structured
interviews. Finally, the project concludes with a summary of the study and
recommendations for policymakers operating within the economic development space.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter explores the existing literature explaining policymakers’ decisions to
use people- or company-based incentive tools when attracting economic development
projects to their state or region. This chapter reviews the literature that guided this project,
specifically, the literature: (1) related to historical institutionalism, with a focus on the gap
in literature regarding institutions themselves structuring behavior; (2) related to how the
rational choice modeling of credit seeking favors company-based incentive package; (3)
related to the creative class, with a focus on the importance of the creative class in
attracting economic development; and, (4) related to rent seeking behavior, with a focus
on the changes in corporate attitudes and priorities in a post COVID landscape and how
it could drive policy.
Not surprising, policy decisions to use people- or company-based incentives are
often highly political. The scarcity of jobs- or desire to attract better jobs- produced as a
result of the volatile national and global economy, frequently puts politicians and
policymakers at the forefront of advancing pro-job creation policies. The chapter explores
relevant scholarship looking at the shift from older industrial or Fordist models of
economic development, primarily focused on company-based incentives, to newer
models of economic systems which account for the value of people-based economic
incentives. The most apparent gap in the literature is the evolving nature and lack of
specific definitions of company (place)- based incentives, while there is an abundance of
research on the problems with company-based incentives the literature does not properly

22

distinguish between different levels of company-based incentives being used by
policymakers in today’s hyper competitive economic development environment.
The review of the literature also highlights a gab connecting the effect of the
historical evolution of existing political institutions on the decision-making process of
policymakers facing intense pressure to not lose the latest economic development
opportunity to other states competing for the business. In particular this project seeks to
highlight how government’s consistent people-based investments, influenced by the
institutions they operate in and around, will lead to future economic development
opportunities and decrease the price states will have to pay in company-based incentives
in order to overcome the state’s past neglect of investing in its people.
Historical Institutionalism
Institutions, and theorizing about the importance of institutions have been present
since scholars first started thinking and studying social relations and politics. Plato,
Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes, Madison, and many others understood the importance of
institutions for structuring behavior (Steinmo, 2008, p. 151). In Politics (1905) Aristotle’s
inquiry regarding how institutions impact normative values is merely a continuation of
Plato’s earlier study in The Republic where Socrates’ famous student compared the
different forms of government to better understand how institutions shape political
behavior (1943). Similarly, the 16th and 17th Century philosophers Locke, Hobbes, and
Martin Luther were interested in the influence of institutions on pollical and social life.
Their thoughts were later studied and pondered by the American founders who had
similar questions regarding the influence of institutions on political actors as they wrote
the US Constitution (Steinmo, 2008, p. 151).
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These classical questions and lines of inquiry regarding the importance of
institutions had significant impact on the modern academic discipline of social science as
it emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Steinmo, 2008, p. 152). The
analysis of institutions and their impact became less frequent in the analysis as social
science evolved and quantitative analysis became more popular as constituent variables
were measured, examined, and analyzed independently (Steinmo, 2008, p. 153).
In its attempt to be more scientific (particularly in America, with the
lure of funding from institutions such as the National Science Foundation),
the cutting edge of social science moved away from historical analysis and
‘thick description’. First, there was significant pressure to be more rigorous
and quantitative. In the eyes of many, too much of the previous work had
simply been historical and descriptive. History could be interesting, but if it
did not lend itself to easily testable and falsifiable propositions, it was not
science. Social science, the ‘behaviouralist’ thought, needed to move away
from the particulars and treat cases as sets of values on variables. It was
also important that social science restrict itself to factors that could be
measured, counted and then compared and analyzed. This meant that we
should study behaviours that are measurable and not institutions – which,
almost by definition, are unique. Certainly, the behaviouralist agreed, social
science was an infant science. The models were crude, the methods rough
and the data pathetically incomplete; but all this was once true of physics
and chemistry as well (Steinmo, 2008, p. 154).
History matters, and more particular, the specific and unique historical context
surrounding the creation and the evolution of government institutions really matters. It is
important for policymakers to understand how the history of the institutions they operate
within can influence the decisions they are making in the organizations they operate in.
At its core, historical institutionalism attempts to illuminate how political and policy
struggles are mediated by the institutional settings in which they take place (Thelen,
1999). Historical institutionalism can be used as an approach to better understand the
impact of the institutional setting that structures make on forming public policy (Steinmo
et al., 1992, p. 2). This project leans into historical institutionalism to explain the
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endogenous, gradual, and transformative institutional change occurring within Nevada as
policymakers formed policy to attract Tesla to Northern Nevada.
For institutionalist scholars, institutions are most often defined as rules; which, has
been expanded to include formal rules and organizations (Streeck & Thelen, 2009) as
well as informal rule and norms (Marcussen, 2000; Hall, 1989). This project will discuss
institutions as formal political organizations such as the Nevada State Legislature; the
Nevada Governor’s Office; the Governor’s Office of Economic Development (North,
1990); formal rules such as the Nevada Revised Statute and the Nevada State
Constitutions; and informal rules and norms when discussing how geographical
intricacies and tendencies shape and limit policymaking decisions (Berman, 2012).
Policymakers need to recognize how the historical formation of the institutional
organizations they operate within are influencing and invisibly guiding their policy
formation. Policy preferences are shaped by both the institutional organizations
themselves as well as the formal institutions that created the organizational institutions.
The project postulates that by informing policymakers about the “impediments to the
success of governments” they are bound up in the history of their institutions and
impacting policy choices (Peters et al., 2005, p. 1276).
“Central Task” of Historical Institutionalism- a New Focus
While historical institutionalism provides a useful approach to the study of public
policymaking within a gradual and stable institution (Steinmo et al., 1992), the approach
is often criticized for its inability to explain political and policy change (Peters et al., 2005,
p. 1278). The literature supports, and there is little disagreement among scholars today,
the underlying emphasis historical institutionalism places on the importance of institutions
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(Peters et al., 2005, p. 1297). Existing research in historical institutionalism looking at
“gradual institutional change (has) focused more on how social and political interactions
transform institutions than on how institutions themselves structure those interactions”
(Capoccia, 2016, p. 1096). Thelen (1999), Steinmo (2008), and others contributed to the
resurgence in returning to the importance of institutions themselves as an approach to
understanding empirical questions regarding endogenous change within institutions and
provided theoretical vocabulary and structure for analysis.
The early work focused on questions of how political and social behavior was
structured by institutions and policy. Later work has shifted to a focus on an analysis of
institutional change (Capoccia, 2016, p. 1096). While this shift is valuable for this project,
it still does not focus on how institutions themselves structure those interactions,
especially the interactions happening within formal government organizations (Capoccia,
2016, p. 1096). Accordingly, scholars are confronting “a central task” to understand the
conditions under which institutions and policies structure social behavior (Capoccia, 2016,
p. 1096) or become themselves the “object of strategic action” (Hall, 2010, p. 204). This
creates a noticeable gap in the literature this project seeks to fill, and the case study of
Nevada’s creation of incentives to attract Tesla illustrates how the institutions within the
state structured those interactions. The nature of Nevada’s predominately companybased economic incentives reflects how the institutions in the state structure policy based
on the institution’s historical evolution. Additionally, the location of Tesla to Northern
Nevada provides insight into how the state’s institutions- both formal legal institutions and
institutions as organizations- are structuring policies. The case study of Nevada used in
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this project provides some insight into the struggle historical institutionalism faces when
explaining exogenous drivers of policy change within stable institutions.
Events happening within a historical context have direct consequences on the
institutions (Steinmo, 2008, p. 165). Economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron argued
that when a country industrializes affects how it industrializes, and the more “economic
backward” an economy is at the beginning of economic development the more likely
certain conditions will occur (1962). In the chapter that follows, this provides a valuable
line of analysis for the case study of Nevada and how its policy preferences in economic
development are impacted by when the state forms a more robust economic development
structure and how it begins experimenting with economic development incentive tools to
attract business. Most importantly, the insight provided by historical institutionalism can
be easily missed in large scale quantitative, cross national comparisons that pool data
across time and treat the context of time as inconsequential (Steinmo, 2008, p. 164).
Despite the broad applicability of this approach of study, historical institutionalism
has not been applied within the context of economic development research and policy
formation. While the theory provides some explanatory value for why past decisions were
made and why certain policy preferences were followed by economic development
policymakers, historical institutionalism can also provide great insight to current
policymakers by identifying institutional currents influencing- or likely to influence policy
creation and stakeholders’ behavior. Informed policymakers, forewarned of implications
of historical institutionalism, can navigate toward better policy outcomes by recognizing
the historical baggage weighing down policy choices and influencing outcomes.
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Path Dependency of Historical Institutionalism
In theoretical terms, path dependency is a central analytic notion in the approach
of historical institutionalism (Peters et al., 2005, p. 1275) where many government actions
occur between the guardrails of a predetermined path of self-reinforcing processes
(Pierson, 2000, p. 251). While knowledge alone may not break the path dependency
historical institutionalism presents, informed policymakers can better strategize and chart
new policy courses when they have a better understand its presence to help them predict
pitfalls and successfully navigating around the influences of history and “solving problems
within that reality” (Peters et al., 2005, p. 1276). This project frames the policy decisions
of Nevada and Virginia within the explanatory power of historical institutionalism while at
the same time seeking to challenge the historical institutionalism ‘can’t teach an old dog
new tricks’ aphorism.
Institutions and policies tend to have policy trajectories that are highly pathdependent. There is a significant body of literature on policy studies that emphasizes the
persistence of policy and its “path dependency” (Peters, et al., 2005, p. 1275). Within
historical institutionalism there is an overarching assumption that policymaking systems
are conservative defenders of the status quo that protect existing “patterns of policy”
(Peters et al., 2005, p. 1276). For Pierson institutions are made up of self-reinforcing
processes, and once a pattern has been established, institutional and policy change can
be difficult within a system built to protect policy from endogenous and exogenous
changing (2000).
For historical institutionalism, although policymaking is often a stable and pathdependent process, there are “formative processes” which can interrupt the path
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(Steinmo, et al., 1992). As actors within the policymaking process, elected officials are
often bound within this path-dependent framework and find it difficult to break out of the
path-dependency created by the power relations of the institutions the elected official is
operating within (Hrelja, et al., 2013). Even elected officials predisposed to challenging
path-dependent systems can find it difficult when operating in an institution with an acute
history of smokestack chasing and awarding company-based incentives.
Rational Choice and Credit Seeking
Drawing from adversary democracy theory, the rational choice model helps explain
how self-interested policymakers, in particular governors, consistently award companybased incentives. The theory of adversary democracy is centered on self-interests where
“voters pursue their individual interests by making demands on the political system in
proportion to the intensity of their feelings” and “politicians, also pursuing their own
interests, adapt policies that buy them votes, thus ensuring accountability” (Mansbridge,
1990, p. 135).
Rational choice assumes that individual behavior is motivated by self-interest,
utility maximization, and goal fulfillment (Petracca, 1991, p. 289). From David Mayhew,
we get the notion that members of congress are “single-minded seekers of re-election”
(1974). This narrow view provides predictive and explanatory power into policy
preferences for members of the U.S. Congress. It also provides some insight into
decisions made by elected officials in other offices at other levels of government when it
was expanded to observations “noting local officials’’ preferences for projects that
facilitate credit seeking in the short term (Gerber & Gibson, 2009, p. 636). For Mayhew,
“credit claiming” is defined as “"acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political
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actor (or actors) that one is personally responsible for causing the government, or some
unit thereunder, to do something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable” (1974, p
52-3). Credit seeking becomes central to the analysis of this project and provides
descriptive insight into the actions of policymakers who support projects that meet the
three factors of credit seeking- visibility, short term results, and targeted benefits (Feiock
& Clingermayer, 1986; Feiock & Kim, 2001; Feiock et al., 2003; Frant, 1993; Frant, 1996;
Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). The scientifically recommended course of action collides and
aligns with the self-interests of politicians when it comes to using tax payer money to ‘buy
jobs’ (Feiock et al., 2003, p. 620). The significant political rewards are recognized by
elected official who will ‘buy jobs’ at any cost (Reese & Fasenfest, 1996, p. 200).
For the private sector the allocation of resources is determined by the market,
whereas in the public sector politics and the “politicians’ desire for reelection” are the
“basic institution for allocating resources” (Frant, 1996). The tangible benefits produced
by a development policy is secondary to the politicians’ ability to claim credit (Feiock &
Clingermayer, 1986). It is this credit seeking addiction that become one of the primary
factors influencing a policymakers preference when choosing between company-based
or people-based investments. Company-based investments immediately connected to a
prized economic development opportunity are highly visible, yield short term results, and
are targeted benefits- meeting all the factors that produce short term. As discussed in
Chapter 6, in the first Tennessee interaction with GM, Governor Alexander had national
political ambitions, and rational choice would suggest his interests made the
determination to do whatever necessary to bring GM to his state. Rational choice
suggests policymakers will choose company-based incentives and its numerous political
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advantages over the incremental benefits, low visibility and disconnectedness of peoplebased incentives.
The Creativity Class Theory
Originally published in 2002, The Rise of the Creative Class became a national
bestselling book which popularized the theory of the creative class by generating
widespread conversation and significant debate regarding the theory’s use and relevance
to economic development (Florida, 2002). The popularization of the creative class theory
can provide better support and linkage for policymakers to make people-based
investments in the name of economic development. Richard Florida credits The Rise of
the Creative Class as a “direct outgrowth of my lifelong work on one of the major themes
in economic development research- the shift from older industrial or Fordist models of
economic organization to newer postindustrial, post-Fordist, and ‘flexible’ economic
systems” (2014, p. 196). While the global best-selling book may have introduced many to
the creative class theory for the first time in 2002, Florida had been engaged in
researching and building the theory through the 90s. The theory’s popularity in the larger
public arena and among practitioners in economic development is partially due to his
successful marketing (Lang & Danielsen, 2005, p. 204).
Focusing on the growing role of creativity in our society, and more specifically its
role in our economy, Florida seeks to explain the future of cities and how certain cities
have become a magnet to attracting, growing and strengthening the creative class.
Florida’s seminal book, The Rise of the Creative Class, seeks to explain the connection
between place and economy as a connection driven by the power of cities. The book
argues for the importance of place, or cities, by chronicling how peoples changing
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attitudes, relationships, choices, values, personal preferences, and tastes influence
where they live and their impact on economic systems. For purposes of this project, it is
critical to better understand the creative class: what it is, what makes it tick, what
influences it; the economic value of the creative class for a business; and, how building a
stronger environment through investing in people can attract the creative class and lead
to a stronger economy by attracting more enterprise seeking the creative class.
The creative class is large, growing and according to Florida “taking over the world”
(Lutz, 2012). Representing about 150 million people worldwide- 38.3 million Americans
and 30 percent of the American workforce (see Figure 2.1)- the creative class is made up
of workers whose primary job is to think and create new approaches to problems (Florida
& Pedigo, 2017) and nearly half of total wages and salaries.

Figure 2.1: Size of Creative Class Sector (Douglas, 2013)

Source: Douglas, R. (2013). Talent in the (new) service economy: Creative Class
occupations? Coevolving Innovations in Business Organizations and Information
Technologies. Retrieved from https://coevolving.com/blogs/index.php/archive/talent-inthe-new-service-economy-creative-class-occupations/
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Since the creative class is big, growing, and influential it is important to explore how
policymakers can expand the creative class as a tool to attract future economic
development opportunities.
Challenges to the Creative Class Theory
Despite the explanatory power of the theory, some scholars do not agree with
Florida’s science and attack the theory on multiple fronts. Criticism begins at the theory’s
core definition where several scholars have issues with Florida’s underlying definition of
the creative class (Howkins, 2001, p. 68) and the value of its vague and imprecise
meaning. The definition’s lack of specificity drives much of the criticism as scholars find
the broad definition practically meaningless, because “the vast majority of occupational
groups in contemporary industrial society involve a certain degree of creativity” (Krätke,
2012) making it difficult to actually identify a distinct creative class.
Edward Glaeser (2012) emerged as one of the fiercest critics of the creative class
theory. Glaeser’s critique of the theory has resulted in substantive exchanges between
Florida and Glaeser resulting in further clarity and precision of the theory by Florida.
Florida himself recognizes the value of the debate saying, “I am grateful to my critics. I
always say I learn the most from the people who force me to think the hardest about my
ideas and assumptions and to clarify what I think and write” (Florida, 2014). Glaeser’s
strongest attacks of the theory seek to undermine one of the theory’s conclusions that
locations attract a creative class. Glaeser’s criticism was primarily based on the
observation that Florida’s creative cities were not adding population as fast as many of
their Sun Belt peers because people actually love their cars and like to live in sunny, dry
climates (Glaeser, 2012). Glaser sought to replace the three Ts of technology, talent, and
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tolerance with “skills, sun and sprawl” succinctly concluding “There is no variable that
predicts urban population growth in the 20th century better than January temperature”
(Glaeser, 2009).
For purposes of this project, Florida’s successful efforts at marketing the theory in
the larger public arena by tailoring the empirically based ideas to a larger audience could
have resulted in trivializing the important scientific concepts (Lang & Danielson, 2005, p.
204). This could have the effect of “encouraging practitioners to misread the policy
implications and thereby pursue potentially counterproductive economic development
strategies based on Florida’s ideas” (Lang & Danielsen, 2005, p. 204). This project
explores the value of the creative class factors presented by Florida and how
policymakers should consider the presence of these factors as significant drivers of
economic development. This project seeks to inform policymakers that large companybased incentives will be needed to overcome deficiencies in creative class factors- this
theme of pay now by investing in your people or pay companies later is present
throughout this project.
Evolving Definition of Company-based Incentives
The lack of specific definitions categorizing types of government investments is
one of the central problems in the literature. Neglecting to provide clear definitions makes
it difficult for researchers to uniformly discuss and understand how government can
effectively promote economic development in ways that benefit their communities in the
long run. The allusive and undefined definitions regarding types of incentives (Spencer,
2002, p. 5) makes it difficult for researchers to identify the incentives that work and
distinguishing them from incentives historically failing to meet promised expectations.
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In early research, economic investments made by governments were discussed in
terms of investing in ‘people,’ i.e., public-based investments in education, health care,
etc. or place-based investments, i.e., direct subsidies to private sector such as stadiums,
casinos, convention centers, etc. These high-cost place-based investments were often
used to bring specific businesses into the community and often resulted in boondoggles
where the direct subsidies failed to meet projected outcomes (Donegan et al., 2021, p.
796; Eisinger, 1988; Hanley & Douglass, 2014; Markusen & Nesse, 2007). Despite much
being known in the research about the incentive failures (Donegan et al., 2021, p. 796)
the various case studies do not provide consistent distinctions between types of
government investments, and the allusive and undefined (Spencer, 2002, p. 5) terms
began to evolve further in recent literature.
The imprecise terms have allowed recent scholarship to create further confusion
by taking the term “place,” formally defined as company type incentives, and using it to
describe traditional people-based investments. Much of today’s research focuses on
“place” as the geographic location where people live, and investment in “place” refers to
investment in the location for the benefit of people. Governments are unique from
corporations in the fact that they represent a specific geographic space (Renn, 2016).
Place is fixed and tightly bound by geographically territory that does not move (Renn,
2016) whereas people can migrate and move from location to location.
For Florida (2002) and Glaeser (2012), “place” is the location where people and
businesses chose to locate, and these clusters of people are the real drivers of economic
development. These researchers argue the geographic location attracts people and the
people attract business; the central contention being that certain geographic locations
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embodies with specific characteristics attract productive workforces. While Florida (2002)
and Glaeser (2012) agree that place matters they disagree on the specific characteristics
that attract productive people, and more importantly the nature of the characteristics. For
purposes of the arguments in this project, the characteristics and qualities of a city that
induce workers to locate there will be divided into two buckets- characteristics influenced
by government and characteristics independent of government action.
For Florida, governments can play a role in building programs to build an
environment that attracts business. To a certain degree, Florida’s original three “t” and
later 4th “t”- territorial assets- can all be impacted and influenced by government action.
For this project, the comparative analysis of Virginia highlights several examples of placebased incentives to attract Amazon. Virginia demonstrates how investing in the “space”
where people live ultimately benefits both residents and future companies such as
Amazon. Virginia’s incentive package included several investments in the community
such as upgrades to two metro stops (see Figure 2.2), pedestrian bridges, improvements
in infrastructure in the surrounding neighborhoods, massive expansion of tech higher
education9 including the construction of a Virginia Tech campus focused on innovation in
Alexandria, and expansion of George Mason University’s tech program in Arlington
(McCartney, 2018). These direct investments in the community are place-based in nature
representing investments beneficial to both Amazon and all their neighbors.

Amazon said this was an initiative by the state and not something that the company proposed (McCartney,
2018).
9
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Figure 2.2: Virginia’s Investments in DC Metro for Amazon and residents

Source: Slatt, C. (2018, November, 14). Here are 5 new infrastructure projects we’ll
likely get with Amazon. Greater Greater Washington. Retrieved From
https://ggwash.org/view/69866/crystal-city-national-landing-virginia-new-infrastructureget-amazon

For Harvard economist Edward Glaeser (2012), place-based incentives attracting
people and businesses are natural forces largely uncontrolled by humans. Geographic
locations with sunny, dry climates is one the place-based incentive that attracts people
and business. While Nevada may not have historic investments in people which have
resulted in building or attracting the “creative class,” Nevada has the natural climate
Glaeser contents will attract workforce and business (Glaeser, 2009). Nevada is the third
sunniest state in the U.S. Southern Nevada, averages 294 sunny days per year, well
above the national average of 205 days a year (Wittstein, 2019).
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Power of People-based Investments
Despite the definition problems within the literature concerning “place-based
investments,” many scholars point to the significance businesses place on historical
people-based investments. Florida and Feldman conclude that geographic innovation is
usually dependent on an area’s technological infrastructure consisting of: university R&D,
industrial R&D, agglomeration of related industry, and specialized business services
(Feldman & Florida, 1994, p. 225). The researchers make a bold conclusion that
“locational advantage would seem to reflect cumulative investments in human and
technological capability in specific places, more so than the conventional natural
advantages of land, labor, and capital” (Feldman & Florida, 1994).
Existing literature points to how investments in higher education led to future new
business development from within the state and was a factor in attracting new business
from out of state. Ann Markusen, Peter Hall and Amy Glasmeier (1986) provide insight
on the effect of university research expenditures on economic development. Researchers
Adam Jaffe (1989), David Audretsch and Maryann Feldman (1996) look at geography
and innovation and how the co-locating of university and industrial R&D at state level has
a positive effect on innovation. Most significantly, this research begins a substantive move
away from the norm of research focused on production (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996) and
begins a more concentrated examination of the linkage between geographic or spatial
dimension and economic development later relied on by Florida (2002) and others.
According to Author Kevin Kelly, “the New Economy operates in a ‘space’ rather
than a place, and over time more and more economic transactions will migrate to this new
space . . . geography and real estate, however, will remain, well . . . real. Cities will flourish,
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and the value of a distinctive place, such as a wilderness area, or a charming hill village,
will only increase” (Kelly, 1998, pp. 94-95). This is very similar to Florida’s later contention
that “place and community are more critical factors than ever before” and “the economy
itself increasingly takes form around real concentrations of people in real places,”
because place remains the center of economic activity due to the fact that firms cluster
together increasingly more in a snowball type effect (2003, p. 4).10
Rent Seeking- Smokestack Chasing
Economist Gordon Tullock popularized the concept of rent seeking behavior
(1967) while studying tariffs and monopolies. Although Tullock described rent-seeking
activity, he did not use the term. “Rent-seeking” was reintroduced11 into literature by World
Bank Chief Economist Anne Krueger (1974) seven years later. Together these two
economists are the mother and father of “rent seeking,” and the seminal works on rentseeking by both Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) have been cited more than 8000 times
(Hall et al., 2019, p. 72).
When placed within the arena of economic development, rent seeking behavior by
large job creating ventures tends to lead to an increase in rents proposed by governments
as the competitive bidding among the different states drives up the cost of the rents. While
the economic theory seeks to explain how government intervention and involvement
generate “higher than normal returns” for the economy as a whole (Rosen, 2013, p. 123),
the cost to governments engaged in rent seeking can become “self-generating in that
offense creates a demand for defense. If one feudal lord builds an army, his neighbor

11

Rent-seeking was coined by economist David Ricardo over one hundred years earlier.
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does so as well; if a customer hires a lawyer, his supplier must do likewise; and so on”
(Schleifer & Vishny, 1998, p. 82). In the case of using rent seeking as a tool for economic
development, the competitive race to attract companies by states is a clear example of
this “self-generating” (Murphy et al., 1993, p. 409) reality of rent-seeking as bidding wars
between the states creates an escalating cost to the rents being proposed and ultimately
offered. In Nevada, is clear to see this effect in the legislative record where legislators
focused on the need to compete with rent seeking behavior, and the belief that without a
massive incentive package Nevada would lose the opportunity to bring Tesla to the
state.12
Rent seekers also have the “strength in numbers” phenomena where they are
protected because, “if only a few people steal or loot, they will get caught; but if many do,
the probability of any one of them getting caught is much lower, and hence the returns to
steeling or looting are higher” (Schleifer & Vishny, 1998, p. 82). This is particularly true
when it comes to rent-seeking in the space of economic development. Large scale
economic development opportunities like Tesla and Amazon promise immediate
construction jobs and long term-jobs at the respective companies. Construction trade
labor unions, committed to adding work to the pipeline for their members, became
immediate advocates and “strength in numbers” in the corridors of the legislature
(Schleifer & Vishny, 1998, p. 82). These highly organized stake holders, intimately familiar
with lobbying the governing bodies deciding on what rents to provide, provide ample cover
as they promote an immediate injection of economic activity when the hundreds or

While the incentives may have ultimately been necessary, the state could have minimized the fiscal
impact of their abatements and maximized the promised return of generating economic development by
focusing on where best to locate the rent-seeking opportunity as discussed in Chapter 5 below.
12
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thousands of construction jobs materialize shortly after the project is secured. In the case
of Nevada, days before their historic vote to give Tesla unprecedented tax incentives,
officials from building trade groups drove legislators out to the job site to see the massive
earthmoving equipment to feel the excitement of the opportunity adding pressure to the
decision in front of them.
Governments looking to attract rent seekers can learn valuable historical lessons
from Brazil and Tennessee. While existing research provides valuable insight into the
consequences governments faced in the wake of their smoke stack chasing efforts, it
could be unrelatable or unknown to local and sub national policymakers engaged in
growing their regional economies. Comparing the more familiar experiences of
metropolitan regions in this project could provide more relatable data for U.S based
policymakers as well as international policymakers who are more likely to visit the
metropolitan units used in this study than the jungles of Brazil or the rolling farm hills of
Tennessee.
The COVID-19 Pandemic and Future of Rent Seeking
Understandably, researchers have not had much time to analyze the impact the
pandemic will have on the future of rent seeking. Although the majority of this project was
completed during the ongoing 2020 COVID-19 global pandemic, some literature
concurrent with the pandemic is starting to analyze the pandemics impact on workforce
and global markets. While uncertain if these established practices will be long term trends,
there is some evidence that the pandemic has unlocked new ways of doing business that
may stick around long after the pandemic is over. The new ways to understand and define
a “place of business” or “corporate headquarters” may have the most destabilizing effect

41

on a government’s expectations of the rent seeking corporations. New technologies,
spurred on by the pandemic, are disrupting the physical and geographical constructs of
enterprise (Khalifa et al., 2021) creating potentially more transient industries untethered
to any particular geographic area. This unknown adds to the uncertainties already facing
policymakers trying to predict the future when analyzing the prudence of incentive
packages while competing for the latest economic development opportunity interested in
relocating with its promise of new jobs and economic development. Many times, the
projected return on investment of government abatements is based on the expectation of
the business staying and operating even after the abatements sunset; however, the ability
for business to more easily relocate today should be a factor considered by policymakers.
Summary
The creative class theory provides a compelling reason why states should prefer
policies which promote establishing and growing the creative class as a significant
economic development tool to attract new enterprise. Aligning the creative class theory
as a driver for the value of people-based investments can inform policymakers of the
value of using people-based economic incentives to attract economic development. This
present study looks at how Virginia’s historic investment in the development of a creative
class has been subsequently leveraged to attract economic development, including
Amazon H2Q, and how Nevada used a largely placed-based incentive approach to attract
Tesla. This project explores how historical institutionalism guides policy creation and
makes it difficult for institutions to break the influence of history and to look outside the
box for alternative methods of economic development.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Overview
This project uses the creative class theory to frame policy alternatives and uses
the approach of historical institutionalism to analyze the role public institutions play in
influencing policy preferences to better understand whether company-based or peoplebased incentives should be preferred by policymakers offering economic incentives to
attract new enterprise. Why policymakers in Nevada preferred company-based incentives
to attract Tesla to Northern Nevada may be best answered using historical institutionalism
to explain the influence of Nevada’s institutions on steering decision-making. The policy
preferences evidenced in the case study of Nevada, as well as the policy preferences
present within the comparative analysis of Virginia, are consistent with Streeck and
Thelen’s (2009) historical institutionalism approach to understanding ways institutions are
internally structured by their history with some evolving patterns based on the global
pressure and demographic changes (Campbell, 2004). Additionally, this study will add to
the approach of understand the historical development of intuitions by expanding the
approach of historical institutionalism to explain how the institutions themselves impact
policy formation in a particular time and place (Pierson, 1993; Pierson 2016).
Rent seeking theory describes Nevada’s historic rent seeking approach of using
company-based incentives to induce economic development, and Florida’s (2002)
creative class theory helps frame Virginia’s use of people-based incentives to create an
attractive environment for economic development. The subsequent chapter utilizes a
sensitizing scheme to better understand how the theories and approaches above
influenced policy formation in Nevada.

43

Historical Institutionalism
Winston Churchill said, “The farther backward you can look; the farther forward
you are likely to see.” History matters; understanding the context of the past helps
understand where we are, and more importantly where we are going and how we are
likely to get there. Too often policy decisions are understood through the realities of
today's world; thereby, ignoring the purpose behind legislative intent and its impact on the
future. At its core, historical institutionalism is an approach that attempts to illuminate how
political and policy struggles are mediated by the institutional settings in which they take
place (Thelen, 1999).
For these social science researchers, it was important to deconstruct the
processes of decision-making and break down the world around them into its constituent
parts to better understand those parts independently from one another. While this micro
analysis was taking place, another body of social science moved in the direction of grand
theorists applying a macro approach to the real world around them (Steinmo, 2008, p.
152). For purposes of this project, it is important to understand how the history of the
institutions and the policymakers working within them assimilate together into
policymaking patterns with outcomes dependent on historical pressures.
This project focuses on the examination of the actual legislative packages offered
to Tesla and Amazon and places them within their comparative and historical contexts to
better understand the role institutions in Nevada played in structuring behavior. The
questions of this project are not motivated by the desire to push any particular
methodology or argument, but the desire to better understand why Nevada selected and
provided Tesla the kinds of incentives ultimately prescribed in statute. The empirical
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investigation of the research questions in this project revealed that “history matters” and
the institutional structures in Nevada had profound effects on shaping the process,
outcomes, and ultimately the incentive packages offered to Tesla. This reality is best
understood and framed around the approach of historical institutionalism.
Problem with Historical Institutionalism
As discussed in the preceding chapter, historical institutionalists provide useful
theories of the endogenous development of institutions; unfortunately, the causal impact
the institutions themselves have on political outcomes is less developed within the
discipline (Capoccia, 2016, p. 1095). Identifying how institutions become “object(s) of
strategic action” (Hall, 2010, p. 204) is central to this project’s attempt to fill some of the
gap in current research on how institutions themselves structure those interactions
(Capoccia, 2016, p. 1096). The formation of Nevada’s institutions were influenced by “rent
seeking” stakeholders who then became members of the organizational institutions
created. Historical institutionalism is an approach that helps understand the impact of
history on the evolution of the institution, and in the case of the Nevada legislature, the
institutional organization itself is structuring interactions and policies around the same
history. Even when exogenous forces helped Nevada develop a thoughtful approach to
economic development during the 2011 session through the Unify, Regionalize, Diversify:
An Economic Development Agenda for Nevada (Muro et al., 2011), the moment a realworld opportunity of Tesla came, the state’s institutions effectively reverted back to
policies exhibiting the historical rent seeking preferences of the institutions. Historical
institutionalism provides a useful approach to structuring and orienting the analysis of this
project and its attempt to add Nevada’s experiences to the gap in research.
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History matters, not just as reference points for analysis, but “when” events happen
within the historical context the events matter and impact the trajectory of policy formation.
Gerschenkron’s (1962) study of the process of industrialization in Russia demonstrated
that the process of industrialization is different for late developers than for early
developers. This project uses a qualitative historical institutional approach to avoid losing
the significance of this insight easily missed in quantitative analysis (Steinmo, 2008, p.
165). The specific timeframe when government in Nevada formed, how the state formed,
and the context around its formation matters and has a direct impact on the state’s future.
For Nevada, the “when” economic development policy was created really matters.
There were two fundamentally important creation points for the establishment of
economic development policy in Nevada; first, the initial economic development structure
and corresponding codes were created in the wake of the intense pressure created by
the global economic recession in 2009; second, Nevada created specific economic
development incentives for the first time to attract an enterprise during an intense multistate bidding war to win Tesla’s new Gigafactory with its thousands of promised jobs to a
state facing historic unemployment. Clearly, the “when” mattered and impacted the
creation of these economic development policies. The context of history matters, and
Schattschneider (1960) and Pierson (2000) demonstrate that choices policymakers make
at an earlier point in time have important consequences on choices that are later made,
and in some instances the choices that are available. The policy choices made in Nevada
to invest in economic development in 2011 are not independent from the economic
incentives offered to Tesla in 2014, and both of these are not independent from Nevada’s
early experiences with rent seeking corporations, ultimately making this project viewed
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from the lens of historical institutionalism skeptical of the very notion of variable
independence (Steinmo, 2008, p. 166).
In Nevada geography plays an important part in the formation of early institutions
and is ever present in policy formation today. The significance of geography is particularly
true within state institutions, because any given institution within the state apparatus is
embedded within a larger set of institutions all of which have been largely drafted and
formulated by bureaucrats residing within the northern part of the state. As described
below, geography played a significant part in Nevada’s formation and evolution as a state.
The geography of institutions in Nevada matters, because rules can fail to understand
uniqueness in other geographic areas of the state or appreciate the need to optimize the
state’s best interests over geographical interests within the state.
Creative Class Theory
As described in the preceding chapter, Florida challenges the traditional view in
much of the economic development theory research which focuses almost exclusively on
the behavior of firms when selecting locations for economic expansion. Florida’s focus
on the people and the place they live is central to this projects analysis of people-based
incentives packages as an alternative to government economic development endeavors.
Place, in the sense of geographical location, is central to this project’s proposition that
companies will chase place and collections of talent, thereby challenging the status quo
reality of state’s chasing companies with large company-based incentive packages. The
particular assets of a community provide a better indicator to better understand the
regional capabilities and how those capabilities attract economic development in and of
themselves thereby reduces the overall cost of company-based incentives needed to
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induce the company. “Talented people are drawn to places that have an abundance of
jobs . . . and places that attract talent attract companies” (Florida, 2014, p. 198). For this
to occur, policymakers must make the investment in people and place as a driver of
economic development.
As presented in the previous chapter- and highlighted in the analysis of Brazil and
Tennessee below in Chapter 7- there is a significant body of literature highlighting the use
of government incentives to build a stronger economy. These examples provide
substantive information regarding specific case studies of government induced economic
development and smokestack chasing. However, existing research does not do a good
job distinguishing between the different tools governments use to attract a specific
economic development opportunity and categorizing them into company- or peoplebased options. Additionally, despite many examples of government attention and
adopting tenets of the creative class theory (Bloomberg, 2012; Evans, 2009; Florida,
2014; Norton, 2018; Peck & Theodore, 2010), little attention has been paid to how
institutions impact the implementation of the theory and the stickiness or durability of
future adherence to investing in people. In other words, policymakers can incrementally
invest in creating a culture and climate attractive to prospective businesses which takes
time before there is a return on the investment, or policymakers can provide immediate
incentives to secure a new business resulting in an immediate return on the investment
which largely benefits the company and its shareholders. Policymakers do not have to
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start from scratch, because the creative class is everywhere (see Figure 3.1), and the
prevalence of an existing creative class provides a foundation for policymakers to build
policies on strengthening and growing this sometimes-hidden driver of economic
development.

Figure 3.1: Creative Class Density in the U.S.

Source: Richard, F. (2010). Creative Class Density. The Atlantic. September 14, 2010.
Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/09/creative-classdensity/62571/

Who makes up the Creative Class?
Using the U.S. governments most current system of Standard Occupational
Classification System codes introduced in 1998, Florida breaks the creative class into two
major subcomponents- a ‘Super-Creative Core’ and ‘Creative Professionals.”
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Super-Creative Core:
This group consists of about 12 percent of all U.S. jobs, and includes a wide range
of occupations in science, engineering, education, computer programming, and research.
The Super-Creative Core also contains a small subset made up of arts, design, and media
workers. Florida considers those belonging to this core group to be "fully engage in the
creative process" (2002, p. 69). Members of the Super-Creative Core have a primary job
function of being creative and innovative. "Along with problem solving, their work may
entail problem finding" (Florida, 2002, p. 69).
Creative professionals:
This group of workers are made up of the classic knowledge-based professions
which include professionals working in healthcare, business and finance, the legal
profession, and education (see Table 3.1). These workers rely on their educational
attainment to "draw on complex bodies of knowledge to solve specific problems" (Florida,
2002).

Table 3.1: The Creative Class
List of major occupational groups within the two categories defining the creative class
Creative class
1. Super creative core
Architecture and engineering occupations
Life, physical, and social science occupations
Computer and mathematical occupations
Education, training, and library occupations
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations
2. Creative professionals
Management occupations
Business and financial operations occupations
Health care practitioners and technical occupations
High end sales and sales management occupations
Legal occupations

Adapted from Florida, R. (2012).
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For purposes of this project, Nevada has one of the lowest population shares of creative
class jobs in the nation; whereas, the metropolitan region of Washington, D.C. has the
nation’s largest population share with creative class jobs (Florida, 2019b) further
highlighting the use of Virginia for comparative analysis of Nevada’s case study.
Florida’s First Three Ts
As describe in the preceding chapter, a central problem for this project is that
researchers have left the distinction between people- and company-based incentives,
also referred to as ‘place-based’ in early literature, allusive and undefined (Spencer, 2002,
p. 5). The absence of clear definitions for the two distinct incentive structures can create
confusion within the policy arena and frustrate a targeted approach to creating and
tracking precise and reliable differences within the incentive packages created to entice
economic development opportunities. The creative class theory’s “3- T’s” provides useful
categories to help identify and separate investments as either people or company based.
Although the “3-Ts” concept” is the kind of catchy expression that chamber of commerce
types love and yet drives many academics nuts” (Lang & Danielsen, 2005, p. 204), the
categories provide a framework to help discuss the economic incentives created by
policymakers (see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2: The “Ts” of the Creative Class

Source: Rakestraw, A. (2017). The New Creative Class Crisis: A Critical Review of
Creative Class Theory. Retrieved from https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/356327
Technology

For Florida, “technology is what enables capitalism to constantly revolutionize
itself, ensuring its vitality” (2014). Scholars have long focused on the importance of
technology in economic development. In fact, the longest chapter in Karl Marx’s most
detailed analysis of capitalism, Capital, is dedicated to technology and its impact on the
working class (1887). Joseph Schumpeter, one of the most influential economists of the
early 20th century, theorized that technology would concentrate ownership and wealth
towards large corporations (1947). In 1987, Robert Solow won the Nobel Prize in
Economics for his neo-classical theory of achieving economic growth through adding
more capital, labor, ideas and new technology- this conclusion ultimately led him to devise
a mathematical formula regarding technology’s contribution to economic growth (1956).
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Florida measures the presence of technology in several ways. The concentration
and growth of high-tech companies within a region are central to identifying the presence
of technology. Measuring innovation by identifying the number of patented innovations
per 1000 people and the growth of patent innovation is another way Florida measures
technology. The technology base present in a region is both a necessary condition for
and a result of a region having a strong creative economy that helps attract the creative
workforce (Stolarick, 2009). For purposes of this project, incentives offered by Nevada
will be analyzed through a technology lens to determine the incentive’s impact on
technology within the region.
Talent
Talent is a pure people-based factor that focuses on the concentration of creative
people made up by Florida’s Super Creative Core and Creative Professionals categories.
These individuals cluster in places that are centers of creativity and have a stronger
relationship with economic growth (Stolarick, 2009). Governments often tout their
favorable business client. According to Florida there needs to be a favorable “creativity
climate” to create the clusters. This idea is supported by Nobel Prize winning economist
Robert Lucas who contends that “the driving force in the growth and development of cities
and regions can be found in the productivity gains associated with the clustering of talent”
(Florida & Gates, 2002, p. 35).
The “talent” factor is measured by bachelor’s degrees and above; percentage of
scientists, engineers, artists, musicians, designers; and those who make up the super
creative and professional’s class. This is similar to Paul Romer’s theory of endogenous
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growth where investment in research and development and education yield measurable
returns over the long term (1994). For this project, the incentives offered by Nevada will
be evaluated through a lens to determine their impact on “talent” by assessing effect on
higher education, research, college graduation, and other drivers of a creative climate
cluster.
Tolerance
Florida’s view of “tolerance” and its impact on economic development has been
the subject of much scholarship. The “tolerance” factor has been one of the more “hotly
debated factors” of Florida’s research (2014) and presents some problems for this project
as well. Tolerance can be seen when people in urban settings from different backgrounds
collide on the street and “rub shoulders” with other residents (Wilson, 1986). In the
simplest terms “tolerance” is seen as diversity. It is measured by the percentage of
population that is foreign born, the percentage of gay and lesbian population, the
percentage of nonwhite and nonblack, the percentage of interracial marriages, and more.
Florida relies heavily on the Gay Index developed by demographer Gary Gates to identify
the clustering and concentrations of gay population (Gates & Florida, 2001). The
percentage of gays do not cause creative clusters; however, if gays feel comfortable in a
place it is a good indication that immigrants, ethnic minorities, and others will feel
comfortable (Florida, 2014).
For purposes of this project, the government incentives are not decidedly crafted
in a way to squarely fit within Florida’s “tolerance” factor; however, the promotion of
diversity can be seen within the incentives offered to Tesla and is clearly present in the
legislative record. While at the same time, often economic development incentives have
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a certain protectionist element infused within them. For example, common state
requirements that a certain percentage of the projects jobs must be given to residents of
the state is contrary to the underlying assumptions of welcomeness and inclusiveness
central to Florida’s “tolerance” factor. What is apparent in this project is how policymakers
in Nevada largely ignored the significance of tolerance when directing Tesla where to
locate in the state.
4th T: Territorial Assets
In a follow up to his bestselling The Rise of the Creative Class (2002), Florida
further refines his thoughts on the creative class in The Rise of the Creative Class
Revisited (2012). His new book provides another decade of research to support his
original 3-Ts and adds five new chapters as well as introduces “territorial assets” which
he identifies as “quality of place” as the fourth key factor in attracting the creative class
(Florida, 2012, p. 281). Territorial assets are measured by economic growth, housing,
culture, climate, education, healthcare, recreation, levels of crime, amount of inclement
weather, and transportation. In short, it is the “‘what’s there” (the built and natural
environment), “who’s there” (diverse people), and “what’s going on” (vibrant street live,
café culture, arts, music, and outdoor activities) (Natekal, 2018, p. 10). Policymakers have
the ability to impact some of these specific assets and help create and promote the type
of environment that will attract the creative class (Florida, 2012).
Florida does not give specific details of the fourth T only broad descriptions of the
environment. The territorial assets are an environment where a variety of amenities
encourage and facilitate social interaction and integrate work and community (Florida,
2012). For this project, looking at economic development incentives through a lens of the
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fourth T is difficult to operationalize. This is partially due to the lack of specificity within
Florida’s factor regarding specific characteristics and the reality that the “environment”
type approach is more than one specific thing. However, most large economic
development opportunities are attracted to state level incentives.
In Nevada, Tesla was attracted by state incentives and had some flexibility on
where they located within the state. In fact, Tesla’s first several self-initiated trips into the
state were to Southern Nevada, and it was not until the Governor’s office learned of the
visits to Southern Nevada that Tesla was invited to come explore their future home in
Northern Nevada. While the incentives may not be constructed in a way to build a
territorial asset, the state may have the ability to steer an economic development
opportunity in a way to take advantage of existing territorial assets to ensure future
success of the project and- in the case of Tesla- provide an environment to better capture
future expansion and development surrounding the project.
Rational Choice and Policy Preferences
The rational choice modeling provides some insight into policymakers preferences
when awarding economic incentives, and helps to explain why policymakers often prefer
company-based incentives over people-based incentives. As discussed in Chapter 7,
three different governors were one of the most significant differences between the three
different times Tennessee provided incentives to GM. These different elected officials all
ignored evidence of the dangers of smokestack chasing, and incredibly even ignored their
state’s own direct experience with chasing the exact same smokestack- giving new
meaning to doing the same thing (and then a third time) and expecting a different result.
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When it comes to preferences between company- or people-based economic
incentives, the elected officials tend to make policy choices motivated by self-interest,
utility maximization, and goal fulfillment as theorized by rational choice scholars
(Petracca, 1991, p. 289). Direct company-based incentives provide the kind of photo op,
positive press, and immediate results sought after by enterprising elected officials. The
ceremonial shovels, hard hats, oversized scissors and large red ribbons provide more
immediate political gain. Company-based incentives are easily connected to the
economic project allowing policymakers to connect their decision to award companybased incentives to the immediate flurry of economic activity. Credit seeking elected
officials bound up by path dependency are often unable to separate from the appeal of
company-based incentives for the less concrete long-term investment of people-based
incentives where the measured success of the investment could be decades away from
the policy action responsible for the success.
Summary
Drawing from the historical institutionalism approach, this project analyzes how
institutions, from the rules to the organizations operating under the rules, impact
decisions. Embedded within political organizations is a predetermined path that guides
future decisions and eliminates future options. The creative class theory provides new
insight into drivers of economic development and provides policymakers additional factors
to consider to further efforts to bring jobs and diversify their economy. However, selfinterested policymakers will have to overcome the lure of highly visible and credit seeking
opportunities connected to smokestack chasing behaviors in order to adapt
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people-based investment strategies toward economic development. High profile,
competitive and game changing economic development opportunities place policymakers
in difficult must win positions where sophisticated and skilled corporate negotiators
overwhelm eager policymakers and bureaucrats.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Overview
This project utilized a mixed methods research design where document analysis,
news coverage, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and analysis of legislative records
analyzing economic development policy formation in Nevada were systematically
integrated with descriptive statistics of Nevada’s historical allocation of tax abatements.
Additionally, the project analyzes the frequency company-based and people-based
approaches were taken within the incentive packages offered by Nevada to Tesla as
compared to the packages Virginia and New York offered Amazon. This study adds to
existing literature on company-based and people-based economic development, by
highlighting the key metrics most likely to attract economic development to a state. This
project identifies what a state needs to do to overcome structural deficiencies in historical
investments in people-based incentives to attract new economic development. The study
looks at how Nevada had to make aggressive company-based incentives to Tesla to
overcome the state’s historic inadequate investments in its people. The study also
provides guidance for state and local governments creating public policy to diversify their
economies and compete at the national level for businesses looking to expand or
relocate. More importantly, the project highlights the need for policymakers to invest in
their people now or pay for it later- at a much higher cost in both dollars and lost
opportunity.
Rationale for Mixed Methods Methodology
The main objective of this research is to identify institutional and path-dependent
influences on policy formation, and to inform policymakers of differing outcomes
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associated with government based economic incentives offered to attract business. This
project relies primarily on a qualitative case study analysis of Nevada within a mixed
methods approach to address the research questions presented below. Due to the nature
of these questions and the level of exploration needed to answer them, the qualitative
method is especially valuable for the construction of this project (Stake, 1995; Tuli, 2010,
pp. 8-97), and the mixed methods approach provides a more complete and synergistic
utilization of data (Wisdom & Creswell, 2013). The use of historical institutionalism as a
primary approach of analysis within this project partially dictates the heavy reliance on a
qualitative method with its corresponding sensitivity to context (Neuman, 2011). The
qualitative research design includes many of the data sources such as observation,
document analysis, news coverage, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and legislative
records relied on in this project (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).
The qualitative research method of semi-structured interviews is a primary source
of data gathering the narratives for this project (Tuli, 2010, p. 100). Understanding the
influence of the institutions on Nevada policymakers requires the examination of the
spoken experiences through interviews, written documents, and discourse surrounding
the bills of the 28th (2014) Special Session of the Nevada Legislature which awarded
economic incentives to Tesla in order to avoid losing the significance of the insight easily
missed in quantitative analysis (Steinmo, 2008, p. 165).
The mixed methods research design adds depth to the understanding (Perry,
2012) and helps balance biases inherent in using qualitative or quantitative methods
alone (Hendren, et al., 2018). The use of mixed methods research designs is on the rise
because the method helps us better understand and address complex public policy issues
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through improving the quality of evidence and foundation of knowledge (Hendren, et al.,
2018). The semi-structured interviews in this project help add context to the decisionmaking experiences of policymakers bound up and influenced by historical
institutionalism. Additionally, the interviews go beyond the textual analysis of the
incentives awarded to Tesla.
Research Questions
The research questions in this project are:
RQ1: What role does the historical evolution of Nevada’s public institutions
have in the policy preferences for people- or company-based investments?
RQ2: Do companies prefer company-based more than people-based
economic incentives, and which did Tesla prefer?
RQ3 Why does Nevada pursue company-based incentives despite the
empirical research suggesting their ineffectiveness?
RQ4: Do these observations recommend a particular investment strategy
for policymakers seeking to attract new enterprise?
The examination of these questions seeks to explain and identify institutional influences
on policy formation in an effort to better inform affected policymakers, and offer differing
outcomes and policy choices associated with government based economic incentives
offered to attract business. Using the mixed methods research design, this project relies
on interview responses and publicly available data to answer the research questions
presented.
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Case Study Typology
The case study approach of this project helps gain a deep understanding of the
complex circumstances through an in-depth investigation of stakeholders involved in
crafting public policy. In particular, this project analyzes Nevada’s 2014 efforts to bring
Tesla to Nevada through government economic incentives crafted in the legislation of the
28th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature. The analysis of policymakers engaged in
a specific two-day special legislative session is best explored and understood within the
context of a case study investigation.
For this project, the case study is utilized as more than just an “interpretivist frame”
(Thomas, 2011, p. 512) but also through “neopositivist” means where specific variables
are identified and studied (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5). Studying the complexity
involved in the real-world example of Nevada’s policy choices embody the case study
definition provided by Simmons as “an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of
the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or
system in the ‘real life’ context” (2009, p. 21). The use of the case study in this analysis
is not a method in and of itself (Thomas, 2011, p. 512), but a design frame that
incorporates the mixed methods approach to this project.
The case study of the legislation in the 28th (2014) Special Session and how policy
choices were influenced by the institutions of Nevada will be analyzed through the mixed
methods design of this project (Stake, 1995, p. 443). This project looks at “the complex
interactions of many factors” (Ragin, 1992, p. 5) present in the formation of the incentive
package for Tesla in an intensive in-depth explanatory narrative emerging from the data
collected in this case study (Thomas, 2011, p. 512). The case study’s design, allowing
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for a researcher to study a “single unit of a small number of units, where the researcher’s
goal is to understand a larger class of similar units (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 296),
is consistent with this project’s larger goal of informing policymakers of path-dependent
influences and policy alternatives when engaged in economic development.
Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Nevada is a unique state, and much of the data uses the state as the unit of
analysis which ignores the reality that in Nevada 88.9% of the state’s population lives in
two counties- Southern Nevada’s Clark County and Northern Nevada’s Washoe County.
In short, over 79% of the state’s population resides in Clark County, 15% live in Washoe
County, and the remaining 11% of the population is spread throughout the state’s fifteen
rural counties (U.S. Census Bureau). “Using the state as the unit of analysis inevitably
obscures spatial processes that occur within a state or across state boundaries” (Feldman
& Florida, 1994, p. 216). Clearly, the spatial processes and analysis of this project would
be lost if Nevada was used as the sole unit of analysis. The economic data provided in
this project provides a sub-state unit of analysis to identify functional linkages and
dependencies (Czmanski & Ablas, 1989) as they are presented with a comparison
between the Northern and Southern regions.
This project’s use of regional factors demonstrates the historical preferences of
Nevada as viewed within the historical institutionalism approach. This analysis highlights
Nevada’s reliance on the state and in particular the regional tax base from the south to
pay for the incentives offered to Tesla in the north. By itself, the Northern Nevada Metro
Reno-Carson region could not afford to provide Tesla the incentives. They relied on the
taxes collected in the south to offset the abatements to Tesla. This project uses sub-state
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units of analysis in Nevada to analyze the historical regional preferences to give greater
explanatory power to the institutional impacts of policy formation. To a certain extent, the
comparative analysis of Virginia also requires a sub-state analysis, because Virginia is
really four unique parts- Richmond, Tidewater, Northern and Western. Therefore, the substate analysis provides better comparative aligning with this projects case study.
Data Sources
This project uses the mixed methods approach to collect and assimilate both
primary and secondary data. Content analysis used to build the case study of Nevada
relied on publicly available data including executive orders, resolutions, bills, reports,
legislative journals, as well as news media coverage surrounding the 28th (2014) Special
Legislative Session of the Nevada Legislature (see Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Publicly Available Sources of Data Related to the 28th (2014) Special
Legislative Session

The comparative part of this project analyzing Virginia’s use of economic
incentives to attract Amazon will use information collected from publicly available
resources including executive documents, regional reports, as well as media coverage
surrounding the selection of Northern Virginia for Amazons corporate expansion. Table
4.2 below identifies the types of data examined for this project.
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Table 4.2: Publicly Available Sources of Data Related to Amazon H2Q in Northern
Virginia

The Nevada legislature is a part time legislature meeting biennially on odd years for a
120 calendar days session. This unique structure creates challenges addressing normal
day-to-day business within the state and becomes particularly challenging when
addressing sudden, and rapid emerging issues such as competing within the fast-paced
arena of economic development. Since the 2011 adoption of formal economic
development centered institutions, Nevada has been required to convene three different
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Special Sessions of the legislature to address time sensitive economic development
projects. The 28th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature began on September 10,
2014 at 12:41PM and adjourned sine die the next day on September 11, 2014 at 9:51
PM. Most of the publicly available government sources are bound by this narrow window
of time and readily available on the Nevada Legislature’s website (www.leg.state.nv.us)
through the Nevada Electronic Legislative Information System (NELIS) database as
shown below on Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Screenshot of Nevada Electronic Legislative Information System
(NELIS) Database Webpage for 28th Special Session of the legislature (2014)

Source: 28th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature (Nev. 2014). Retrieved from
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/28th2014Special/
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The NELIS database also provides the exhibits associated with the 28 th Special
Session which includes most of the publicly available documents created by the
government that were used in this project. The 28th (2014) Special Session of the Nevada
Legislature was 33 hours 10 min long from start to finish, this includes the evening hours
when the legislature was adjourned, the legislature was only in session for a little more
than 21 hours. The special session consisted of one Senate Bill and three Assembly Bills,
and the majority of the incentives were outlined in SB 1. The NELIS database provides
all the exhibits for the session including the Economic Impact of Tesla on Washoe and
Storey Counties (GOED, 2014a) and Tax Inventive Analysis for Tesla in Storey County,
NV (GOED, 2014b). These two studies were critical documents provided to the legislature
by the Governor’s Office of Economic Development outlining the impacts and significance
of Tesla for the state of Nevada. These publicly available documents are found on NELIS
and provide this project and future researchers interested in state-level policymaking
easily accessible and transparent information for analysis. For this project, the publicly
available documents are used to inform and provide an in-depth understanding of the
pressure of the compressed timeframe, quantity, and quality of information available to
legislators considering one of the Nation’s largest economic incentive packages ever put
together.
Sensitizing Scheme
The case-study approach used in this project requires an analytical scheme to help
organize key concepts within defined classification schemes “that denotes the key
properties, and interrelations among these properties within the social universe” (Turner,
2001, p. 14). “The concepts of the scheme chop up the universe; then, the ordering of the
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concepts gives the social world a sense of order” (Turner, 2001, p. 14). According to
Turner, the “explanation of an empirical event comes whenever a place in the
classification scheme can be found for an empirical event” (Turner, 2001, p. 14).
This project will utilize a type of analytical scheme referred to as a sensitizing
scheme. Turner describes the concepts within this scheme to be “more loosely
assembled congeries of concepts intended only to sensitize and orient researchers and
theorists to certain critical processes” (Turner, 2001, p. 14).

Unlike the naturalistic

scheme on the other end of the spectrum of analytical schemes, the sensitizing scheme
is “more skeptical about the timeless quality of social affairs” (Turner, 2001, p. 14),
recognizing that the one constant quality of human activity is change. Therefore, the
linkage between the concepts of the sensitizing scheme must always be “provisional and
sensitizing” and must be “flexible and capable of being revised as circumstances in the
empirical world change” (Turner, 2001, p. 14). The sensitizing analytical scheme is often
foundational and a necessary prerequisite to begin theorizing.
The analytical sensitizing scheme used in this project will rely on a qualitative
analysis of a case study of Nevada which includes quantitative analysis of the companybased investments in Nevada between 2011-2019. This project’s qualitative approach will
consist of an extensive analysis of the specific legislative records surrounding the
legislative efforts in Nevada during the time the state was working to attract Tesla as well
as a historical analysis of the people and company-based investments Nevada and
Virginia made.
This project will analyze several different levels of policymaking and historical
conditions impacting the traditional methodical and slow formation of policy as well as
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intervening market conditions which can lead to accelerated policymaking. By utilizing a
sensitizing scheme, the project can move from an analysis of how policy is made on the
state level to the individual characteristics of localities and the impact of these
characteristics on the decision of companies making the decision to select one state over
another.
The analysis will look at levels of policymaking from the state level to the local
level. At the macro level this project will look at some historical institutional differences
directly and indirectly impacting the decision-making at the state level in Nevada and
Virginia. At the state level, the project will analyze the specific legislative packages offered
to Tesla by Nevada and to Amazon by Virginia and New York. These legislatively
approved packages can shed light on deficiencies at the local level that needed to be
overcome to induce the company to locate there. The packages can also highlight the
strengths of the state and local area when minor additions are added to an asset valued
by the company to accommodate their specific business needs.13
IRB Approval of Research Protocol
The Exempt Research Application and research protocol for this project’s
qualitative semi-structured interviews was submitted to the University of Nevada Las
Vegas Social and Behavioral Institutional Review Board (IRB) for review on April 21,
2021. The initial determination of exempt status for this project was made on May 21,
2021 (See Appendix A). On January 5, 2022 an IRB Modification request was submitted
to make minor modifications to limit the scope of this project, the number of subjects

For example, the METRO added a stop for the Amazon headquarters demonstrating the value of the
asset and the need to incorporate a small addition so the business could fully utilize its beneficial purpose
to a region.
13
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interviewed, and modify the survey questions. The Administrative Review Modification
Acknowledgement and final determination of exempt status for this study was made on
March 15, 2022 (See Appendix B).

The qualitative interviews were collected in

accordance with this IRB exemption and approval between the dates of January 14, 2022
and February 25, 2022.
Semi-Structured Interviews
The validity of this mixed methods project design is achieved by triangulation
through the convergence of information from different sources. The project began with
an in-depth case study of Nevada with its associated comparative analysis of Virginia.
Next, confidential and voluntary semi-structured in-depth qualitative interviews were
conducted with subject matter experts to examine the experiences and perceptions of
policymakers and stakeholders involved in the case study of Nevada. Each question in
the interview protocol was created to help identify the intentions of the policy actor and
the influence of historical institutionalism on their policy preferences. The interview
protocol was used to gather the facts and opinions surrounding the events leading up to
the 28th (2014) Special Session as well as the session itself. This method allowed the
researcher to frame the discussion within the context of the predetermined set of IRB
approved questions (see Appendix D), while also allowing the researcher to ask clarifying
and follow-up questions to garner more relevant and important data as intended by the
semi-structured interviews.
In adherence with this scope, a total of seven individuals were interviewed for this
project, including state government officials, individuals representing higher education,
and officials at the city or county level (see Table 4.4 for interview participant categories).
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The individuals were selected based on their participation in the 28 th (2014) Special
Session of the Nevada Legislature and invitations for interviews and all subsequent
communications with participants were disseminated utilizing the University of Nevada
Las Vegas Social and Behavioral Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved scripts via
the University email. All participants were provided with a confirmation of their scheduled
interview, which included meeting information such as time, date and location of the
interview.
In addition to this confirmation email, all interviews were emailed a preview of the
twelve interview questions approved by the IRB for reference and preparation, and
participants were informed that to protect their privacy and provide ample confidentiality
the researcher would obtain verbal consent at the beginning of the interview. All interview
participants were asked what interview platform would be most convenient to them, with
the choice of either face-to-face, phone, or virtual interviews; however, due to
complications with the ongoing pandemic all interviews were scheduled and conducted
as phone or virtual interviews. The initial individuals to be interviewed were identified by
the researcher prior to scheduling any interviews, and then after the first round of
interviews the researcher identified individuals commonly named in the first round of
interviews to invite to subsequent interviews.14 All of the interviews were recorded with a
voice recorder and the researcher took notes during each interview. The interviews lasted
between 45 and 90 minutes. The information collected from these interviews provided the
required context for understanding the phenomenon of policy choice formation on
economic incentives at the state level from varying perspectives.

There were two additional interviewees identified in the first round of interviews that were subsequently
interviewed for this project.
14
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Measuring Investments in Company or People Using the Creative Class
The mixed methods design of this project allowed the researcher to analyze the
presence of company- and people-based economic incentives offered to attract new
enterprise. The presence of people-based incentives was measured using the four factors
of the creative class and company-based incentives was identified as incentives provided
to the company directly. All of the incentives explicitly provided in the legislative package
of the 28th (2014) Special Session as well as other inherent direct and indirect government
action associated with Tesla locating in Nevada were then analyzed to identify policy
preferences as either company-based or people-based preference. For quantitative
analysis, the instances or manifestation of each preference was discussed to identify the
policymakers preference and reliance on either company-based, people-based, or
combined people and company-based incentive.
Measuring Nevada’s Geographical use of Economic Incentives
This project used quantitative descriptive statistics to analyze the presence of
creative class factors within Nevada. This project looked at level of infrastructure
investment, how many passengers traveled through the airport in each region, education
attainment of local residents, and diversity. Additionally, this project analyzed the amount
of approved or withdrawn tax abatements provided by the state to projects located in
Nevada. This regional based analysis of where incentives were located was used to
analyze the state’s influence on the creative class factor of territorial assets and how the
state’s prioritization of economic development aligns with its territorial assets. These data
points are views through the lens of historical institutionalism to explain impacts on policy
preferences.
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First Person Experience Protocol and Researcher Biases
In order to avoid internal biases, many researchers stay away from research where
they have inherent experiences. It could reasonably be argued that a researcher having
first hand experiences with the events examined in a case study could provide unique
and valuable insight for discovery; however, these same experiences could also create
unintended researcher bias. In particular, the presence of internal biases in public policy
research is even more likely the closer the researcher is to the dynamic, opinion packed,
and often passionate environment surrounding policy formation. It has been said politics
and policymaking is a full contact sport, and the events surrounding Tesla’s move to
Nevada were packed with concussive partisan, geographic, and ideological tensions.
The author of this present study is a local government official and was a registered
lobbyist during the 28th (2014) Special Session and an active participate in the original
conversations with Tesla regarding their interest in coming to Southern Nevada.
Additionally, the author was the chief strategist and principal city official representing and
coordinating the city’s efforts in the four-day 29th (2015) Special Session of the Nevada
Legislature to create a new incentive package to attract a major economic development
opportunity to Southern Nevada. Personal experiences with driving economic
development in Nevada and connections with policymakers featured in this project and
case study influences and strengthens the author’s perspective on this project and
enhances the analysis presented. The selection of this project is drawn from the
researcher’s direct involvement in the events leading up to and during the 28 th Special
Session and Nevada’s efforts at diversification during the past decade.
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The mixed methods design of this project was selected to minimize any
confirmation bias and navigate the strict personal bias inherent with a sole qualitative
approach. The rigorous mixed methods design and triangulation of the data presented in
this project was also utilized to minimize any biases. The selection of the specific interview
participants was purposeful and the researcher intentionally identified stake holders from
both political parties residing in both the north and south with different views on the role
of government in economic development.
Summary
The mixed methods approach of this project and information gathered through the
qualitative interviews of decision makers and stakeholders involved in the 28th (2014)
Special Session of the Nevada Legislature have increased the understanding of
policymaking preferences and pressures operating within historically bounded institutions
as they create and award economic incentives. The subsequent chapters present data
on the impact of institutions in creating path-dependent options for policy formation via
document analysis, and individual perceptions of policymakers in the 28th (2014) Special
Session via interviews. The methods of research in this study allow the author to
confidentially present a robust analysis of Nevada’s historic incentive package to Tesla
and its implication for future policymakers operating in an increasingly connected global
economy with its evolving realities.
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CHAPTER 5: NEVADA CASE STUDY FINDINGS
Overview
This chapter outlines the historical creation of Nevada’s institutions and the
findings of the data collected in the case study of the 28th (2014) Special Session of the
Nevada Legislature. The data for this case study is collected from legislative proceedings,
legislative record, technical exhibits to the bills, the language of the bills, and media
reports to analyze the policy preferences of policymakers during the session. Viewed
through a lens of historical institutionalism, this chapter explores how Nevada’s rent
seeking policy preferences result in company-based incentives being awarded in the 28th
(2014) Special Legislative Session. Using rent seeking and the creative class theory, this
chapter introduces two distinct policy options available to policymakers when crafting
incentive packages to attract or expand enterprise to generate economic development.
Early Nevada- Applying Historical Institutionalism
Nevada provides an ideal subject for this case study’s exploration of policymakers
preferences between using people- or company-based incentives to attract economic
development. Historically, Nevada is a state born from a rent seeking territory and its
original institutions embody a policy preference of company-based incentives.
Additionally, Nevada has one of the nation’s least diverse economies which has been
prone to large booms and busts during the past two large economic crisis- the Great
Recession of the late-2000s and the most recent global economic crises created by the
COVID-19 pandemic. Following the Great Recession, Nevada policymakers began
efforts of economic diversification through developing new institutions to attract new
economic development opportunities. The state’s unique history and new focus on
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economic diversification provide a valuable case study where shifting policy preferences
bound up within path-dependent institutions, resistant to change and conditioned by their
past, are examined to identify the impact of transitioning policy preferences. Nevada’s
rent seeking history encourages company-based incentives to overcome the state’s
neglect of people-based investments.
Nevada was first institutionally created from the territorial expansion of the Utah
Territory where settlers created a squatter government- establishing bylaws and
regulations to govern the farming and trading community. The period between 1857 and
1861 was described as an “era of anarchy and confusion” in the territory (Bowers, 2006,
p. 11). The first local government was set up by settlers from The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). This resulted in decades of tension between Mormons
and non-Mormons in the territory until Mormons were recalled by Brigham Young in 1857
to Salt Lake City to prepare for the Utah War. This move created a power vacuum of
chaos, lawlessness, and conflict where residents repeatedly tried to succeed from the
Utah Territory and establish a territorial constitution. These efforts resulted in three
dysfunctional governments operating in the territory: a provisional territorial government
largely viewed as illegitimately elected through voter fraud; the Utah territorial government
attempting to govern from the distant Salt Lake valley; and, the federal court authority
which had two U.S. District Judges claiming authority- President Buchanan appointed
R.P. Flenniken to replace Judge Cradlebaugh who refused to leave his position (Bowers,
2006, p. 13).
The nation’s first major discovery of silver ore in 1859, known as the Comstock
Lode, sparked a silver rush in Nevada that would result in businesses needing a
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government authority to protect their mining interests. The sudden unplanned influx of
people with competing conflicts over ownership rights ended Nevada’s experiments with
ineffective and chaotic institutions incapable of settling conflict and protecting property
rights. Residents, aided by Nevada’s fledgling mining industry, earnestly worked to
establish a functional regional government.
On March 2, 1861 President Buchanan signed legislation establishing the Nevada
Territory thereby paving the way for the creation of legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government. The first major political battle within the newly established
legislature involved the generation of revenue for supporting the territorial government.
A proposed mining tax on the territory’s major enterprise was the first of many battles
over taxing the state’s first “smokestack” leading one observer to state, “the background
of Nevada politics for thirty years was a fight of mine operators against paying taxes”
(Lillard, 1942, p. 25). In fact, the opposition to taxing corporate mining profits lead to the
defeat of Nevada’s first constitution drafted by the constitutional delegates in 1863. The
failed constitution unsurprisingly mirrored California’s constitution, considering thirty-four
of the thirty-nine delegates to the constitutional convention had come from California and
had lived in Nevada for less than five years (Elliott & Rowley, 1987, p. 78).
Although mining interests had defeated the first attempt at statehood, political
pressure from outside the territory would give the territory a second chance. President
Abraham Lincoln and his congressional allies needed more votes in Congress to assure
the two-thirds votes needed to secure passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish
slavery, and President Lincoln believed he needed Nevada’s three electoral votes to win
the upcoming 1864 presidential election (Bowers, 2006, p. 20). To accomplish these two

78

goals, Nevada needed to become a state. Under the watchful eye of the federal
government, a new convention dominated by mining interests was convened and the
constitution from the failed convention of 1863 was used as a starting point. After a long
and divisive fight over mining-tax, the delegates agreed to a mining exemption from taxes
which states:
The Legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real, personal and
possessory, except mines and mining claims (Nevada Constitution, art. X,
sec. 1).
With the corporate mining incentives spelled out in the document, the 1984 constitution
was overwhelmingly ratified and Nevada was quickly admitted into the Union as the thirtysixth state just prior to the 1864 national elections.15
History of Investing in Place- Rent Seeking
Nevada may be “Battle Born” but it was conceived in rent-seeking. The state’s new
constitution is the most formal institution established in the State of Nevada, and the
state’s foundational document contained company-based incentives clearly prioritizing
rent seeking within the state. Institutions, defined as sets of laws or rules, are at the very
core of historical institutionalism. For purposes of this project the definition of institutions
is expanded to also include political organs. This case study of Nevada offers insight into
historical institutionalism’s struggle with rent seeking within the state to frame the projects
central task of understanding the conditions under which institutions and policies structure
social behavior (Capoccia, 2016, p. 1096) and become objects “of strategic action” (Hall,

Congress, waived the right to inspect and approve the constitution which was hastily “wired to the nation’s
capital at a cost of $3,416.77, making it the longest and most expensive telegram ever dispatched in the
United States at that time” (Bowers, 2006, p. 23).
15
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2010, 204). The institutions in Nevada provide a window to analyze how institutions are
structuring interactions with companies today. Even more important is how Nevada’s
current exogenous interactions with companies and policymaking to attract new
enterprise are highly path-dependent with policy trajectories conditioned by Nevada’s
past (Peters et al., 2005, p. 1275). The state’s 1864 constitution establishes an institution
within Nevada which is later supported by self-reinforcing processes establishing a
pattern making change difficult.
The 1864 Constitution of the State of Nevada represents the state’s first institution
which all other institutions (whether rules or government organizations) derive. Corporate
interests are further enshrined in Article Ten which limits mining taxes to no more than
five percent of net proceeds or the amount of money mining brings in after deducting all
expenses (Nevada Constitution, Art. X, sec. 5). Over time, this constitutional guarantee
allowed the legislature to create several specific deductions or loopholes significantly
limiting mining’s tax burden (NRS 362.120 [3] [a-m]), and further identified the policy
trajectory and self-reinforcing processes associated with path dependency. The creating
of these deductions on ordinary business expenses like costs of extracting minerals,
transportation costs, industrial insurance costs, costs associated with reclamation to
remediate the mines own damages are consistent with protections originally outlined in
the state’s constitution. For mining, these government benefits have resulted in a
significant reduction in their tax burden and have established Nevada’s institutions on a
path favorable to corporate enterprise (see Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1: Nevada Department of Taxation Net Proceeds of Minerals

Source: Sierra Club.(2021). It’s Time to Reform Nevada’s Mining Tax Laws. Toiyabe
Chapter. Retrieved from https://www.sierraclub.org/toiyabe/blog/2021/04/its-timereform-nevadas-mining-tax-laws

With the path clearly set, Nevada would continue favoring corporate interests and
orienting laws and government organs around the historical lessons learned in the failed
and successful passage of the state’s constitution.
Bolstered by the favorable government treatment and the state’s rich natural
resources, Nevada’s mining industry accounts for 70 percent of the country’s gold and 30
percent of its silver production making the state one of the top three gold producers in the
world (Bowers, 2006, p. 130). While mining was booming in Northern Nevada, gaming
started to take hold as a key industry in the state’s southern desert. With mining deeply
planted within the state’s institutions, gaming was seen as an industry that could provide
a source of tax revenue to support the growing state and fund state government.
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Gaming- Nevada’s Second Industry
During the post war period, the gaming and hospitality sectors became Nevada’s
chief industry. As a prohibited industry throughout the country, gaming took an almost
laissez-faire don’t rock the boat type approach to government, where gaming kept their
heads down and tried to conduct business without attracting government attention. This
deferential approach to government combined with mining’s constitutionally protected
interests made gaming a prime target for taxes. Within a short period of time, gaming
made up the largest share of the state’s revenues, and eager policymakers supported by
the mining industry devised four different types of gaming taxes. Taxes on the gross
gambling income of each casino is the largest source of gaming tases, followed by a $250
annual tax on each slot machine, third is a live entertainment tax on all live entertainment
in or out of a casino, and finally each gaming table is taxed.
Geographically, the primarily southern gaming industry became another
unsuspecting target for institutions oriented around northern interests. For the northern
Nevada controlled legislature, gaming was an industry which could be taxed to shift the
tax burden away from the constitutionally preferred mining industry. Additionally, the
newly levied taxes could be collected in southern Nevada to support projects in other
parts of the state. Although these taxes were generated and collected in southern
Nevada, tax laws were written to divert the revenues to the north and rural parts of the
state- far from where the taxes were generated. Proceeds from the gross gambling tax
and the live entertainment tax go to the state’s general fund for the legislature to
appropriate wherever they want; 80 percent of the revenues from the slot machine tax
are earmarked for education throughout the state and 20 percent “pay off bonds sold to
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construct and renovate the Thomas & Mack Center at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas and the Lawlor Events Center at the University of Nevada, Reno”; and finally, the
gaming table tax primarily generated in Clark County- the state’s southernmost county- is
divided evenly among the states seventeen counties regardless of whether they have a
gaming table or not (Bowers, 2019). According to scholar Michael Bowers, without the
division of the gaming table tax “the less-populated counties in the state would have
difficulty meeting their revenue needs” (2019, p. 118). This historical evolution of
institutions in Nevada beginning with the preferential treatment for corporate mining
interests now added a northern centric factor to the mix.
Nevada has typically been a one industry state, first mining and then gaming. A
predominant reliance on gaming for state revenues may protect certain interests, but it
makes the state’s budget largely vulnerable to the fates of one industry. Over half of the
state’s budget relies on tax revenues from the relatively unstable and unpredictable
gaming and sales tax (Bowers, 2019, p. 116). Unpredictable events like the terrorists’
attacks of September 11, 2001, economic downturns like the Great Recession of the late2000s, and global events like the COVID-19 pandemic are highly disruptive and create
significant challenges for a state so reliant on an unstable tax base. The state’s heavy
reliance on hospitality and tourism combined with explosive population growth made
Nevada one of the least prepared states to weather inevitable economic periods of
expansion and recession.
Economic Crisis Demands Change Through Policy Action
As the 2008 economic crisis abated nationally, Nevada’s recovery continued to lag
behind the rest of the nation. The subprime mortgage crisis of the early-2000 recession
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had a profound impact in Nevada where the state’s heavy reliance on hospitality and
tourism revenues experienced sharp declines as disposable incomes dried up nationally.
Local governments in Nevada built reliance on the revenues associated with building to
accommodate the explosive population growth. Nevada was arguably the state hit
hardest by the Great Recession of the early-2000s. It had the nation’s highest rate of
home foreclosures and lead the nation with the highest unemployment rate for three
years- 2010 (14.9 percent), 2011 (12.9 percent), and 2012 (11.1 percent) (Bureau of
Labor Statistics & Department of Labor, 2010; Bureau of Labor Statistics & Department
of Labor, 2011; Bureau of Labor Statistics & Department of Labor, 2012) (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: State Unemployment Rates in 2010

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor,
The Economics Daily, State unemployment rates in 2010
at https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110301.htm (visited January 17, 2022).
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In many ways, the Great Recession was a perfect storm for the state and local
government revenues in Nevada. The state’s economic growth in hospitality and tourism
lead to explosive population growth creating high demand for housing. Between 2010
and 2020, Nevada was the fifth fastest growing state in the Nation (Mackun et at., 2021)
and is expected to continue its fast growth through 2030 (Urban Institute, 2021). When
you start having construction workers build their own house you begin to see how a major
problem is developing on the horizon when the housing market slows and the construction
worker finds themselves without income to support their new home purchases. Local
governments in Southern Nevada structured budgets around the perpetuity of robust
construction, despite the cyclical nature of the housing market.

Meaning, the sub

mortgage crisis of the Great Recession alone would have been devastating to Nevada
because as home prices plummeted more than half the new residents had negative
mortgage equity in their recently purchased homes. The world economic crisis
dramatically impacted hospitality and tourism as disposable incomes dried up and
vacation plans were altered. Additionally, businesses cut costs which impacted Nevada’s
robust business convention market.
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Figure 5.3: Home Foreclosures in Zip Code 89031 Since 2006- 2018

Source: Goldstein, M., Gebeloff, R., Mantle, R., & Ruby, M. (2018, September, 12). The
Epicenter of that Housing Bust is Booming Again. The New York Times. Retrieved at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/12/business/las-vegas-housing-crisis.html
In Figure 5.3 above, the yellow dots represent homes foreclosed in one Southern Nevada

zip code from 2006-2018, representing more than one in three homes foreclosed at least
once in the Las Vegas region. The national media repeatedly showed pictures of
residential streets in Las Vegas lined with signs advertising homes for sale in front of
almost every house on the street. The foreclosure crisis and high unemployment resulted
in massive cuts to social programs and education.

86

State spending, in what could be considered “people-based investments” in the
economic development arena, was impacted by the Great Recession. During good
economic times, Nevada had low levels of spending on social programs, and naturally
during bad economic times this spending decreased further. The state consistently ranks
near the bottom of any national list assessing state provided social services (Bowers,
2019, p. 69).
Faced with these challenges, policymakers “made significant and extended cuts
to education, public safety, health care, and other public sector budgets” (Tuman, et al.,
2013). For purposes of this project, these cuts were clearly cuts to “people-based”
investments further exacerbating problems associated with the state’s history of not
investing in its people. As the frequency and severity of the state’s cycle of revenue
shortfalls attributed to its one industry reliance piled up, policymakers became desperate
to stabilize their tax base through economic diversification. To address its vulnerable
economy a new era and reorientation of economic development began with the intention
of growth through diversification and shifting from the rent seeking past. To drive new
economic development to the state, Nevada began to organize and restructure economic
development efforts within its institutions and regional organs.
Economic Development in Nevada
In 2011, the Nevada Legislature proactively and rapidly created the Governor’s
Office of Economic Development (GOED) to “promote a robust, diversified and
prosperous economy” (A.B. 449, 2011),16 and one of its first actions was to commission
a state-wide economic development study. The Washington, D.C. based Brookings
This came on the last day of the session, only minutes before the session concluded for its two-year
hiatus. CITE
16
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Institution: Metropolitan Policy Program, Brooking Mountain West on the campus of
University of Nevada Las Vegas, and SRI International in Arlington Virginia authored the
report- Unify, Regionalize, Diversify: An Economic Development Agenda for Nevada
providing a significant blueprint to guide the state as it embarked on efforts to diversify
and grow the state’s economy (Muro et al., 2011). This report became a blueprint that
was used to fully engage stakeholders in the state and began aligning economic
development priorities in Northern and Southern Nevada.
With a blueprint in place, Nevada appeared fully committed to diversifying its
economy and curing its overreliance on the hospitality and tourism sector through
strategically targeted economic development. Most notably, GOED took the lead in
attracting and vetting opportunities, and the state legislature embraced the role of rapidly
creating real time incentive tools to attract new enterprise and expand existing Nevada
businesses.
28th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature- Chasing New Smoke Stacks
In 2014, during a first of its kind 28th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature,
the legislature developed the state’s first real robust statewide economic incentive tools
while simultaneously using them to close the deal to bring Tesla to Nevada. By all
appearances the special session was for Tesla and the incentives created were for the
company, however Nevada does not allow for this degree of specificity. The Nevada
Constitution requires all laws passed by the legislature to be “general and of uniform
operation throughout the state” (Article 4 sec. 21) meaning, the incentives could not be
specifically for any one company (read Tesla) or any specifically “named” county as they
must be ‘general’ and ‘uniform.’ Over the years, the Nevada Legislature has devised
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different drafting strategies to avoid this constitutional prohibition; and one of the more
popular techniques being to draft laws which are general in nature, but constructively
specific when applied. For example, if the legislature desires to write a law for a specific
business in Clark County, the legislature will draft a law that only applies in counties with
a population greater than one million residents. As the most populous county, Clark
County’s 2.2 million residents far eclipses the second most populous county Washoe with
its 471,500 residents. Therefore, the law’s construction is specific only to Clark County,
without naming Clark County, much less the company the law was actually drafted for.
While the session was legally convened by Governor Sandoval’s proclamation to create
economic incentive tools to diversify Nevada, the session was called to create state
incentives to close the deal with Tesla and bring them to Nevada. The bills passed during
the 28th Special Session did not mention Tesla by name, but the Governor’s joint press
release with Tesla announcing the special legislative session, and the clear legislative
intent to create an incentive package designed for Tesla made it clear- the 28th Special
Session marked a new way Nevada would continue along its historic smokestack chasing
path.
Convening the Special Session
On September 4, 2014 Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval and Tesla Chairman and
CEO Elon Musk issued a joint press release announcing that Nevada has been selected
as the official site for the Tesla Gigafactory (Tesla, 2014). Up to this point in time, GOED
Executive Director Steve Hill had successfully negotiated and constructed the incentive
deal that would be presented to the legislature which, except for some legislative
leadership, had largely been in the dark prior to the announcement. The announcement
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that Nevada won the intense competition among several states reverberated around the
nation and world, yet the intended audience was the 63 legislators who were suddenly
the only thing standing in the way of the incredible opportunity to have the “world’s largest
and most advanced battery factory” and its promise of “nearly one hundred billion dollars
in economic impact” (Tesla, 2014). Similar to the experiences seen in Tennessee, the
Governor announcing the selection of Nevada and then handing it off to the legislature to
approve the deal put a tremendous amount of pressure on policymakers to not mess up
the once in a lifetime opportunity (Gaventa et al., 1990, p. 181), and all but guaranteed
the legislature would acquiesce to the magnitude of the moment.
GOED Report
Five days after the joint announcement, Governor Sandoval issued an official
proclamation on September 9th to convene a special session the next day. Between the
announcement and the proclamation, the Governor’s office released two reports,
Economic Impact of Tesla on Washoe and Storey Counties and Tax and Incentive
Analysis for Tesla in Storey County, NV, prepared by a third party outlining the economic
impacts should Tesla win legislative support and the proposed government incentives
(GOED, 2014a; GOED, 2014b). For many legislators, they received the reports along with
the media and general public.
The Tax and Incentive Analysis for Tesla in Storey County, NV outlined the
proposed incentives which would need legislative approval and the net new taxes that
would be generated by Tesla over a twenty-year period (GOED, 2014b). The Economic
Impact of Tesla on Washoe and Storey Counties provided a detailed analysis of the
economic and revenue impacts on Storey County and the state generated by the jobs
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and investment Tesla was planning on making and the catalyst impact the project would
have on attracting future development to the region (GOED, 2014a). As the only technical
reports provided to the legislature, the reports were the primary documents policymakers
relied on during the special session, and they represented the only substantiative
economic impact analysis in preparation for the short special session which provided little
time for substantive analysis of the two reports, preparation of additional reports, or
mobilization of any opposition.
The two reports provided a “framework for understanding the economic and
revenue impacts” Tesla would bring to Nevada (GOED, 2014a; GOED, 2014b).
According to the analysis on jobs, Tesla’s $4.95 billion investment in buildings and
equipment would create 9,000 direct construction jobs, an additional 4,700 indirect jobs
in the first three years and upon construction of the building the factory would create 6500
direct on-site jobs, and 16,000 indirect jobs in the community. The jobs impact of the
project would increase state employment by approximately 2% and regional employment
by more than 10%. According to the reports, the direct economic impact generated would
be nearly $40 billion over 20 years and indirect economic impact of another $60 billion
over the same time. It would and add over 3% to the state’s gross domestic product and
a more than 20% increase in the northern region’s gross domestic product. The enormity
of the project was indeed “monumental” with the potential to, as Governor Sandoval
stated, “change the world” (Tesla, 2014).
Limiting Structure of the Legislature
The excitement and attention of the potential project continued to build as the
legislature prepared to convene and consider the world changing project. Nevada’s
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Constitution allows the Governor to specify the day and time the session convenes and
“state to both houses, when organized, the business for which they have been specially
convened” further stating the legislature “shall not introduce, consider or pass any bills
except those related to the business for which the Legislature has been specially
convened” (Article 9, sec 1-2.). These constitutional provisions allowed the governor to
quickly convene the legislative session in the middle of the intense media hype which
provided limited time for close scrutiny of the proposed incentives or the projected
benefits of the project.
The founding legal institutions of Nevada established in the constitution orient and
prioritize the power structures within the state. Although the constitution provides for the
traditional three branches of government, constructively they do not appear to be equal.17
The treatment of the legislature within the constitution as a lessor branch of government
is consistent with subsequent constitutional amendments regarding the legislature. The
construction of Nevada’s constitutional provisions limiting the scope of the session
provide even more power to the executive branch’s ability to influence the process and
push through a project. The 1864 constitution originally limited the regular session to
sixty days and the special session to 20 days. Consistent with this limiting treatment of
the legislature, in 1998 the constitution was amended by voters to limit the session to 120
calendar days in a regular session. Plainly stated, Nevadans like their legislature best
when it is not in session subscribing to Mark Twain’s belief that, “No man’s life, liberty, or
property are safe while the legislature is in session.”

Aside from the traditional three branches of government, the Nevada State Constitution also sets aside
higher education as a fourth branch of government which has been the subject of much debate and
disagreement in the legislature.
17
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Legislation of the 28th Special Session
Passing the entirety of the incentive package for Tesla during roughly a 24-hour
special session of the legislature may do little to inspire confidence that the best policy
outcomes were achieved; however, the successful results of attracting one of the most
nationally sought-after economic development opportunities speaks for itself, or does it?
Following this apparent success, the state continued to use the approach of short special
session of the legislature to attract the promise of multibillion-dollar projects to the state
two more times during the 29th 2015 Special Session and the 30th 2016 Special Session.
Quickly crafting economic development tools during hasty special sessions offers unique
insight into the rapid transformation of state institutions which traditionally transform
gradually over longer periods of time. Historical institutionalism can be used as a scientific
approach to better understand the impact of the institutional setting that structures make
on forming public policy (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 2)
Incentive Package
The total inventive package to Tesla was $1.25 billion in sales tax abatements,
property tax abatements, and other tax credits and reimbursements making it the 10th
largest in US history (see Table 5.1). Notably, Nevada was providing more than double
the $500 million package Tesla said would be needed (Damon, 2014) calling in to
question the soundness of the deal. The sales tax abatements are for 20 years, the
property tax abatements are for 10 years (during the time Tesla makes the vast majority
of its purchases to tool the factory) with the other tax credits and reimbursements lasting
between 10 and 20 years.
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Table 5.1: Summary of Tax Revenues, Abatements and Reimbursements by Tax
Type for Tesla

GOED. (2014b). Tax Incentive Analysis for Tesla in Storey County, NV. Prepared by
Applied Economics. Retrieved from https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/28th2014
Special/ Committees/ S_Committees/docs/COW%20Exhibit%20B%20%20Steve
%20Hill%20(GOED).pdf

While these incentives fall within the definition of company-based incentives, the state
also agreed to build the road connecting Tesla to Interstate 80 and extend the road to
other parts of the privately owned industrial center at a cost of $100 million. In contrast to
Virginia below, Nevada’s investment in infrastructure is an exclusive benefit to the
company and should be categorized as a company-based incentive. Nevada officials
contend the eighteen-mile roadway will make the rural area more appealing for future
business that can service the industrial center (Perea, 2014); however, there is not
sufficient information in the legislative record or surrounding media reports to substantiate

94

the benefit the roadway will have to the few residents residing in the area. Additionally,
Assembly Bill 2 represents another example of a company-based incentive passed by the
legislature allowing Tesla to bypass the state’s auto dealer franchise requirements and
sell cars directly to consumers through a manufacturer’s store. The only people-based
incentive is a requirement for Tesla to contribute $7.5 million a year for five years to
education in the state for a total of $37.5 million. This structure allows Tesla certain
additional federal tax benefits as the company makes the payments to Nevada’s schools.
The overwhelming reliance on company-based benefits follow Nevada’s historical
preferences embedded within the state’s institutions.
Aside from smokestack chasing, the 28th Special Session predictably followed
other historical institutional preferences. Following the creation of a Unify, Regionalize,
Diversify: An Economic Development Agenda for Nevada in 2011 (Muro et al., 2011), the
Nevada legislature took action to diversify by creating a film tax credit program in the very
next legislative session (S.B. 165, 2013). Given the popularity of Las Vegas as a
Hollywood backdrop, this $80 million program was designed to bolster the emerging
industry in Southern Nevada; however, the program was gutted when $70 million was
shifted out of the program and shifted to a northern interest. The policy choice to move
funds allocated for diversification in southern Nevada followed the historical pattern of
prioritization of northern interests over southern interests. Once again underscoring
Nevada’s lack of self-awareness of where things should go geographically.
In One Nevada, Geography Also Matters
Popular Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval made the slogan “One Nevada” central
to his administration’s narrative of a singular Nevada family (Hagar, 2014) in an effort to
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counter the traditional North-South divide entrenched in the state’s institutions. In terms
of geographic preferences, the “One Nevada” looks a lot like the old two (or more)
Nevadas. Central to the Brooking’s report Unify, Regionalize, diversify was the concept
of the desire of Nevadans to ‘get on the same page’” (Muro et al., 2011, p. 4). As
highlighted in the report’s title, “unify” was a central concept and underscores an existing
divide the “intense five-month inquiry” sought to correct through recommendations that
would lead to more even distribution of opportunities across the state. Interestingly, the
report seeks to “unify” by embracing geographic differences and leveraging regional
strengths by separating the state into regional industry networks and clusters to
strategically align and target new opportunities (Muro et al., 2011).
Often, company-based investments create jurisdictional cherry picking where
more sophisticated jurisdictions can reap the rewards of a localized economic
development without directly subsidizing it. For example, within metropolitan regions
made up of various governing entities, one local government can vote for a sports stadium
deal and if a resident or business does not want to deal with the consequences of a new
stadium, they can simply move to a neighboring jurisdiction, thereby avoiding the taxes
yet still being able to enjoy the benefits of the new stadium. Often this reality allows the
business seeking government incentives to pit one jurisdiction against another and wait
on the sidelines as the competing jurisdictions drive up the overall incentive package in
their effort to attract the business. For this reason, states often reduce the incentives local
governments can offer. This is particularly the case in a Dillon Rule state like Nevada
where the legislature has complete control over local jurisdictions.
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In Nevada, the jurisdictional cherry picking occurred but did not follow the
traditional localized regional model where a neighboring jurisdiction receives the benefit
without the direct cost. The traditional line of thinking was flipped on its head because
the south provides the money for the exploits of the north. Tesla and all the economic
advantages flowing to the northern region of the state were isolated over four hundred
miles away from taxpayers in the southern region paying over 80% of the cost of the
incentives.
Nevada has a historical north-south divide. The phenomenon of geographical
areas being treated differently by their governing body is well established in states where
metropolitan regions develop after existing seats of power and where older cultural
connections, traditions and beliefs are still present to challenge the emerging metropolitan
region (Zelinsky, 1973). The growth of a metropolitan region requires an influx of people
usually drawn from outside the state. These “outsiders” threaten the “subdued, yet
meaningful, internal cultural heterogeneity of an older America is being supplanted by a
novel mosaic, equally variegated but pieced together from newer materials and with new
forces” (Zelinsky, 1973, p. 110). In Nevada, this dynamic allowed for the connected and
settled cities of the North to exploit the disconnected discombobulated towns booming in
the south. There disadvantages were further assisted by the fact that southern gaming
interests were subservient to the northern controlled legal systems who had complete
control over their southern based industry. This created a dynamic where southern
interests were submissive and deferential to northern control creating a historic chasm
between the traditional northern regional power and the new emerging southern power.
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There are many examples of institutional manifestations of this north-south power
chevage. Beginning with the constitutional protection of geographically fixed industry
located in the north, this favorable treatment continued over time and is embodied
institutionally throughout the state in government structures and statutes. The state
statutes governing gaming and entertainment tax are written so that revenues generated
in the south are collected and distributed to support state operations and public services
provided in the north. In funding for education, the state allocates more per pupil dollars
for students enrolled in institutions of higher education in Northern Nevada and a
distributive education model funding K-12 provides more favorable funding treatment for
schools in the North and rural areas of the state. In Southern Nevada, UNLV enrolls over
28,600 students and UNR in Northern Nevada enrolls 20,194. Despite UNLV being 34%
larger the two schools are funded equally, and the schools both provided the same
amount of physical teaching and research space despite their very different sizes (Morris,
2014). The unequal treatment is also seen in funding for infrastructure, roads, health
outcomes, federal funding, and nonprofit support where Northern Nevada nonprofits
receive more than twice the assets and revenue per capita from the state than Southern
Nevada nonprofits (Morris, 2014).
This consistent unequal treatment of Northern Nevada continued with the incentive
package put together for Tesla. The incentive package would not have been possible
without the tax base from Southern Nevada which was used to pay for the incentives
given to support an economic development opportunity located over 400 miles away.
Nevada’s natural assets, industry, geography, and population density are all factors that
further this historic treatment. Urban Las Vegas vs rural cow counties, new residents
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flocking to the south vs old-timers with generational connections to the state in the north,
and casino towns vs mining towns are all differences that bolster and support the divide.
These differences create natural divisions making unity challenging for policymakers
working within institutions molded by history, and when economic challenges unevenly
impact the state, the challenge is even more difficult. Events like 9-11, the Great
Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic expose the inherent regional differences
manifested when rates of unemployment and home foreclosures were dramatically higher
in Southern Nevada compared to other areas of the state.
Drafting an economic development agenda, creating GOED and the adoption of a
state economic development plan were designed around recognizing the differences
existing between the north and south (read “unify”), embracing and leveraging the
differences (read “regionalize”), and working together as a state to evenly grow (read
“diversify”); however, since the creation of GOED, the data suggests the state prioritized
economic development opportunities locating in the north furthering Nevada’s historical
regional preferences (see Table 5.2).
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Table 5.2: Approved and Withdrawn Tax Abatements and Projects in Nevada,
2012-2020.

Sources GOED, “Biennium Report to Legislature of Abatements from Taxation, 2021”
and Nevada Department of Taxation, “Certified Population Estimates of Nevada’s
Counties, Cities, and Towns 2000 to 2020 Estimates from NV State Demographer.

The state’s new economic development institutions are evolving consistent with the
established

geographical

prioritization

historically

established

within

Nevada’s

institutions. Surprisingly, there has been little attention given to the unequal distribution
of these abatements despite the clear inequity. Distilling the allocation of abatements
between two regions (Clark and Nye County vs all other Nevada Counties) and comparing
it to the amount of revenue each region produces for the state’s coffers suggest the exact
opposite percentage of abatements received should be allocated for equal treatment (see
Table 5.3).

100

Table 5.3: Tax Abatements Received Per Region Based on Population

Sources GOED, “Biennium Report to Legislature of Abatements from Taxation, 2021”
and Nevada Department of Taxation, “Certified Population Estimates of Nevada’s
Counties, Cities, and Towns 2000 to 2020 Estimates from NV State Demographer.

The table above demonstrates the effects of institutional preferences for Northern
Nevada. Incredibly the path dependency of favoring the north is so strong that it continues
today despite the overwhelming majority of representation of elected officials from
Southern Nevada in the legislature. In the Nevada Senate 16 of the 21 districts are located
in Clark County, and in the Nevada Assembly 31 of the 42 members of the Nevada
Assembly represent districts in Clark County. In the case of Tesla, despite 74% of the
members of the legislature elected from districts in Southern Nevada, the scales were
tipped due to the fact that Governor Sandoval is from Northern Nevada with a long history
of representing his Northing Nevada neighbors as an elected official. In fact, until Nevada
Governor Steve Sisolak’s election in 2018, Nevada had never had a governor who
graduated from UNLV, Nevada’s largest university located in Southern Nevada.
However, it is worth noting that despite this fact, the vast majority of Governor Sisolak
staff were assembled from Northern Nevada where the state bureaucracy is located and
where local residents make up the vast majority of the staff in all three branches of the
state’s government.
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The north vs south concern with Nevada’s historical regional preferences was
discussed extensively during the 28th Special Session. During GOED’s presentation of
the incentive package, Senator Mark Manendo stated “one of the concerns I have heard
over the years regards funding for transportation. Last Session we brought forward a bill
to rework the Transportation Board due to the inequalities that have occurred in this State
from the north to the south,” and then inquired if the infrastructure required for Tesla would
be “a shift in dollars from the south to the north” (Nevada Senate, 2014, p. 32). Senator
Ruben Kihuen asked, “What would you say to my constituents in southern Nevada who
do not want to subsidize this project for northern Nevada jobs?” (Nevada Senate, 2014,
p. 26). Senator Justin Jones pressured the state by asking “What assurances can you
give us that when companies take advantage of the provisions of this bill, they will not
look only to northern Nevada or the Salt Lake area, but rather to southern Nevada first”
(Nevada Senate, 2014, p. 28). These examples of legislators directly addressed the
regional debate combine with the universal description of the project as a “Northern
Nevada” project, not a Nevada opportunity, underscore the regional considerations
present and the awareness of the presence of this historical factor.
During testimony in the Assembly, where the north vs south argument simmered
barely below the surface for much of the day, in response to a statement and question
regarding the number of different companies choosing to expand in Clark County, the
governor’s office stated:
“In fact, Mr. Musk, who is the chairman of Tesla Motors, is also the chairman
of Silver City. The first company that was related to Mr. Musk’s business
ventures chose Las Vegas. The second choice he has made is here in
northern Nevada and, obviously, this was his choice directly” (Nevada
Assembly, 2014, p. 104).
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Although nothing in the questioning asked if it was Tesla’s choice to locate in Northern
Nevada, the revealing testimony shows the hypersensitivity if not omission to the
concerns of where Tesla ultimately chose to locate. The facts remain, when Tesla first
came to Nevada on their own to explore a location for their Gigafactory, they came to
Southern Nevada multiple times. When their self-selection of Southern Nevada became
known, they were contacted by stake holders in Northern Nevada and whisked away to
visit Northern Nevada for the first time (Elkind, 2014).
Applying the Creative Class Theory to Nevada
Nevada’s constructive and deliberate use of the newly created institutions and
abatement policies to divert and direct economic development to specific areas of the
state are antithetical to arguments of ideal economic development and model city building
advanced by Richard Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class (2003), Edward Glaeser’s
Triumph of the City (2012), and others. In 2014, Nevada specifically steered Tesla away
from Southern Nevada’s larger population and the more robust metropolitan region made
up of the state’s three largest cities and induced Tesla to build its $4.5 billion factory in
the middle of the desert 25 miles away from the state’s 4 th largest city. Locating in
Northern Nevada instead of Southern Nevada sacrifices the intrinsic value Gaeser places
on density and the advantages Florida gives for robust technology, talent, and tolerance.18
While these regional preferences are consistent with the path-dependent direction
historically established within the state’s institutions, the creative class theory provides a
useful critique to better inform policymakers. Data shows that the creative class in

The insufficient workforce, lack of housing inventory and ancillary corporate service providers made it
difficult for Tesla to build their planned project and impossible to scale any future expansion or attract
indirect economic development opportunities.
18
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Nevada’s largest metropolitan region is growing and beginning to outpace other
metropolitans providing informed policymakers an opportunity to realign historical policy
preferences toward leveraging the creative class as an asset (see Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4: Growth and Change of Creative Class in U.S. Metros

Source: Fenske, S. (2019). St. Louis Is in the Top 10 Metro Areas for Growth in the
Creative Class. River Front Times, Jul 12, 2019. Retrieved from
https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2019/07/12/st-louis-is-in-the-top-10-metroareas-for-growth-in-the-creative-class
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Territorial Assets
This project operationalizes this factor by analyzing Nevada’s use of existing
territorial assets to attract Tesla. There is a lot of uncertainty regarding the future success
of economic development projects and their long-term commitment to new locations.
Within the “smokestack chasing” arena, companies attracted by incentives are
susceptible to relocate when the incentives sunset. Strong “territorial assets” can offer a
stabilization of sorts where workforce becomes anchored to a community providing more
integration and connectedness to a place. When a geographical location is of intrinsic
value, the unmovable territorial assets can shore up some of the uncertainty and risk
facing policymakers intent on investing in a long-term relationship.
Comparison of North vs South
Place matters, and for Tesla, the company was interested in the incentives the
state had to offer them for locating within it. Given that Tesla first went to Southern Nevada
and then to Norther Nevada, the actual location within the state was less important than
the hundreds of millions in subsidies. For policymakers from Southern Nevada, they saw
the Tesla locating to the north as an opportunity to finally end Northern Nevada’s historical
reliance on revenues generated from tax payers in Southern Nevada. They also saw it as
an opportunity to establish a reliable local economy in Northern Nevada. While putting an
economic anchor like Tesla in Northern Nevada could provide significant gain for the
region, the economic projections from the state predicted Tesla would become over 25%
of the local GDP (GOED, 2014a) making the entire region reliant on the success of one
relatively new company which at the time had yet to have a profitable year (Mackenzie,
2020).
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Tesla would instantly induce the migration of a creative class. In the first few years
Tesla moved more than 900 engineers into the Reno-Sparks Metropolitan area. While
these employees are initially with Tesla, tech companies have some of the highest level
of employee turnover of any industry, and Tesla is no different with employees staying an
average of 2.1 years (Fagan, 2018). Given this reality, policymakers should focus on
which region was better positioned to capture this turnover and keep the talent in the
region. Putting Tesla to Northern Nevada creates a one company region with limited
employment options for turnover employees. Southern Nevada has more significant
territorial assets more likely to retain tech talent.
Airports
Harry Reid International Airport in Southern Nevada is one of the ten busiest U.S.
airports, significantly more accessible and convenient than the Reno/Tahoe International
Airport. In 2021, Reno/Tahoe International Airport had 104,654 passengers pass through
it and 93,636 aircraft operations, averaging 256 per day. During the same time, Las Vegas
Harry Reid International Airport had 39,710,493 passengers pass through it and 486,540
aircraft operations, averaging 885 per day. For Richard Florida, the airport is seen as the
“biggest investment a community makes in its future” and one of the most strategic
decisions a community can make for its future (2008). With Southern Nevada’s airport
over 40 times larger than Northern Nevada’s airport there is little comparison to which
airport provides more support and options for the creative class.
Educational Attainment
Education is a central characteristic of members of the creative class and the
regional presence of educational attainment suggests the presence of the creative class.
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Additionally, levels of education of local residents are a significant workforce factor
considered by businesses looking to locate in the region (see Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.5: Las Vegas Educational Attainment Breakdown

Source: Town Charts. (2020). Las Vegas, Nevada Education Data. Retrieved
from https://www.towncharts.com/Nevada/Education/Las-Vegas-city-NV-Educationdata.html#Figure1
Figure 5.6: Reno Educational Attainment Breakdown

Source: Town Charts. (2020). Reno, Nevada Education Data. Retrieved from
https://www.towncharts.com/Nevada/Education/Reno-city-NV-Education-data.html
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Nationally, Nevada is consistently ranked in the bottom ten states of educational
attainment. Despite this abysmal statistic that hinders economic development as a whole,
the educational attainment comparison between the northern and southern regions is not
significantly different and would not have likely been a deciding factor in Tesla’s decision
of where to locate within the state. With regards to the territorial asset of entertainment,
the world class entertainment amenities available in Las Vegas are unmatched by
Northern Nevada or the rest of the world for that matter.
Entertainment
One fundamental question is whether Nevada missed their opportunity to leverage
Las Vegas as the entertainment capital of the world. For Florida, one repeating and
defining characteristic of a region’s ability to attract a creative class is viewed by his
assertion that the creative class looks for a city to be “a center for experience, lifestyle,
amenities and entertainment” (Florida, 2003, p. 16). This suggests that Nevada’s efforts
to push economic activity to the North failed to take advantage of the significant
entertainment and amenities offerings in Southern Nevada. This was evidenced when it
was reported that Tesla’s Elon Musk was actually camping out on the Gigafactory roof so
as he said “because it was less time than driving to a hotel room in Reno” (Clifford, 2018).
Government missed the mark when the creative class is forced to navel gaze at night on
the top of their multibillion-dollar taxpayer funded factory. According to Florida,
researchers need to “understand the city as an arena for consumption, for entertainment,
and for amenities- a city that competes for people as well as for firms, a city of symbols
and experiences, a city at night- is a huge research opportunity for sociology, geography
and related disciplines” (Florida, 2003, p. 16).
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Another issue is whether the rich and seemingly endless entertainment options
offered by Las Vegas are so dramatic that they discourage the creative class. As one of
the world’s premier entertainment destinations, many visitors seem surprised that people
live in Las Vegas much less work anywhere other than the strip.

Figure 5.7: Cities where the Creative Class Lives

Florida, R. (2019, August, 27). The Changing Geography of America’s Creative Class.
Boomberg.com: Bloomberg Citylab, Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2019-08-27/the-changing-geography-of-america-s-creative-class

However, the data suggests the creative class understands people live in Las
Vegas and the size of the creative class in the region is growing beginning to outpace
other metro regions (see Figure 5.7). With one of the lowest population shares of creative
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class, there is much improvement to be made. The metro region should be seen as an
asset that can be leveraged for current economic development projects and strategically
expanded to attract future opportunities. The emerging and growing creative class in
Southern Nevada provides an opportunity for policymakers to structure policies around
attracting the creative class to further Nevada’s policy goals of diversification. Through
the lens of the creative class theory, policymakers can become aware of the uniqueness
of the Las Vegas Strip as a territorial asset and an important foundation of economic
development that can act as a successful multiplier of state investments in economic
development.
Diversity (Creating class drivers)
For Florida, diversity is accounted for in his “tolerance” factor.

Tolerance is

measured by the percentage of population that is foreign, percentage of gay and lesbian
population, percentage of nonwhite and nonblack, and percentage of interracial
marriages, and more (Florida, 2014). As the largest county in Southern Nevada, Clark
County has a minority-majority population, is the most diverse county in Nevada, and is
one of the more diverse counties in the country (see Table 5.4).
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Table 5.4: Population Estimates Clark, Storey and Washoe County- Race

Source: Unites States Census Bureau (2020). Quick Facts: Clark County Nevada,
Storey County Nevada, Washoe County Nevada. Retrieved from
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
clarkcountynevada; https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/storeycountynevada;
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/washoecountynevada

Tesla is located in Storey County, one of the least diverse counties in the state. Although,
Tesla located in the decidedly less diverse Norther Nevada, the legislative record
provides many examples of legislators expressing their support for diversity. Notably, the
record reflects the value of diversity consistently expressed by legislators from Southern
Nevada. Senator Ford stated his support for Tesla due to the company’s “strong
commitment to diversification and diversity” (Nevada Senate, 2014, p. 30). Senator Ford
also pressed the Governor’s office on the types of “diversity programs” Tesla has and
how they would work on diversity with higher education in Nevada (Nevada Senate, 2014,
p. 31). The importance of tolerance and the significance of this value was present in
session and is a value of the majority of the legislature, yet the value was not connected
as a territorial economic driver as emphasized in the creative class theory.
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Applying Path Dependency, the New and Old Path
The 28th Special Session firmly established Nevada on its historic smokestack
chasing path. Influenced by history and restrained by institutional preferences, the policy
emerging from the special session reinforced the century old constitutional proclivities for
supporting company-based policy structures. The 21st century manifestation embodied in
the 28th Special Session is similar to the state’s past, and also become a new mile marker
for orientating the state’s future policy on a path of relying on company-based incentives
for future economic development opportunities. Subsequent special sessions have
followed the new, yet old, path established in the 28 th Special Session. With only a few
differences, the 29th (2015) Special Session to provide economic incentives for a
prospective car manufacturing plant followed the formula laid out in the precedent setting
28th Special Session of using company-based incentives.
The 29th Special Session of the Nevada Legislature
The 29th (2015) Special Session was designed to follow the same path as the
previous 28th Special Session. On Thursday December 11, 2015 Governor Sandoval
announced that Faraday Future, a California-based electric car start-up, had chosen
Southern Nevada to locate its production facility following a competitive national bidding
war. To secure the 3 million square foot facility and its promised 13,000 Nevada jobs and
$85 billion in economic impact, there would need to be a Special Session of the Nevada
Legislature. Similar to the Tesla session, Governor Sandoval announced the session on
a Thursday and issued a proclamation the following Tuesday to convene the session the
next day. Following the press announcement, the Governor’s office released an economic
impact analysis compiled by Applied Economics assessing the proposed abatements and
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impacts of the project (GOED, 2015). The language of the four bills was released shortly
before debate began, designed to follow the approach of the quick timeline and result of
the previous special session for Tesla the year before. The “new path” created a recipe
to quickly announce the thrilling victory in a national competitive bidding war, immediately
schedule a special legislative session, and quickly get company-based incentives
packages passed and signed into law.
The Assimilation of Two Paths
The events surrounding the special session presented a challenge to the historical
predisposition of the path-dependent smokestack chasing northern centric power
dynamics and how it manifested within the “new path” of special sessions for awarding
economic development incentives outlined above. The large spaces of undeveloped
desert in Nevada provide the perfect location for massive industrial parks unique to the
entire Southwest region of the country. This provides economic development
opportunities for Nevada; however, the 107,000-acre industrial park in Northern Nevada
and the competing 18,000-acre industrial park in Southern Nevada expose the historic
regional tensions. Since the creation of the state’s economic development tools, the
majority of the awarded abatements, as demonstrated in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above, have
been provided to lure companies to the industrial park in Northern Nevada. Learning from
the experiences of working with Tesla only to have them later persuaded to locate to
Northern Nevada, the Southern Nevada municipality of North Las Vegas decided to go
out and seek economic development opportunities on their own and not turn them over
to the state for abatement discussions until the company was firmly committed to locating
in Southern Nevada (Morell, 2015). This aggressive Southern Nevada approach to
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economic development threatened the state’s power dynamic, and the designs to have
another quick special session were undermined when attempts to stop this aggressive
approach were imbedded within the legislation.
The first attempt to slow down the competition between the dueling industrial parks
was to take away North Las Vegas’ ability to control water. Some credit Mark Twain with
saying, “whiskey is for drinking and water is for fighting over.” Whether the famed Nevada
miner turned beloved writer said it or not, in the arid desert, and particularly within the
legislative building during the 29th Special Session, it rung true. For the first time in
Nevada history, the Governor proposed taking away the water purveyor rights of an
incorporated city in SB 2 and giving them to another government entity (S.B. 2, 2015).
This unprecedented action would have significantly impacted the city’s ability to quietly
pursue future economic development opportunities and eliminate some of the competitive
advantage the city had painstakingly developed.19 The city could no longer guarantee
water to prospective companies without first going to outside agencies for a basic
municipal service. SB 2 put North Las Vegas in a difficult position of petitioning the
legislature for help while at the same time working to amend the bills proposed by the
Governor and deviating from the path established in the previous special session. The
city secured some changes to the bill draft request for SB 2 prior to introduction, but had
to return to the legislature in the 2017 Regular Session to completely reverse the bill’s

The city was on the verge of bankruptcy when Mayor John Lee was elected in 2013. Facing a $156
million budget deficit, the mayor and his team quickly reevaluated city permitting process, deconstructed all
building processes and developed a system where businesses could quickly build and expand. Permitting
processes that took 6 months were changed to over-the-counter processes taking only minutes, making
the city one of the quickest and easiest cities for businesses looking to locate. The city also developed a
very seamless permitting process where internal “red carpet” taskforces were established to work with
prospective businesses to identify all their building needs and put together development timelines
significantly faster than any other jurisdiction in the country. This process was a key driver in the city’s
successful efforts to attract business.
19
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language and original intent to create competitive advantages for the industrial park in
Norther Nevada (A.B. 79, 2017).
Similarly, the legislature attempted to continue the historically unequal revenue
treatment of southern enterprise. The historical constitutional protections against taxing
the northern industry of mining, and the onerous legislative taxes levied on the southern
industries of entertainment and gaming disproportionally placed the state’s tax burden on
Southern Nevada. Following this same model, the incentive package put together for the
electric car company (Faraday Future) looking to locate in Southern Nevada was
decidedly different than what was passed for the electric car company (Tesla) that located
in Northern Nevada the previous year. During the 29th Special Session S.B. 1 contained
a small provision that required the local government where the project was located to be
on the hook for delinquent bonding payments (SB 1, 2015, sec 28(4)) first before the
state’s general fund would be obligated. A similar requirement was not made of the local
governments located in Northern Nevada the year before, but demonstrates the
continuation of the historical difference in treatment of enterprise depending on where it
is located in Nevada.
The votes on final passage of the incentive package legislation were a further
departure from the 28th Special Session for Tesla the year before. As described above,
the unamended legislation in the 28th Special Session for Tesla unanimously sailed
through the southern controlled legislature in just a few hours. Fast forward fifteen
months, and the legislative package to provide similar incentives for a Southern Nevada
company lasted four days and required several amendments during acrimonious debate.
Possibly the most telling difference were the final votes; unlike the unanimous votes one
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year prior, the incentive package for Southern Nevada’s electric car manufacture was
opposed by one Senator and four members of the assembly- all but one of them were
representatives elected from the north.

Although these incentives were eventually

withdrawn by the state when the struggling automaker moved their operations to
California, the different treatment of the two similar projects conforms to historically
different regional treatment in Nevada.
Summary
The case study of Nevada provides several examples of how historical
institutionalism impacts future decisions and aligns the institutions (both rules and
systems) on a path that is difficult to get off. Not only do the reinforcing mechanisms keep
the institutions bound to a path, but unsuspecting policymakers are being guided and
contained by these latent guard rails. Nevada demonstrates how its geographic and
smokestack chasing history remains interdependent with its current identity and policy
preferences. The incentive package provided to Tesla during the 28th Special Session
relied almost exclusively on company-based incentives and was steered to the preferred
northern region of the state.
Contrary to the creative class theory, policymakers in Nevada doubled down on
smokestack chasing without leveraging and taking advantage of the successful creative
class factors within the state. While the creative class theory framework could have better
informed policymakers, the short amount of time provided for consideration of the
incentive package did not allow a robust debate or discussion on how to best maximize
a return on the state’s investment in Tesla. One year later, the next special session to
consider economic incentives for an electric car company for Southern Nevada followed
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the new path of using almost exclusively company-based incentives to attract the
company. Although the new path is really just a segment entirely consistent with the path
previously established in the constitution, the 28th Special Session further entrenches
Nevada policymaking around a smokestack chasing model of relying company-based
incentives.
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CHAPTER 6: COMPARATIVE STUDY FINDINGS, BRAZIL, TENNESSEE, AND
VIRGINIA

Overview
This chapter compares the case study of Nevada with historical economic
diversification efforts in Brazil and Tennessee and the contemporary diversification efforts
in Virginia. Brazil and Tennessee provide parallel experiences of governments engaged
in smokestack chasing to improve their local economies and bring jobs to their residents
by using company-based incentives to attract enterprise. Historically, Virginia has a policy
tradition of making more substantial investments in people, and this policy preference can
be seen embedded in the proposal as well as the incentives Virginia extended to bring
Amazon’s new headquarters to the state. Additionally, this chapter compares the
company-based historical traditions in Tennessee with the case study of Nevada. The
chapter uses content analysis to compare the press releases from the governors of
Nevada and Virginia announcing their respective projects and to compare the industry
treatment of the two projects from Site Selection Magazine.
Lessons from Brazil
There are important lessons to be learned from Brazil’s efforts in the 1950s and
1960s to create an automotive industry through the use of incentive structures to attract
automakers. Similar to other countries around the globe, the post-WWII period in Brazil
was a transitional period where the traditional agrarian and export-oriented economy
began to be replaced with an industrial and urbanized society. “The central government
would emerge as the only political player capable of formulating and enacting new
strategies” to successfully navigate this transition and capable of providing the leadership
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necessary to coordinate the process (Ioris & Ioris, 2013, p. 414). The state-sponsored
company-based incentive plan initiated in 1965 saw gradual success in exporting
Brazilian-made auto parts and components which influenced policymakers to
aggressively seek opportunities to build and export finished vehicles.
Brazilian President Vargas and his administration believed the state needed to
create state-owned companies to accomplish the goals of industrialization. Vargas
promised fast-paced industrialization through robust government intervention to create
manufacturing jobs while his political opponents believed Brazil needed to lower import
tariffs to attract private foreign investors (Ioris & Ioris, 2013, p. 419). Ultimately, attracting
private investors won the day and the state focused on creating a winning environment
to attract private sector partners to help facilitate the national goals of industrialization.
Unlike Nevada and Virginia, Brazil had a statewide approach to their goal of fast-paced
industrialization but lacked an overall state strategy to facilitate economic planning to
guide their efforts in transitioning away from their traditional agrarian society (Ioris & Ioris,
2013, p. 411). The decentralized approach failed to weigh the needs of the vastly different
parts of Brazil and did not strategically align targeted industries to maximize ROI- very
similar to what Nevada experienced. Brazil’s ‘plan’ was to stop supplying just raw
materials and to pursue the need to industrialize.
Winning the Soccer World Cup for the first time in 1958 launched Brazil into the
international spotlight, and the government was “quick to cunningly exploit the symbolism
of the social and economic transformations taking place in the urban and rural landscape”
(Ioris & Ioris, 2013, p. 412). Brazil’s media blitz highlighted the budding industrialization
within some smaller areas of the country, but it ignored the long legacy of
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underdevelopment facing the vast majority of its citizens. Unfortunately, their efforts at
economic development paralleled their media campaign by promoting industrial growth
and urban regeneration that was “restricted to a minority of the population” and focused
primarily on wealthier parts of the larger cities located in the Southeast Region (Ioris &
Ioris, 2013, p. 412). Brazil focused almost exclusively on company-based incentives.
They believed the Federal government should not attend to the basic social needs of their
citizens and that government’s promotion of economic development would result in
providing for the public- going so far as manipulating inflation to create a better
environment for economic development. This resulted in further exacerbating the
inequalities between the city and the countryside and decreased the quality of life for the
majority of their citizens (Ioris & Ioris, 2013, p. 421).
Initially, Brazil was not focused on building an export-based growth model, but
focused on leveraging the existing lucrative and rapidly growing Brazilian auto
consumption market (Shapiro 1989, p. 2). While campaigning for the Presidency,
Juscelino Kubitschek was introduced to Admiral Lucio Meira who suggested automobiles
be added to the state industrialization agenda Kubitschek was promoting in his campaign.
While campaigning later that same day, Kubitschek decided to test the intriguing idea
during a political rally and announced his goal to build a national automobile. The
response was overwhelming positive and the idea of a national automobile quickly
became central to his winning bid for the presidency (Shapiro, 1989, p. 60). By restricting
imports, Brazil used financial incentives and their lucrative market to attract foreign capital
and technology investments from automotive companies.
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Brazil provided a unique set of incentives to lure the auto manufactures. The state
relied heavily on import and export tools as incentives. Since the executive lacked
substantial budgetary powers, Brazil used indirect incentives to attract the private auto
manufacturers (Shapiro, 1989, p. 8). The plan largely worked, and by 1961, six years
after its adoption, eleven different manufactures- including most of the major multinational
firms in the industry- were producing over 145,000 vehicles a year. By 1968 that number
increased to 280,000 (Shapiro, 1989, p. 2). By all appearances, the dramatic increase in
production and exportation of vehicles seemed to suggest efficacy of state planning;
however, “the production- and even the export- of vehicles alone is not sufficient criteria
for judging the program a success” (Shapiro, 1989, p. 3) for the community in the long
term.
The creating of a Brazilian automotive industry would be deemed a success if
performance criteria was measured only on whether rent transfers to the private sector
firms equaled the tax revenues generated from the firm. The plan was a clear success in
the first five years as the amount of federal, state, and local taxes paid by the auto
manufacturers exceeded the indirect subsidies they received (Shapiro, 1989, p. 273).
From a business standpoint for Brazil, the partnership did not result in a loss of forfeited
revenue, and the taxes collected were around the same as the costs of all subsidies;
however, questions remain concerning whether there was a net gain for Brazil, and more
importantly who experienced the windfall, and if the increases in tax revenues invested
benefited all Brazilians. From the auto manufactures standpoint, the partnership allowed
the manufacturer’s entry into Brazil’s market to excise profits from domestic sales within
the country, as well as tapped the less expensive labor and material costs afforded within
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Brazil for the manufacturing of domestic products. Within the context of an import
substitution scheme the plan was a success.
The larger issue is whether the positive growth in the economy translated to social
benefits for residents, and if the company-based investments lead to better outcomes for
residents. Researchers Jean Dréze and Amartya Sen concluded, “Brazil represents the
most extreme case of a very rapid and sustained economic growth—about 7 per cent per
year over the forty years 1940–80 —and a spectacular modernization, going hand in hand
with persistent poverty, endemic malnutrition, and occasional hunger. The exorbitant
social and ecological price paid for this performance is even more surprising, given
Brazil's extremely favourable resource and land endowment” (Dréze & Sen, 1991, p. 2).
It is clear the authoritarian regimes of the 1950-1960s created a “Brazilian miracle” which
resulted in the accumulation of wealth for large multinational automakers, banks, and
Brazil’s existing upper-class elites at the expense of “keeping the working-class earnings
at abnormally low levels and allowing for a continuous deterioration of income
distributions” and dreadful social indicators (Dréze & Sen, 1991, p. 3).
One well- documented study contrasts Brazil’s eighth largest economy in the world
with its social indicators that are comparable to those of poor Asian and African countries
with significantly worse economic indicators (Jaguaribe et al., 1986). Overall, Brazil’s
investment in economic development through the auto industry did not result in positive
changes of key social indicators of unemployment, poverty, income distribution, wages,
purchasing power, malnutrition and hunger, life expectancy, and basic public services.
Brazil stands as a reminder to policymakers that “some kinds of 10-12 per cent
growth per annum can lead to an increase in poverty rather than to its eradication” (Kurien
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1978, pp. 15-16) when rapid growth and industrialization aligns with the interests of the
upper class.20 Brazil’s growth and fast-paced industrialization of the 1950-60s “came to
represent an authoritarian and inflexible urbanism” which gave way to the dictatorships
of the 1970s (Williams, 2005, p. 120). Brazil had to overcome its lack of an industrial base,
inadequate trained workforce, and lack of established supply chains to build its auto
industry. While Brazil was extremely successful chasing and attracting foreign investment
resulting in robust job creation for citizens, in the end the real winners were the
automakers.
Lessons from Tennessee
More and more it looks like GM came to this rural area of Tennessee looking
for a colony to exploit instead of a community to respect … The Volunteer State
better start volunteering more citizens and governmental oversight and get the
free-loading GM off welfare.
-

Ralph Nader

The preliminary interactions and policymaking surrounding General Motors’
decision to locate to Tennessee parallel many of the facts surrounding Tesla’s move to
Northern Nevada. Policymakers in Tennessee could have somewhat predicted the
eventual outcome and dangers of negotiating with large sophisticated multinational firms
by understanding Brazil’s earlier experiences with the auto industry, while policymakers
in Nevada could have drawn from the experiences of both Brazil and Tennessee.

In 2011, Brazilian politicians took a page out of their history when they used subsidies and the threat of
continued high tariffs on imports (similar to what they did to the multinational auto manufacturers in the
1950s) to persuade technology companies (including Foxconn and Apple) to start producing smartphones
and computers in a factory north of São Paulo in Jundiai.
20
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In 1985, GM announced its intention of building a $3.5 billion investment creating
over 6000 manufacturing jobs. Following GM’s historic announcement, exuberant
politicians across the nation began clamoring to attract the economic opportunity for their
residents. Ultimately, GM selected Tennessee for their new home and Governor Lamar
Alexander, eyeing a bigger presence in national politics, took out full page newspaper
ads around the county heralding the Volunteer State’s victory. These actions were
understandable considering the highly competitive, and widely publicized competition for
what was considered the largest one-time investment in U.S. history (Gaventa et al.,
1990, p. 176). On the surface, the $3.5 billion dollar investment promising 6,000
manufacturing jobs appeared to accomplish the state’s three goals of providing jobs for
locals, improving the tax base, and increasing the quality of life for locals (Gaventa et al.,
1990, p. 176). History shows that what followed actually mirrored the experiences of the
“winners” of other large economic development competitions.
GM’s surprise selection was no accident. Other states competing for GM’s Saturn
plant offered considerably more lucrative packages (Gaventa et al., 1990, p. 176);
however, Tennessee had one thing these larger states with more manufacturing
experience did not have- an exploitable region inexperienced in high stakes negotiations.
The national competition set off a highly publicized bidding war between states
determined to win:
Kentucky’s legislature passed a $306 million education package when it learned
that GM considered its education system inferior. New York’s state legislature
passed a bill to give Saturn 100 megawatts of free hydroelectric power for twenty
years—a billion-dollar savings. Michigan offered substantial incentives to remain
the center of the auto industry: $250 million in aid over ten years, $250 million in
local tax property relief over twelve years, $65 million in job training, $35 million in
training for suppliers’ employees, a health and a day-care center, and an
ombudsman to cut red tape. Michigan’s governor promised to “beat any offer.”
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Minnesota’s inducements were worth at least $1.2 billion. Included were a thirtyyear tax holiday, free child care for imported workers, and relocation monies and
subsidized mortgages for top management (Gaventa et al., 1990, pp. 177-178).
Ultimately, the well-publicized efforts of the thirty-eight state bidding war resulted in three
specific benefits for GM; first, the intense competition drove up the price of the incentives;
second, it took time for the states to react to each other’s public offerings as they one
upped each other, creating an incentive for GM to take their time as millions of dollars in
free national media covering the intense bidding war provided the perfect platform for
advertising their future product which had not even been designed yet; finally, the media
frenzy of the suitors provided an overwhelming advantage for GM’s future negotiations
with elected officials who would be under intense pressure to not lose or mess up the
once in a lifetime deal everybody wanted.
The media frenzy created a heightened sense of urgency and need to succeed.
Those who have ever perused a car dealership lot, taken a test drive, and sat across the
table from a commission motivated salesperson would not likely be surprised at the
sophistication and mastery of pressure tactics at the highest level of the auto industry.
Tennessee offered the “usual benevolence to large corporations” (Gaventa et al., 1990,
p. 181) by not only providing a lucrative incentive package at the state level, but also by
steering Saturn to choose a county with the lowest property taxes, Maury County. In turn,
“Saturn then hammered Maury County officials into an unprecedented forty-year in-lieuof-tax agreement” (Gaventa et al., 1990, p. 181). GM benefited from the pressure local
officials faced in getting the time sensitive deal done, and Maury County budget director
said the “greatest urgency came from state officials, who wanted an agreement to be
reached but refrained from offering much assistance” (Gaventa et al., 1990, p. 182).
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Similar to the events in Brazil, the outmatched and overwhelmed local government was
constructively forced to negotiate with an experienced, sophisticated, and multinational
corporation employing more lawyers than the number of residents living in the county.
GM recognized the pro-business environment Tennessee promoted for small
businesses as a lucrative and exploitable opportunity. Tennessee officials failed to
understand how their right-to-work state promoting a pro-business climate with minimal
regulations presented itself as an inviting henhouse for Wall Street wolfs. Similar to
Nevada and Brazil, Tennessee failed to recognize how their pro-business climate was
readily exploitable by multinational corporations who could scale the advantages beyond
original legislative intent to promote small business. Tennessee and Nevada offer some
of the lowest taxes in the nation, which unsurprisingly means “Tennessee’s state
government expenditures per capita and school revenue are among the lowest in the
nation” (Gaventa et al., 1990, p. 181; Holzauer, 2021). For big business, Tennessee being
at the bottom nationally for statutory protection for workers from maximum benefits for
disability to unemployment was an unspoken selling point (Gaventa et al., 1990, p. 178)
as well as the favorable tax climate shifting tax burden away from business (UrbanBrookings Tax Policy Center, 2017).
The impact of attracting the new firm to the sleepy Tennessee farming community
was significant. The town transformed in the first few years from a community where a
double-wide trailer parked next to the elementary school served as its town hall (Gaventa
et al., 1990, p. 177) and from a “two-traffic-light, two-police-officer village of 800 residents,
into a bustling community of 12,000 with six traffic signals, two national chain
supermarkets, a pair of McDonald's restaurants and a police department of 21 officers”

126

(Paul, 2002). The lure of thousands of jobs and economic development softened some of
the pains of explosive growth. However, the promise of thousands of jobs did not exactly
pan out, despite local taxpayers footing the bill and enduring the growing pains as their
community changed. Not many new jobs went to locals. Out of the 6,829 Saturn jobs,
only 600 went to local residents- and even these 600 jobs were thought to be actually
“held by commuters who travel I-65 from as far away as Kentucky and Alabama” (Paul,
2002).
More Lessons from Tennessee
GM has had a tumultuous tenure in Spring Hill. In 1990, the first vehicle rolled of
the assembly line where manufacturing continued until 2007 before it abruptly stopped.
Considering the majority of the state and federal tax incentives had expired, GM
contemplated idling or shutting down the plant; however, the state of Tennessee came
back to the table with more incentives to lure GM to produce the new Chevrolet Traverse
(American Machinist, 2010). This new round of state taxpayer incentives kept the factory
running until late 2009 when manufacturing of the Travers, was moved to Michigan. For
nearly the next decade the Tennessee facility endured a “period of idling” as the facility
faced an uncertain future (Ferris, 2019; Vlasic & Bunkley, 2011). Then in late 2020, the
Tennessee State Funding Board approved a new round of $35 million in economic
incentives for GM to convert Spring Hill operations into a factory to build future electric
vehicles (Associated Press, 2021). The board also approved an additional $60 million to
GMs joint venture partner Ultium Cells (Jones, 2021) in the state’s efforts to keep their
smokestack in place. This new round of state incentives prompted Tennessee Governor
Bill Lee to state: “This will create generations of jobs. As we know, an investment like this
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in a community not only creates the jobs that are announced today, but these kinds of
investments create multi-generational job growth in this state. That in itself makes it very
exciting” (Jones, 2021). The history of GM in Spring Hill suggests “multi-generational”
jobs will require a continual multigenerational investment by the state.
As part of the first incentive package, Tennessee had to provide Saturn
infrastructure upgrades. These direct company-based investments for Saturn were
necessary to connect the rural site to existing infrastructure. In September 1985,
Tennessee announced plans to build a $29.3 million five-mile road, State Route 396, to
connect the plant to Interstate 65 (Sherman, 1994, p. 320).21 The infrastructure incentives
tied to Saturn followed the same pressure tactics of “if we don’t build we will lose” as the
other incentives; in his 1986 State of the State address, Governor Alexander warned the
legislature that a failure to pass the roads package would result in losing the Saturn
suppliers who were necessary for the indirect economic development promised in GMs
development in Tennessee (State of the State Address, Lamar Alexander, 1986). As
discussed below, Nevada’s incentive package to attract Tesla also included the
construction of a road almost exclusively for Tesla to connect the company to Interstate
80. Whereas in Virginia, the inventive provided to Amazon was the addition of another
metro stop for the benefit of all commuters on the extensive public subway system.
The lessons policymakers can learn from Tennessee seem apparent. While the
history of smoke stack chasing from Brazil and Tennessee provide substantive warnings
for policymakers, the fact remains that three decades of Tennessee’s cyclical investments
in GM did not appear to change how the state approached economic development-

The final cost of the five-mile road came in at $37 million (Barlow, 1989), the 26% increase received very
little scrutiny.
21
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despite this experienced history. The short attention span and failure to learn from their
immediate past demonstrates the difficulty policymakers face when competing for the
promised jobs of economic development. The often-quoted proverb from Homer’s Iliad22
“Fool me once, shame on me, fool me twice shame on you” leaves to the imagination
what follows after being fooled three times. Maybe only a state nicknamed the Volunteer
State would sign up to be fooled three times; however, other states can learn from the
previous smokestack chasing experiences of Brazil and Tennessee.
Comparing Virginia’s People-based Approach
The smokestack chasing of Brazil, Tennessee, and Nevada has resulted in
primarily company-based incentive packages offered to attract business. Often, the lack
of dedicated people-based investments in a location, as described in the creative class
theory, require states to overcome these historical deficiencies by attract companies
through other means, and it naturally follows that the less a state invests in its people
today the more the state will have to offer in company-based incentives in the future to
overcome this lack of investment. The central issue becomes whether governments
should make regular invests in people to drive future economic opportunity, or should
they invest in companies to induce economic opportunity?
The age-old causality dilemma is commonly presented in the philosophical
“chicken-and-egg” question. Whether to pursue people- or company-based investments
presents the same dilemma as scholars and government officials struggle to determine
the correct drivers of economic development. Virginia’s historical people-based incentive

22

“For once deceiv'd, was his; but twice were mine” (Pope & Homer, 1992).
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approach provides comparative value to this project when contrasting with the decidedly
company-based investments deployed by Nevada.23
The competition to attract Amazon’s HQ2 headquarters to Arlington Virginia
provides significant comparative power and can help inform policymakers committed to
attracting new enterprise into their boarders. Compared to Nevada, Virginia developed
within its institutions a robust legacy of investing in its residents and the places where
they live. This historical commitment to people-based investment creates a path
dependency where, once again, history matters when assessing today’s outcomes.
Virginia’s historical commitment to higher education, mass transit, healthcare, and other
people-based investments are attractive to businesses and give the state an advantage
when competing for economic development opportunities.
Applying Historical Institutionalism to Virginia’s Incentive Package
Virginia follows the more traditional incrementalism approach where inherently
stable institutions of policy subsystems develop over time. Similar to Nevada, Virginia’s
legislature considered real time economic incentives to close the deal to bring Amazon’s
headquarters; however, they were able to rely on the product of their long-term
investments in their people to attract Amazon. Which means, many of these “real time
investments” were actually increasing investments in the factors that attracted Amazon
to the region, such as higher education, workforce training, transportation, and K-12.
Unlike Nevada, Virginia’s rich history of investing in Florida’s three Ts of economic

Often the priorities of an institution are reflected in their budgets, and by looking at their budgets you can
identify their priorities. This holds true when looking at incentive packages states propose to attract
businesses. When looking at the investment a state makes in economic development one could infer the
priority of the state- do they value their people and invest in them over private enterprise?
23
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development- Technology, Talent and Tolerance (2003, p. 10) not only lifts and helps
their residents succeed, but also provides significant tools to attract and facilitate
economic development.
Amazon clearly valued Virginia’s historic people-based investment strategy toward
economic development. For starters, Virginia often views their higher education system
through an economic development lens. With three large flagship institutions- University
of Virginia, Virginia Tech and College of William and Mary- the state is ranked second
among all states in terms of average six-year graduation rates (Brown et al., 2013, p. 27).
Virginia’s coordinating body for higher education, the State Council of Higher Education
for Virginia (SCHEV) created the Virginia Plan for Higher Education which established a
very straightforward objective for the state to be the best-educated population in the
nation by 2030 (State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, 2013).
With fifteen public four-year institutions; twenty-four public two-year institutions;
and thirty private, nonprofit colleges and universities, Virginia directly connects the state’s
investment in higher education to economic impact where the state reports:
“each dollar spent on Virginia’s public higher education system in Virginia
produces $21 in greater Gross State Product (GSP). And, it more than pays
for itself, returning $1.92 to the state treasury” (Virginia Business Higher
Education Council, 2015, p. 3).
The incentive package offered by Virginia demonstrates their commitment to peoplebased investments and highlights how Amazon required less direct company-based
incentives when the creative class factors within the region are robust.
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Virginia’s Incentive Package
In May 2016, Virginia created the Go Virginia economic development plan for the
state, and at the same time created an incentive structure available to attract enterprise.
In other words, they created the structure and the tools that the structure could use to
attract businesses at the same time. Whereas in Nevada, they created the structure in
2011, and later added inventive tools in a piecemeal fashion largely driven by firms
looking to relocate or expand during legislative sessions in September 2014, December
2015, and October 2016. In other words, Nevada’s tools were created to close the deal
not attract the company; whereas, Virginia’s historical investments in their people were
what attracted the company.
Altogether, Virginia offered up to $750 million in public incentives directly to
Amazon and more than $1.712 billion investment in their residents. The money went
directly to Amazon in the form of workforce cash grants of a $22,000 payment to Amazon
for each job created with wages over $150,000 (Arcieri, 2018). Over 70 percent of the
incentive package went to an assortment of people-based investments in improvements
to mass transportation, community parks, higher education, K-12, and more (Table 6.1).
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Table 6.1: Summary of Grants and Incentives for Amazon

Source: Arcieri, K. (2018, November, 13). Virginia’s Amazon HQ2 win wasn’t just based
on traditional incentives. Here’s what else was included. Washington Business Journal.
Retrieved from https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2018/11/13/virginias-winof-amazon-hq2-wasnt-just-based-on.html

Virginia offered an incentive proposal considerably smaller than what other states offered
Amazon. For example, Maryland proposed an $8.5 billion inventive proposal and New
Jersey proposed $7 billion incentive proposal (McCartney, 2018). This strongly suggests
that “factors such as access to talent and airports, and overall business climate, were
more important for the company” (McCartney, 2018).
Applying the Creative Class Theory- New York City and Northern Virginia
Originally, when the H2Q selection was announced it was divided evenly across
two headquarters in Northern Virginia and New York City (Amazon, 2018). Although the
politicians in New York later retracted their proposal, it is relevant for the purposes of this
project because it demonstrates the different amounts of investments each location had
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to make for the same 25,000 jobs, and the difference could be attributed to the value
Amazon placed on the presence of creative class factors within the respective regions.
New York offered $1.525 billion in direct company-based incentives for the 25,000
jobs or a $48,000 payment to Amazon for each job created with wages over $150,000
(Amazon, 2018). In other words, for the same job, New York had to pay Amazon $48,000
and Virginia only had to pay $22,000. Additionally, New York proposed up to $480 million
reimbursements for capital costs for construction of its office building and up to $900
million in relocation assistance to revitalized areas (Edwards, 2018). The stark
comparison of these two deals created the political resistance that resulted in New York
retracting its deal. For purposes of this project, the two proposals provide an interesting
sub-comparison of two contemporary approaches to highlight the value of the historic
people-based investments Virginia compared to the cost New York was going to have to
pay for the same benefit when using an almost exclusive company-based incentive
approach.
Regional Issues
Unlike the historical regional friction in Nevada, Virginia has greater selfawareness of their territorial assets. Virginia’s economic development plan, Go Virginia,
allows diverse regions to identify and define their own strengths and have the flexibility to
grow their different regional economies. Virginia recognizes that regions grow and
prosper along economic- not geographic- boundaries. For Virginia, the business sector,
education sector, and government sector must collaborate together. Whereas in Nevada
education has been an afterthought, and any education discussions that occur are driven
by the business coming to Nevada concerned about the workforce readiness; the
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discussions are not proactively engaged in by policymakers. As described above, when
Tesla first visited Nevada, the company explored sites in the Las Vegas area, and once
the state government got involved, they were steered to northern Nevada contrary to the
kind of economic development and city building advanced by Richard Florida (2003) and
Edward Glaeser (2012). Whereas in Virginia, Amazon located their new headquarters
right in the heart of the metropolitan region of 6.2 million people taking advantage of all
the qualities Gaeser and Florida conclude a city offers in robust economic development.
Geography did not play the same role in Virginia as it did in Nevada. Despite Tesla
coming to Southern Nevada first, when the state submitted their proposal to Tesla for
consideration, the state went all in and only submitted the Northern Nevada site, because
the state viewed it as the more suitable site for meeting Tesla’s timelines. The industrial
location options in Southern Nevada lacked critical infrastructure and would have required
more of a creative solution and open-minded partnership from Tesla. However, Nevada
did not give Tesla the opportunity to explore another option in the state. In Virginia, the
state submitted three “world class proposals- one each for Richmond, Hampton Roads
and Northern Virginia” in what the state said was a “very intense effort on the front end”
(Starner, 2019). Virginia did not have a political history of geographical tensions like in
Nevada driving the decision-making process.
Content Analysis
Content analysis was first defined by Bernard Berelson as “a research technique
for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of
communication” (1952, p. 18). In his seminal book on the subject, Berelson takes a highly
quantitative approach in his textbook on communication research techniques thereby
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coding communication data to convert to a purely quantitative analysis. Only a few
months after Berelson’s breakthrough, German Siegfried Kracauer argued that
“overemphasis on quantification tends to lessen the accuracy of analysis” (Kracauer,
1952, p. 631). Kracauer further argues that when scientists rely on coding on the basis of
graded scales, they proport to use their findings as quantitative analysis which ignores
that the determination for coding on a scale “still involves qualitative considerations” to be
made during the analysis (1952, p. 632).
The use of content analysis in the project aligns with Kracauer’s assertion that
given “qualitative appraisals play a larger role in interpretation anyways, there is no
reason why such cumbersome quantitative techniques should be preferred to qualitative”
(1952, p. 633). Kraucauer “argued for the importance of including latent structures of
meaning into the analysis, and he pointed out that the single occurrence of a phenomenon
in a given text can also be meaningful” (Schreier et al., 2019, p. 1). One advantage of
content analysis is that the content being analyzed remains in text and should errors occur
the researcher can return to the texts to correct which provides greater accuracy than
survey or experimental research (Woodrum, 1984, p. 6). For this reason, Babbie (1975,
p. 234) and others conclude that content analysis is an unusually safe methodology
Content analysis also provides a good balance for this project’s reliance on
interviews for qualitative analysis. “Content analysis has the advantage of facilitating
empirical study without disrupting the research subjects” (Woodrum, 1984, p. 6).
Additionally, the content analysis for this project was initially done in preparation for the
interviews which helped inform the construction of the interview questions.
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Woodrum concludes that one major advantage of qualitative content analysis is in
“forcing researchers to specify category criteria and assess their success in measuring
qualitative phenomena” (1984, p. 6). This exercise reduces content ambiguity and by
“forcing the researcher to go beyond impressionistic generalizations, and assess his or
her efforts through reliability and validity check, one generates a replicable, empirical data
base for hypothesis testing and similar objectives” (Woodrum, 1984, p. 6). As is the case
with the content analysis of this project, content analysis required the researcher to
generate categories and criteria for measuring the qualitative phenomena.
Given the nature of this project, the traditional coding of the quantitative content
analysis will be replaced with a more qualitative content analysis methodology. The
limited content analysis of this project leans on the importance of words and how their
variance is seen in the governors announcement from both Nevada and Virginia, the initial
press release from Amazon concerning locating to Virginia and the initial press release
from Tesla concerning locating in Nevada, economic impact analysis prepared by the
governor’s office for respective legislatures in both states, and the articles from Site
Selection Magazine announcing the selection of each state. Additionally, this project will
use content analysis to directly compare the two economic incentive packages to
quantitatively identify the investment each state made in people and the investment each
state made in place.
Press Release from Tesla and Amazon
The press releases from the two companies shed some light on what attracted the
company to the respective state. While these press releases came from the individual
company, they were clearly coordinated with the Governor’s offices of the respective

137

states. For example, in Nevada, Tesla’s short press release served as the primary press
release while in Virginia both the Governor and Amazon issued a press release. Although
they largely mirror each other; understandably, Virginia focuses on the Virginia portion of
Amazon’s announcement.
Nevada
The press release announcing Tesla’s choice to come to Nevada is significantly
different from the press release issued by Virginia. Tesla and the Nevada Governor’s
office jointly issued the 252-word press release highlighting the economic impact of the
factory (Tesla, 2014). One glaring omission from the press release is the mention of ‘jobs’
(Tesla, 2014). As the national leader in unemployment in the years leading up to the 2014
announcement, it is surprising the press release did not mention jobs.24 The succinct
press release also did not mention anything about incentives or the nature of the
incentives. The closest thing to mentioning incentives was in the quote from Nevada
Speaker of the Assembly Marilyn Kirkpatrick saying she “looked forward to receiving the
necessary information so the legislature can meet and take the necessary action to
support this major industry” (Tesla, 2014, emphasis added). The joint press release
focused almost exclusively on the corporate interests of Tesla; the focus of the press
release was the regulatory ability of Nevada to facilitate the rapid construction of a factory
to guarantee Tesla’s production timelines. The contents of the press release were better
suited for a shareholder earnings call than an announcement informing ratepayers how
their taxes were going to be invested for their benefit.

24

Nevada had a 7.3 percent unemployment rate, higher than the 5.9 percent nationally in September 2014.
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Virginia
Virginia Governor Northam’s office took a significantly different approach on their
press release. First, the Governor issued his own press release independent of Amazon;
however, it is worth noting the press releases issued at around the same time were
coordinated and contained very similar content. The press release from Virginia consisted
of less than two thousand words (1,993 words to be precise) and provided a detailed
summary of the incentive package being offered and the opportunity Amazon would
provide the commonwealth. The press release mentioned jobs in large font in the subtitle
of the press release. Jobs were also discussed in the document’s first paragraph and
eleven additional times throughout the document (Virginia Governor Ralph Northam,
2018). In fact, the press release from Virginia used 354 words to discuss jobs, which was
100 more words than the entire length of Nevada’s 252-word press release (Tesla, 2014;
Virginia Governor Ralph Northam, 2018). This clear distinction between the press
releases is even more stark when considering Virginia’s unemployment rate at the time
of the press release was 2.7 percent, putting it well below the national rate of 3.5 percent
(Virginia Employment Commission, 2018).
The press release from Virginia also emphasized the incentives as people-based.
By framing the deal as a partnership proposal with Amazon to make investments in
education, transportation, and workforce, the press release leaves little doubt as to the
state’s intent. The announcement also highlights the “strategic” people based investments
the state has made to attract opportunities like Amazon, and highlighted how through
careful planning the presence of the region’s creative class makes it “one of the most
vibrant, civically engage communities in the world” adding that the choice by Amazon
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highlights the “collective strengths of our communities- our workforce, education system,
infrastructure, and unparalleled quality of life” (Virginia Governor Ralph Northam, 2018).
The announcement also highlighted the challenges the opportunity created. The
strain the new headquarters will put on the community was also addressed in the press
release by discussing how the incentive package makes investments in transportation,
affordable housing, and K-12. From the first announcement of their project, Virginia,
unlike Nevada, anticipates the negative consequences of the economic development
opportunity and structures an incentive package around those realities. By focusing on
the people not just the company, Virginia was able to anticipate the community impacts;
whereas, in Nevada the focus was on the company, the size of its building, and how the
state would make sure the company’s production schedule was met. Not only does the
Governor of Nevada ignore consequences of the project in the press release, during the
28th Special Session there is no discussion in either the Senate or Assembly of affordable
housing and the negative community strains and impacts a project will have. It is worth
noting that six years after Tesla moved to Northern Nevada, Reno is facing an extreme
affordable housing crisis and is ranked as one of the least affordable cities in the country
(Hidalgo & Jason, 2021).
Site Selection Magazine
Site Selection Magazine, differentiates between “must” and “want” criteria for
business relocation (Spicer & King, 1996). “Must” criteria are essential factors that would
disqualify a location if they were not available. These could include a minimum site size,
access to rail lines or a major airport, availability of water and natural gas, or other
requirements. “Want” criteria are location factors that are desirable, but the lack of which
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could be compensated for by strengths in other areas. Tax incentives and other
government economic development policies fall into this category, along with such factors
as labor quality, operating costs, competitor locations, and distance to suppliers” (Turner
2003, pp. 273-274). For purposes of this project, the content analysis of the two
announcements from Site Selection Magazine focuses on the textual differences between
the tone and the emphasis the article places on people- vs company-based incentives.
Virginia
The importance Virginia and Amazon placed on people-based incentives is clear
from the article announcing Amazon’s decision to locate in Virginia. First, the article points
out that Virginia understood they would ‘lose’ if they focused only on company-based
incentives and submitted a proposal where “more than 70 percent of our commitment was
an investment in public assets like higher education and transportation infrastructure”
(Starner, 2019). The article also emphasizes how Virginia’s proposal aligned with
Amazon’s interests in describing how after the three sites Virginia submitted were
selected as three of the 20 finalists, the Amazon team came to Virginia to “learn more
about the sites, our colleges, and our K-12 system” (Starner, 2019). The article
emphasized Amazon’s focus on “talent,” stating Amazon wanted “access to a deep and
talented pool of tech and headquarters professionals in a thriving urban environment” and
discussed other creative class theory factors such as a variety of hotels, restaurants,
abundant parks, and open spaces with sports and cultural events (Starner, 2019). The
article clearly outlines a people-based incentive approach offered by Virginia that was
also sought by Amazon.

141

Nevada
In stark contrast, the Site Selection article announcing Tesla’s selection of Nevada
focuses on the size of the factory and the jobs the project will create. The article points
out that the incentives are “mostly in the form of tax abatements” with over “80 percent of
the total of [the Tesla] deal seems to come from property and sales tax incentives”
(Rasmussen, 2014). The article quotes Tesla CEO Musk as stating that it was not just
about incentives, but a state that was “a get things done state.” He had high confidence
the factory would be constructed on time to meet their production timeline which Musk
credited as “truly the most important thing, and, of course, whether we can operate the
factory cost-effectively so the car itself would be affordable” (Rasmussen, 2014). Once
again, similar to the tenor of the earlier joint press release, Musk’s comments are directed
at shareholders and Wall Street. While the article points out the very important
performance-based protection aspect of the incentive package that Governor Sandoval
and GOED Chief Hill negotiated into the deal, their article makes clear that the
announcement of the Nevada’s victory was due to the company-based incentives in their
package aligning with Tesla’s profit driven focus.
Nevada and Tennessee
Similar to Tennessee officials, Nevada officials failed to understand the
vulnerability of their right-to-work state, with no personal income tax, low corporate tax,
and pro-business climate with minimal regulations. For corporations, these perceived
strengths provided a very promising and exploitable opportunity. Institutions legislatively
designed to promote small business were not created to be dramatically scaled up to
accommodate large enterprise. However, Nevada’s institutions do accommodate large
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sophisticated multinational firms within the narrow gaming and hospitality industry through
world renowned gaming boards, regulations and legal structures. Outside of gaming,
Nevada is easily exploitable as evidenced with its historic dealings with the mining
industry.
Similar to Tennessee, Nevada did not have experience negotiation in high stakes
negotiations. The institutions themselves not only lacked the experience, but the newly
created Governor’s office of economic development was untested, unproven and not
structured or staffed for such high stakes negotiations. The finalists for Tesla were
California, Texas, Arizona, and compared to those more populous states, Nevada has
significantly smaller state political institutions with some of the smallest bureaucratic staffs
in the nation.
Summary
The comparative inquiry of Brazil, Tennessee and Virginia provides more data
points to analyze the research questions in this project and help inform policymakers
working to attract economic development of policy options and investment strategies to
attracting new enterprise. Unfortunately, the pattern of smokestack chasing experienced
in Brazil is continually repeated by credit seeking and or uninformed policymakers
believing their situation is somehow different and will yield different results.
While it would be somewhat understandable and possibly even excusable for
Tennesseans to not know about what happened decades earlier and over 4,000 miles
away, it is disconcerting- to say the least- to explain how they did not learn from their own
experiences at the same factory three different times. To wit, three different governors in
Tennessee have all tried the same thing expecting different results, and although we do
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not yet know the likely outcome of Tennessee’s most recent attempt, it is reasonable to
predict it will be similar to their first unsuccessful attempts to use company-based
incentives to achieve successful economic development outcomes for the Volunteer
State.
Virginia’s people-based approach to attract Amazon is insightful when compared
to this project’s case study of Nevada; however, Amazon’s concurrent selection of Virginia
and New York also provides a unique side-by-side comparison of what a people-based
vs company-based incentive package looks like. For Amazon, they were attracted to
Virginia due to their creative class environment, and the people-based incentive package
doubled down to further enhance and strengthen the regionally appealing environment
Amazon valued. In contrast, New York had to provide a significantly larger companybased incentive package to overcome creative class environmental deficiencies in order
to lure Amazon into a redevelopment zone. New York had to pay the price for its historic
failures to invest in people to compete; unfortunately, its proposal would have paid that
price directly to a company and not to improving their neighborhoods or region for future
opportunities. Virginia’s historical investments in their people created intrinsic value that
attracted Amazon and was reflected in the large people-based incentive package that
required a much smaller company-based investment than New York had to offer Amazon
for the same number of jobs and economic impact.
The comparative content analysis in the chapter further highlights Nevada’s
company-based incentive structure against Virginia’s people-based approach. Nevada’s
failure to mention anything about jobs in the press release announcing the state’s largest
ever economic incentive package could have simply been an unimaginable oversight;
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however, it is clear the press release unmistakably focuses on the needs of the company
and does not directly address the needs of the citizens who will eventually pay for the
incentives. The content analysis also provides corroborating data emphasizing Virginia’s
keen awareness of their historic investments in building a creative class environment and
the state’s institutional dedication to continue building a place people and businesses
want to come.
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CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS OF QUANTITATIVE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
Overview
The purpose of this project’s semi-structured interviews and case study was to
explore the factors influencing policymakers when choosing between using people- or
company-based incentive to attract new companies to their region. This analysis intends
to contribute to scholarship surrounding economic development by providing a qualitative
analysis to guide policymakers toward better outcomes. The interviews were a significant
part of the project, and although the data collected from the interviews is largely confined
within this chapter, the information echoes the data and confirms the analysis and
conclusions throughout this project.
Semi-structured

interviews

were

conducted

to

better

understand

the

circumstances surrounding the 28th Special Session. The confidential and voluntary semistructured in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with seven subject matter
experts (see Table 7.1) to examine the experiences and perceptions of policymakers and
stakeholders engaged in the 28th Special Session. The findings in this chapter are the
results of this confidential interviews conducted to answer the research questions central
to this project.
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Table 7.1: Summary of Interview Participants

For the most part, the data in this chapter is presented utilizing thick description
(Geertz, 1973) to use the qualitative data collected during the interviews to better describe
a “clear picture of the individuals and groups in the context” of the impacts of the
institutions on their decision-making (Holloway, 1997, p. 154). Using thick description, this
chapter uses background information to contextualize and better understand the meaning
of the data collected in the interviews and “inserts history into the experience” (Denzin,
1989, p. 83) providing valuable insight into the events of the special session as well as
confirming the value of using a qualitative historical institutionalism approach central to
this projects analysis. The qualitative interviews described thickly in this chapter seek to
merge the participants experiences during the 28th Special Session with the researcher’s
interpretations of these experiences (Ponterotto, 2006).
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Analysis of the Interview Data
As discussed in the case study in the previous chapter, Nevada has engaged in
rent seeking since inception, and the policy choice to provide Tesla almost exclusively
company-based incentives were consistent with this history. At the same time, the
interviews reveal how the policy actors understood Tesla’s singular focus on companybased incentives, and the pressures of the monumental opportunity decreased the
thoughtfulness of the implications of the proposal to Tesla. Additionally, the interviews
reinforce the conclusion that the high costs of the company-based incentives were due to
deficiencies in education, healthcare, transportation, and other social services. Tesla
picked Nevada because of its proposal of significant direct company-based incentives
and the ability to accommodate its rapid construction timeline aligned with Tesla’s primary
goals.
Incentives were Critical to Tesla’s Decision
All of Elon Musk’s companies, including Tesla, rely heavily on government
incentives and subsidies. Tesla, SolarCity Corp., and Space Exploration Technologies
Corp., known as SpaceX, have benefited from an estimated $4.9 billion in government
grants, tax breaks, discounted loans, environmental or transferable tax credits, and
factory construction grants (Hirsch, 2015). Musk’s companies had been structured around
and already benefited from nearly $4 billion in government aid prior to Nevada’s $1.3
billion proposal. “He definitely goes where there is government money,” according to one
Wall Street analyst (Hirsch, 2015). Tesla’s corporate reliance on government subsidies
was discussed by every interview participant.
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The interview data supported the idea that company-based incentives were central
to Tesla’s decision of where to locate their Gigafactory. In fact, much of the interview data
suggests that incentives were the only factor that mattered to Tesla. One state
government official said succinctly when discussing the incentives, “Generally, without it,
it would not have happened.” This contention was supported by all other interview
participants confirming that Tesla was only looking for company-based incentives. A
researcher in higher education explained that the incentives were critical to Tesla’s
decision by stating:
The legislature was involved more or less signing off on a deal that had been
largely in place and negotiated before the fact. They would not have come without
the incentives, that was the big thing that Nevada could offer.
Two government officials central to the negotiations stated that Tesla’s CEO Elon Musk
kept asking for large company-based incentives from the beginning, at one point even
asking for a $500 million payment directly to Tesla. The attitude of a large company-based
incentive package permeated throughout the culture of the company; one government
official noted:
At one point Musk said we will go somewhere else, but because at the end of the
day his bean counters wanted something for nothing, and we said no.
These kind of pressure tactics by Tesla were something discussed by multiple interview
participants and are consistent with how companies treat their smokestack chasing
suitors during high stakes winner take all negotiations.
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Negotiations Favored Tesla
Tesla’s approach to the highly publicized, national competitive bidding war among
the states, was similar to the approach of the other companies in the comparative analysis
provided in this project. As one local government official stated:
Tesla had all the cards; the real question was whether you would be lucky enough
to have them pick you for their factory. They were going to build it and if you did
not want to miss out you better play ball with them. Musk and his millions of Twitter
followers would quickly learn if you messed up the deal of a lifetime. For Nevada,
which suffers from a certain inferiority complex as only a gaming state, Tesla was
an opportunity they could not miss and best not screw up, and for Tesla. The great
gaming state of Nevada had become the “mark” in Tesla’s card game.
One state government official described the imperious pressure Tesla exerted during the
process by describing some of the negotiations as a “take it or leave it” approach:
The first critical moment was right before Burning Man when Elon said, “I am
leaving to go to New York,” or something like that. And we told them, “We didn’t
care.” He then went to Burning Man and came back and said “I am just kidding;
can we redo this.” I was actually on vacation when he called and he wanted me to
drop everything and reengage and I said, “not happening.” So, we made him wait
a couple of days.
Just like in Brazil, Tennessee, Virginia, and New York- policymakers in Nevada were
under intense pressure to not mess up what Nevada Governor Sandoval described as,
“These 21st century pioneers, fueled with innovation and desire, are emboldened by the
promise of Nevada to change the world” (Tesla, 2014). The pressure to change the world
quickly shifted from exciting press conferences to the Nevada legislature. One researcher
noted:
Tesla had all the leverage; they could play Nevada off other states to get a better
deal. Nevada was very hungry for a win at that point in the state’s economic
development trajectory. Those two dynamics created the situation that favored
Tesla particularly in the negotiations for tax abatements.
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This treatment of smokestack chasers is nothing new, as desperate governments are
seen as a “mark” or an intended victim for hustle and manipulation ripe for a company to
exploit. Tesla also saw exploitable opportunities in the Nevada’s regulatory schemes.
Nevada’s Favorable Regulatory Environment
Nevada’s ability to get things done quickly was a significant factor in Tesla’s
decision to locate to the state. Similar to Brazil and Tennessee, Nevada’s low regulation
environment combined with local government’s ability to quickly get things done appealed
to Tesla. One government official engaged in the negotiations from the beginning
provided the following story to give context to Tesla’s early experiences in the state when
the company was actively deciding between which of the final four states to locate:
Tesla asked Storey County, “if we were to apply for a permit how quickly could we
break ground and start construction.” He [Storey County Commissioner Lance
Gillman, and partner in the property Tesla was looking to buy] said, “here is a piece
of paper, give us a $25 dollar deposit for a filing fee and you can start this
afternoon.” Tesla officials sort of laughed and said, “no seriously.” And Storey
County said, “we are being serious, we will keep up with you and need to review
plans along the way but you can start right now.” And that made a huge difference
and Elon talked about it when we announced it, that the certainty of being able to
break ground, do the construction, and do it at the speed that they could possibly
do it, and not have obstacles being thrown in the way mattered a bunch.
This was similar to Brazil where the final plan to industrialize by establishing a domestic
auto manufacturing industry was written in only six hours (Shapiro, 1989, p. 105).
One university researcher couched the low regulation environment within the context of
Tesla being the state’s first real opportunity to showcase Nevada’s new approach to
economic development:
Tesla was the first big deal in the reconfigured GOED process that included ability
of the office to negotiate substantial tax abatements to lure investment to the state.
This was an effort initially to get Tesla to move out of California to get less
regulation lower cost here in Nevada.
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This statement was one of several statements made by participants recognizing the
realities facing Nevada as it competes with neighboring states for the same economic
development projects. For example, another local government official stated:
In Nevada we can move things a lot faster, in California to make any upgrades and
stuff they have to go through all these EIS studies and all kinds of environmental
stuff that we didn’t necessarily have to do in Nevada.
These statements highlight the pressure to beat neighboring states and the view that
Nevada’s regulatory environment is a major selling point. It is worth noting that the low
regulatory environment in Nevada was discussed by most of the interview participants in
response to the survey question about Nevada’s strengths when attracting economic
development. This exploitable “strength” was rarely seen as a liability or exploitable
opportunity for enterprising companies. One university researcher engaged in the arena
of economic development noticed the problem:
Willingness and openness to deal, and the regulatory barriers are lower and tax is
lower. But that comes with a price, because that means you do not have the
investments in k-12 and healthcare that might get the top of the economic food
chain to invest here. So, concern for Nevada is that we are growing the economy
and diversifying in some degree, but the question is what part of the economic food
chain are we getting here. Are we stuck in the bottom with low paying warehouse
jobs and some manufacturing? Low taxes and low regulatory base is going to
attract people, but the question is- whether it is going to be attracting the top or
bottom of the food chain.
In referencing the “top or bottom of the food chain,” the respondent acknowledges that
company-based incentives will attract companies but raises the question- what kind of
companies? The comparative analysis of Virginia mentioned above suggests the region’s
environment does attract companies. States offering company-based incentives attract
enterprise singularly focused on the bottom line; conversely, states offering people-based
incentives attract companies that value these investments.
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Tesla and People-based Incentives
The data from the interviews confirms the importance Tesla placed on companybased incentives, and the minimal impact people-based incentives and Nevada’s past
investments in social programs had on their decision. When asked if the state’s
investment in healthcare, k-12 education, higher education, mass transit, affordable
housing, and other social service programs were a significant driver of Tesla’s decision
to locate to Nevada, one state government official noted:
I don’t think it did at all. This is not a great commentary on Nevada. If the CEO is
moving to the region, those things start to matter. If the CEO is going to remain
where they are then they are just looking at the spread sheet that has my income
statement on it. And that is kind of the way that works, not just with Tesla but with
companies large and small.
With regards to what role higher education specifically played in Tesla’s decision, a
university researcher stated:
Higher education did not have any role. That was not what Tesla was looking for.
They already have access to Stanford and Berkley in their backyard. This was
about production and lowering cost of production.
A state official provided one of the most succinct answers to the question- How in your
opinion did the region’s and state’s investment in healthcare, k-12 education, higher
education, mass transit, affordable housing, and other social service programs drive the
decision of Tesla on where to locate their new venture? By stating simply, “No, it just had
to pencil out for them.” Tesla may not have valued these kinds of investments, but it is
worth noting that several of the participants made a distinction between what senior
executives wanted and what workers wanted. One policymaker stated:
Here is what I would tell you. They have a mission statement so their employees
are not about the money, they are more about the company’s values like do they
support dogs at work? These workers would be happy making 30k a year if they
can wear jeans to work, so for them it is a different ideology that we have to
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embrace going forward to be successful. In order for us to be competitive we have
to look at a company’s values because that is really what is driving them and what
the workers want in the community even if their bosses don’t.
The executives focus on the company’s finances and the workers focus on the community
where they are going to live is also consistent with a researcher who said:
They [Tesla] were singularly focused on profits, production and shareholders. They
don’t care about where their workers live just so long as they come to work and
make their widgets. They have an outward facing mission statement full of the
highbrow Silicone Valley catch phrases, but profit is all that matters.
This analysis is consistent with the data in this project suggesting the high turnover among
tech companies creates an environment where businesses do not really need long-term
committed employees to be successful. When asked about what impact Nevada’s
investments in social programs had on Tesla’s decision, another researcher stated:
Those considerations were minimal. They saw this for the cost savings for tax
abatements, and if worse came to worse they could get their workers from
California.
The interviews not only confirmed the importance of company-based incentives to Tesla,
but the interviews suggested that people-based incentives as part of Nevada’s proposal
and historical people-based investments in the state did not matter. Despite this, many
of the interview participants openly discussed, usually unknowingly, the importance of the
creative class in the economic development arena.
Creative Class Considerations
Surprisingly, creative class factors were indirectly and directly discussed
throughout the interviews. While there was not a specific question regarding creative
class, the discussion within five different interviews prompted the researcher to explain
and define the concept in an effort to frame the discussion of the interview. Following the
researcher’s explanation of the concept, on elected representative stated:
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While I had not heard that term before, that is exactly what I was just talking about.
I sort of seems Tesla values those things most companies do, but I know their
employees do, and that may be part of the problem. Tesla focused on their balance
sheet and that was what it (the session) was all about. Now their employees are
stuck
A researcher in higher education engaged in economic development was clearly familiar
with the term and framed some of the answers around the creative class. In one instance
stating:
Nevada did not need to give away the farm here. They now know the importance
of building a creative class and most importantly they know the cost of not having
a strong creative class and how failing to invest in K-12 and higher education cost
them dearly.
Creative class considerations were part of the conversation, but they were not clearly
defined by policymakers and recognized as a specific factor. This failure to specifically
define the creative class and connect the theory to economic development outcomes
narrowed the options available to policymakers and eliminates the significance of peoplebased incentives as productive economic development tools. One policymaker pointed
out how the presence of a creative class provides a safety net for workers moving to an
area for employment:
One of the concerns we have heard from workers is they want to feel like if they
do not like the job that they are moving to the city to take that there are alternatives
in their field, so you need some critical mass of companies to attract folks because
they do not want to feel like they are trapped in a city in the job they are in.
Tesla’s decision to locate their large operations to a small area in Nevada provided an
interesting opportunity to constructively grow the creative class at one time. Tesla was
seen as an opportunity to end this dependence while at the same time create an entirely
new economy and import a creative class all at the same time. One state leader stated:
Tesla moved 900 engineers into the Reno Sparks area; it more than doubled the
number of professional engineers that work in that area, and those folks are not
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going to all stay at Tesla, they are going to leave Tesla and that kind of growth and
things start to spin out on their own. After a while, you don’t have to do anything.
Those folks are there and they are going to start thinking about new ventures and
new products and services, and pretty soon your community is just generating
grown in and of itself. And that is an opportunity.
One of the more revealing comments from the interview unknowingly addressed the
‘tolerance’ factor of the creative class theory. A legislative leaders overserved:
Here also is the problem today for them, so they wanted to expand their trucking
thing up there and northern Nevada didn’t want people of color or diversity up
there.
This highlights the lack of ‘tolerance’ in Northern Nevada, and also supports the
contention that putting Tesla in Northern Nevada showed a lack of regional awareness.
Unlike Virginia, policymakers in Nevada steered Tesla to an area of the state where it
was not scalable. In a follow up question to the role of geography a lawmaker stated:
If Tesla was located in Southern Nevada, they could have more opportunity to
locate some of the things they took to Texas. There are more workers, houses,
and more people to hire for additional operations.
Nevada could have captured additional opportunities from Tesla if the project was located
in the state where the creative class is strongest. The historical influences of regionalism
impacted the institution’s ability to formulate the best policy outcomes given the
opportunities Tesla presented to the state.
Geographic Implications
Regional tensions and considerations were referenced by many of the participants.
It is important to note that the questions provided to the participants prior to the interview
referenced geographical concerns, creating some concern of the priming effect this may
have had on the participants. Specifically, question number six asked participants: What
role did geography play in the legislature’s decision? Despite this question, without

156

prompting many of the participants inferenced regional concerns throughout their
interview, and not just in response to question number six. For example, an administrator
and researcher in higher education stated:
Geography clearly mattered to the Governor and he wanted to have this up in
Northern Nevada to create that anchor tenant that then could be used to
encourage other firms to invest to build a supply chain around that.
The need to build a stronger Northern Nevada was discussed by several participants who
pointed out that Northern Nevada did not have a strong economy and the state was
searching for an opportunity to change the trajectory of the north’s reliance on the tax
revenues collected in Southern Nevada. One state policymaker observed:
Northern Nevada did not have much of a core economy once the gaming industry
kind of became a local’s market rather than an export industry that was actually
driving the economy up north, and they needed something. And when they had
gone through recessions really southern Nevada had started to have to support
Norther Nevada because the economy of Northern Nevada was not as strong as
it was in Southern Nevada. So, we were transferring money from Southern Nevada
to northern Nevada.
This comment underscores how financial tensions have been central to the historical
regional conflict that exists in Nevada. Interestingly the statement came from an interview
participant who when asked what role geography played, stated, “Listen, I do not
prescribe to the north vs south distraction.” While this may be true, the acknowledgement
of Northern Nevada’s reliance on Southern Nevada is a significant grievance in the “north
vs south distraction.” Another local government official noted:
One of the issues going on at the time was Washoe County was losing population,
they were going backwards, and we were trying to figure out how to keep Washoe
County afloat because their revenue sources. They were becoming a drain on the
system as a whole so we stated looking to see what assets that we had available
in Washoe- and we had quite a few. Some of it was Storey County.

157

Clearly, policymakers saw utility in having Tesla locate in Northern Nevada in an effort to
fix their economy and mend the tensions between the two parts of the state. One
researcher noted Tesla’s selection of where to locate:
Effort to recruit them to Southern Nevada that did not pan out and ultimately it gets
lured to Northern Nevada with substantial tax abatements to Tesla to set up shop
in Storey County.
Overall, the data from the interviews supported the strong presence of regional conflict
during the special session and underscored the historical role regionalism has on
influencing policymaking in Nevada. The fact that influences of regionalism was present
in the comments of those who do not believe in regionalism demonstrates how policy
actors are unaware the factor is present when it is clearly not only present but binding
and influencing decisions.
Challenges for Nevada
The participants had very insightful observations regarding the challenges the
Tesla proposal had for Nevada and in particular Northern Nevada. Survey question
number nine- “What, if any, are the challenges Tesla has brought to the state?”- and
follow up questions related to this inquiry yielded some of the most data rich and though
provoking insight for this project. The insights challenged some of the original underlying
assumptions of the project and significantly shaped the outcomes and analysis of the
study. All respondents recognized the strain Tesla put on Northern Nevada, the typical
strain growth presents itself was magnified due to the size of the project and the
unpreparedness of the area. One researcher simply noted, “the legislators shot first and
aimed later.” Another researcher noted:
Many conversations should have been had before Tesla was awarded incentives
instead of trying to figure it out after the fact. If we can’t put this close to the people
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what are the challenges that we are going to create, how are we going to alleviate
them, who is going to pay for this infrastructure, what is this going to do for our
ability to have water not just for our community but to attract additional investment?
Similarly, a state government official observed:
Tesla overloaded the region. It brought housing shortages, higher prices, traffic is
much more of an issue. The infrastructure that needs to be supplied in the area
has not been able to keep up with Tesla and Tesla’s growth.
All interview participants observed similar infrastructure challenges, and most of the
participants observed how similar challenges existed throughout the state, regardless of
where the project was to locate. Interestingly, most all of the participants recognized the
infrastructure challenges would not be as severe if the project has been located in
Southern Nevada.
Summary
One of the more striking comments came from another state government official
who observed how putting Tesla in Northern Nevada strengthened the economy, but also
made it very vulnerable:
You almost need to have a different company of the similar scale of Tesla up there
because at some level, not sure exact level, but at a pretty significant level, the
region is very reliant on Tesla. And you don’t want to look up thirty years from now
and think we are Detroit again. Because of the relative balance of size between
Teals and the region, Tesla is 22% of the regional gross product. That is a lot of
reliance on one company. Now they have been a really great company and have
done more than they said they were going to do, so I assume they are probably
more than 22% of the regional economic driver, that over time, you need to
diversify away from that. It is great to have something to rely on but you do not
want to be that reliant on any one thing.
The structure of the 28th Special Session as a quick session did not provide time for
thoughtful conversation and analysis. The report available to the legislators pointed out
the magnitude of the project. Everyone appeared to understand the importance of
creating a new economy in Northern Nevada, yet there is no record of anyone discussing

159

the natural implications of the project. In other words, nobody discussed the wisdom of
paying a relatively new company that had yet to post a profitable year hundreds of millions
of dollars to locate in an area of the state that would quickly become almost completely
dependent on an emerging technology. All participants responded favorable to the
general fact that Tesla put the state on the map. It transformed how many people thought
about Nevada and undoubtedly opened doors for future economic development
opportunities. However, as with any policy, could it have been crafted better; and, of
significance to this project, could better policy outcomes be achieved if policymakers
understood the historical path of the institutions influencing Nevada policy formation?
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary of the Study
This project aimed to explain better how historical institutionalism impacts the
policymaking dynamics in Nevada and, in particular, better inform policymakers of policy
choices existing between company- and people-based incentive approaches as viewed
through the lens of the creative class theory. Using the historical evolution of institutions
within Nevada, this project sought to understand the policy choices available to decision
makers and better explain the economic development tools created to attract Tesla to
Nevada. Applying the historical institutionalism approach, this project analyzed an
institution’s susceptibility to path-dependent outcomes and applied the factors of the
creative class theory to determine if the combination of these important areas of literature
could offer new insight for scholars. Additionally, this project highlights better policy
options for credit seeking elected officials crafting incentive packages to attract economic
development- often while under intense pressure to not lose the opportunity.
This project focused on the following four research questions:
RQ1: What role does the historical evolution of Nevada’s public institutions
have in the policy preferences for people- or company-based investments?
RQ2: Do companies prefer company-based more than people-based
economic incentives, and which did Tesla prefer?
RQ3 Why does Nevada pursue company-based incentives despite the
empirical research suggesting their ineffectiveness?
RQ4: Do these observations recommend a particular investment strategy
for policymakers seeking to attract new enterprises?
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Historical institutionalism, the creative class theory, and credit seeking elements of
rational choice were all employed to answer the research questions and provide useful
analysis for understanding policymaking behavior in the arena of economic development.
Historical institutionalism provides a constructive approach to understand better the past's
influences on today’s policy decisions and how history frames outcomes and limits
options available to policymakers. The creative class theory helps policymakers identify
additional factors critical to business to help attract economic development and provides
a framework for alternative policy choices based on investing in place and people to
cultivate an environment capable of intrinsically driving economic development.
The mixed-methods approach of this project used a case study of Nevada with
some historical comparative analysis from Brazil and Tennessee and a contemporary
comparative analysis from Virginia’s economic development efforts to attract Amazonoccurring a few years after Nevada’s efforts to attract Tesla. In addition, the researcher
conducted a comprehensive qualitative case study analysis of the 28 th Special Session
of the 2014 Nevada Legislature using semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders to
gather data and understand the beliefs and experiences of policymakers. Combined with
the data publicly available from the session, the semi-structured interviews supported the
researcher’s effort to answer the research questions above.
Using the historical institutionalism approach, the researcher provided a brief
historical analysis of Nevada to analyze and understand the state’s historical engagement
with private industry to identify smokestack chasing tendencies, viewed through the lens
of the state’s history of regionalism, to better understand the policy leaning of the state’s
institutions. Combining this approach with the qualitative data from the interviews, the
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quantitative data from publicly available information from the session, and Nevada’s
allocation of state incentives since 2011, the researcher found the legislature understood
many of the factors of the creative class theory. The researcher also found the
understandable presence of an intense pressure to not “lose” the Tesla opportunity to
another competing state. The pressure to ‘win” the opportunity, combined with the state’s
path-dependent institutions that had evolved to prefer and sanction companies over
people-based incentive policies, resulted in policy preferences toward offering Tesla a
financial incentive package heavily reliant on company-based incentives to locate in
Northern Nevada. The design of this project offers a practical explanation for Nevada’s
use of company-based incentives to attract Tesla and provides insight for policymakers
regarding the influence of history on decision-making options.
Limitations on Research
Several limitations associated with this project should be considered in interpreting
the results. First, the definition of “place” has evolved in the literature from referencing
investments made strictly in the company to later defining the term as also including
investments in people and company. The unprecise and unsettled definition of “placebased investments” has required the researcher to re-characterize information from past
case studies identified as place-based investments to the more operational term of
“company-based investments” for consistent usage of terms throughout this study.
Second, this project relies on a limited number of interview participants, and given
the overwhelming support for the incentives to Tesla, it was challenging to find a
participant opposed to the incentives provided to Tesla. All the interview participants
either voted for the inventive package or publicly supported Tesla building the Gigafactory
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in Nevada; however, during the interviews, it became apparent that the package was a
take it or leave it deal presented to the legislature for a limited time to consider during the
short session that measured in hours not days.
Third, the validity of the interviewees is based on recollection of past events and
the interviewee’s perceptions of the researcher conducting the interview. The passage of
time and the addition of new facts may alter the policymaker’s version of actual intent and
their recollection of the political and public pressures they faced at the time of the special
session. Advanced notice of the specific questions in the interview provides the
participants an opportunity to reflect, review any relevant information, and, if necessary,
reinform and recollect the events of late 2014. The researcher’s involvement and opinions
surrounding economic development are well known to every person interviewed for this
project. Given the researcher’s direct interaction with Governor Sandoval and legislative
leadership as well as legislative and executive department staff, it was impossible to find
quality interview participants with valuable insight that were also unaware of the
researcher’s policy preferences and prior work. To account for this reality, the researcher
was purposeful in selecting participants who would be open and uninfluenced by the
researcher. Additionally, at the beginning of the interview, the researcher pointed out this
reality and urged the participant to share their insight without regard to trying to anticipate
the researcher’s views.25
The case study design has a narrowed scope of the sample of documents
pertaining to the 28th (2014) Special Session of the legislature, which restricts the
external validity of the project. Fortunately, the researcher collected and analyzed all the

One interview participant responded to this by saying “Ryann, I love you and don’t give a s*&^ about
trying to guess everything going on in that brain of yours.”
25
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publicly available documents provided to legislators and media during the limited time
frame between the surprise announcement of Tesla choosing Nevada, and the Governor
signed the legislation awarding incentives to the company. Unfortunately, this
compressed time frame resulted in a legislative session lacking significant debate,
discussion, or analysis, as there was little time for the opposition to become informed or
mobilized. However, despite the limitations outlined above, this project's mixed methods
design and methodological framework were best suited to answer the research questions.
Research Implications
The findings of this project present several research implications. First, this project
contributes to a larger understanding of the influence historically impacted pathdependent institutions have on economic development policy choices and the potential
benefits of investing in people to develop the creative class.
Historically impacted path-dependent institutions
In 2011, Nevada began a deliberative approach to diversifying its economy through
economic development. Similar to Virginia, the Nevada legislature created a structure for
promoting economic development within the executive branch. Nevada commissioned
the substantive Brookings Mountain West, and SRI report Unify, Regionalize, Diversify:
An Economic Development Agenda for Nevada to help guide the state’s new endeavors
to diversity the economy and create new jobs through attracting economic development
opportunities (Muro et al., 2011). In 2013, during the next regular legislative session
following

the

report's

creation,

the

state

began

implementing

the

report's

recommendations and started the necessary long-term effort to push the state toward a
more creative based economy. One year later, unlike in Virginia, elected officials in
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Nevada significantly deviated from the blueprint when presented with the opportunity to
bring Tesla to the state. Tesla represented the kind of company contemplated in the
blueprint; however, to get Tesla, Nevada policymakers needed to provide the kinds of
incentives being offered by the other states competing for the opportunity. Providing these
expensive incentives required the legislature to pull funds from the programs
implemented the previous year based on the Brookings SRI report. As a result, institutions
within the state gravitated back to their familiar smokestack chasing beginnings, and the
state reinforced its path dependency by creating a model of using special sessions to
focus on what was necessary to bring one individual company to the state instead of a
strategic focus on diversification within the sectors identified in the report. Policymakers
in Nevada appeared unaware of how the state's institutional structures were impacting
their decisions and creating an environment that reinforced the state’s path dependency.
Following the path-dependent model, the Governor’s office and Nevada
Legislature rapidly developed numerous abatements and incentives to specifically attract
Tesla to the state during an intense national competition to attract the company. The rapid
formulation of public policy and the chaos that ensued ensured Nevada would rely on the
latent historical underpinnings to frame the policy outcomes, thereby ushering in a
disproportionate allocation of resources from Southern Nevada to support tax abatements
to locate Tesla in an isolated place in Northern Nevada. When faced with the rapid
disturbance-induced events of Tesla, Nevada policymakers returned to the state’s reliable
and trusty path; however, during the more tranquil time between special sessions, the
report Unify, Regionalize, Diversify: An Economic Development Agenda for Nevada has
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successfully shifted Nevada’s economy and built a foundation to strengthen future policy
alternatives (Muro et al., 2011).
Nevada has several structural constraints reinforcing the state’s path
dependency, making it difficult for policymakers to change direction. As a Dillion Rule
state, Nevada concentrates decision-making power at the state level with a general
reluctance by the state legislature to share power with local governments. The Las
Vegas Global Economic Alliance (LVGEA) is the regional economic development
authority in Southern Nevada. Unlike other regional development authorities across the
country, the LVGEA receives most of its funding from the state, allowing the stateparticularly the Governor’s office- to have significant influence over the regional body.
The institutional design and structure of the 28th Special Session made it difficult for
policymakers to engage in policy alternatives deviating from the company-based
incentive package presented by the Governor’s office, and the session became a model
for subsequent special sessions assembled for considering economic development
opportunities reinforcing Nevada on a policy limiting path. These are numerous
examples of institutional constraints reinforcing Nevada's path and making it difficult for
the state to change course.
Investing in people to develop the creative class
During the 2014 Special Session, the legislature did not consider how the presence
of more substantial creative class factors in Southern Nevada could have resulted in a
better return on the taxpayer investment had the project been located there. One
researcher pointed out, “The Las Vegas metropolitan region is in the 2020s, and much of
Reno’s infrastructure and amenities are in the 1820s.” Policymakers in Virginia were
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aware of regional strengths and weaknesses, and they used this regional awareness to
align the opportunity with compatible regions in an effort to ensure future success. As was
seen in Tennessee, when company-based incentives are the primary tool to attract a
company, as soon as the incentives run out, more incentives will likely be necessary to
keep a company in an ill-suited location. Similar to the rurally located Saturn factory in
Tennessee, Nevada’s focus on company-based incentives ignored the importance of
location. Data collected during the interviews suggested policymakers understood this
reality; however, they believed the transformative nature of Tesla could, as one scholar
interviewed stated, “constructively jump start the presence of a creative class
environment.” It was believed that the magnitude of the project would result in making an
environment capable of attracting new enterprises to build a creative class around Tesla.
While this is possible, it is yet to be determined if the Reno/Sparks Metropolitan region
can make an environment capable of capturing the creative class as they leave Tesla.
Had Tesla been located in Southern Nevada, it would have had the opportunity to scale
and built-up to the much larger Las Vegas Metropolitan region; however, by locating in
rural Northern Nevada, Reno/Sparks has to build up to Tesla’s size.
Recommendations for Policymakers and Researchers
A critical implication of this project is understanding the impact of Virginia’s historic
people-based economic investment in attracting economic development opportunities
such as Amazon’s new headquarters. Virginia’s historical investments in higher education
and its diverse population are as attractive to businesses as direct company-based
incentives. This project helps highlight how informed policymakers supporting policies to
invest in their people today can be seen as valuable investments attractive to the
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economic development opportunities of tomorrow. The comparative analysis between
Nevada and Virginia and the comparison between Virginia and New York provides a
powerful evaluative approach to better inform policymakers on some of the intrinsic value
in making social service-type investments in people for the purpose of economic
development.
Investing in People is Economic Development
This project can help policymakers reframe investments in social service programs
(i.e., people-based incentives) as critical investments in economic development. Investing
in people, usually through social service type investments, can be seen as a way to attract
future economic development opportunities. When a significant economic development
opportunity presents itself, the outcome is usually bipartisan with almost universal support
as credit seeking policymakers from across the ideological spectrum want to seize a
victory as well as avoid being blamed for the lost opportunity. However, government
investments in social programs such as housing, healthcare outcomes, k-12 education,
higher education, transportation, and so on are often partisan fights. Viewing these
investments through an economic development rather than a partisan lens could better
frame the investments as job-creating, small business supporting, economy-building
investments. The factors of the creative class theory provide identifiable drivers of
economic development and opportunities for policymakers from different parties to
support investing in people-based outcomes today to avoid the high cost of companybased incentives that will be needed in the future to overcome the deficiency from a
historic lack of investing in people. Policymakers can use the creative class theory to
reframe investments in social programs as long-term investments in economic
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development- stripping away the traditional partisan nature of these programs. When
viewed through this lens, policymakers can highlight and inform the public about how past
people-based investments are leading to successful economic development today and
identify how company-based incentives are largely necessary to overcome insufficient
past investments. While this will not always be the easiest needle to thread, policymakers
committed to people-based investments should consider this line of reasoning to set the
stage for productive discussions on the need for people-based investments to generate
economic development opportunities.
Empower Reformed Local Governments
The structure of government influences economic development decisions, and
research suggests that credit-seeking is more dominate in partisan government structures
and environments (Feiock et al., 2003, p. 619). A significant body of research suggests
that the national progressive reforms from the late 1800s that transformed local
governments from partisan institutions to council-manager governments insulated local
decisions from many external political pressures (Feiock & Clingermayer, 1986; Feiock
et al., 2003; Feiock & Kim, 2000; Frant, 1993, 1996; Lyons, 1978; Lineberry & Fowler,
1967).
The research suggests that governments at the municipal level can be best suited
to make economic development decisions that benefit residents. Sharp found that the
number of company-based incentive offerings benefiting the developers decreased in
reformed (council-manager) settings (1991, p. 142). Local governments, with reformed
structures run by professional bureaucrats, “provide local officials with an opportunity to
respond to underlying economic problems and to match development policies to specific
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needs, rather than simply responding to political pressures for development” (Feiock et
al., 2003, p. 619). This insulation of the development processes helps to remove some of
the “credit-seeking” behavior influencing partisan policymakers seeking higher office. In
New State Ice Co. v Liebmann (1932), Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, “a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” For purposes of
this project, it is suggested that municipal governments are best suited to experiment with
economic development incentive packages to attract companies into their community.
The state government should develop incentive tools and align policies and budgets
around creative class-type people-based investing; however, partisan institutions are not
best suited to engage in awarding incentives.
Hire Professionals
Government officials negotiating incentive packages should seek outside help
when negotiating economic incentive proposals. Government officials should contract
with professionals when engaged in negotiating with sophisticated firms. Private sector
law firms, lobbying firms, accounting firms, and other professionals are all available to
assist government bureaucrats in structuring a deal. An investment in outside experts
could more than pay for itself over the lifespan of these billion-dollar incentive packages.
Future Research
Amazon’s decision to split its H2Q project between Virginia and New York could provide
fertile ground for future research. Toward the end of this project, the researcher found
fertile comparative value between the two sites selected by Amazon. The direct
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comparison of Virginia and New York provides a head-to-head comparison between New
York’s largely company-based incentive proposal and Virginia’s people-based incentive
proposal. These two opposite approaches induced nearly the exact same development
opportunity from the same company. New York had to pay Amazon directly for
deficiencies in the creative class to get the same economic development commitments
that cost Virginia half as much money. A thorough comparative case study of New York
and Virginia could provide future research opportunities to understand better the interplay
between how a state’s past people-based investments attract economic development and
result in those states having to pay less in company-based investments in the future.
Conclusion
In the debate between people or company-based incentives, the 28th Special
Session of the Nevada Legislature provides valuable insight for policymakers deploying
economic development inventive tools to create opportunities for their residents. This
case study compared the impacts on a community with a history of making people-based
investments and a community with a history of making company-based investments.
More specifically, the project used a case study of Nevada with some comparisons from
other states to analyze how historical people-based investments can provide a
sustainable pathway for future economic development opportunities.
Economic development is the buzzword in government at the federal, state, and
local levels. Emerging from the Great Recession, local governments aggressively
pursued economic development opportunities to insulate themselves from future
downturns. As a result, the competition among government entities for emerging or
expanding businesses became intense as states and local governments looked to
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prospective businesses as an economic lottery ticket and game-changer, capable of
bringing jobs to depressed areas and providing tax revenues to restore and protect
government services threatened by economic downturns of the past.
It has been noted in the research that chance, serendipity, or “historical accidents”
are often the cause of economic development spurred by innovation (Feldman & Florida,
1994, p. 211). Feldman and Florida discussed how many of the researchers found it
difficult to pinpoint “exactly why some regions are able to capture the consequent benefits
of serendipity, while other regions are not and the fortunes languish” (1994, p. 211). The
creative class theory provides valuable insight into this question by challenging the
accidental view of economic development and confronting the view that states should sit
on the sidelines, waiting for a company to swoop in and extract large company-based
incentives from an ill-prepared state.
The value of this project depends on the takeaways that policymakers can use in
the future as they seek ways to diversify and grow their economies. One critical question
following the analysis of this project is whether company-based incentives and peoplebased incentives can be combined to create a superior set of policy initiatives. When
looking at the impacts of people-based and company-based policies on national housing
policy, Professor George Glaster asks a similar question, “Is there a way to synthesize
elements of both people-based and company-based housing strategies so that their
comparative strengths can be leveraged to gain maximum impact from our scarce
housing policy public resources?” (2017). An equally important issue concerns whether
this synthesis can take place within other areas of economic development.
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As this project shows, economic development in Nevada disproportionately
advantaged the North as policymakers failed to leverage the valuable assets in Southern
Nevada. In addition, the recovery of the 2020 COVID pandemic illustrates the unequal
treatment of Southern Nevada as job recovery in Northern Nevada was nearly at prepandemic levels, while unemployment in the South was still above 14%. According to the
theory proposed by Bruce Katz and Jennifer Bradley in their book, The Metropolitan
Revolution, metropolitan areas need to assert their political independence and take
charge of their affairs- in Nevada; and this is especially true when it comes to economic
development (2013). While most states play the central role in negotiating and awarding
economic development incentives, especially as it comes to tax incentive packages,
giving local governments more control could lead to better policy outcomes.
Policymakers need to proactively work to counter the path dependency their
institutions were historically designed to stay on. It is important for Nevada policymakers
to recognize that the state’s institutions have historical rent-seeking tendencies that can
limit policy choices and guide the state toward company-based incentives. Companies,
particularly the often-sought manufacturers, rank company-based government incentives
17th out of 21 factors they consider when deciding where to locate new assets (Thornton,
1989). This reality is further reinforced in a study of Fortune 500 companies which
concluded that state incentives had “little influence on almost all plant location decisions”
(Schmenner, 1982, p. 51). Despite these findings, states like Nevada, facing the imminent
need to diversify their economy, may need to use some form of company-based incentive
strategy to overcome past failures to invest in people in order to jump-start their economy
properly. For example, Nevada used company-based incentives to jump-start the
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economy in Northern Nevada while also constructively building a creative class overnight
by inducing the labor migration of over 900 engineers into the Reno/Sparks Metro region.
This project suggests the total dollar amount of incentives a state needs to provide is less
for states who have historically invested in its people, which is seen clearly in the analysis
of the different packages Virginia and New York had to offer to attract the same economic
development opportunity from Amazon.
The usual economic justification for using incentives is that the cost of the
subsidies will be offset by the potential for future tax revenues resulting in a net increase.
Despite this being the primary argument provided by state and local governments
engaging in competitive efforts to attract new enterprises to their jurisdictions,
policymakers often can fail to look beyond simply ensuring tax revenues compensate for
the value of the subsides. In Nevada, policymakers focused on whether Tesla
economically penciled out in Northern Nevada without engaging in a similar analysis to
identify how much more profitable it would have been to locate the project in Southern
Nevada. Policymakers in Virginia were focused on maximizing the return on the tax
investment by using geographical awareness to maximize the state’s return. This ‘return
on investment’ or ROI approach is used by the enterprise seeking to maximize their
bottom line, but unfortunately, public sector policymakers are often not conditioned to use
the same private sector financial analysis. The rent-seeking enterprise is often indifferent
to the actual location within the state, so long as it is suitable and the company gets the
incentive package to maximize their rents. It then becomes incumbent on the state to do
the math and identify where the investment would be maximized - often, the location of
the enterprise within the state can be a critical factor to consider when trying to maximize
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the ROI for ratepayers. In the case of Nevada, when Tesla was located in Northern
Nevada, it tapped out the existing workforce, dramatically impacting the housing supply
and subsequently impacting the projected ability for Tesla to attract other enterprises.
Locating the Tesla Gigafactory in Southern Nevada would have been more scalable for
Tesla- providing the workforce for the company’s future expansion and accommodating
housing needs without creating a housing crisis. Once again, Reno had to build up to
Tesla’s size instead of Tesla building up to Reno.
This project provides substantive insight for policymakers committed to growing
and strengthening their economies. Politicians receive short-term gain from landing large
economic development opportunities where the immediate returns are great. However,
the long-term costs associated with the arrangement are latent, which is why pushing
these decisions down to the local level produces better policy outcomes. The creative
class theory provides a valuable approach to help policymakers understand the
importance of investing in their people to attract and retain economic development
opportunities. The case study of Nevada provides insight into endogenous and
exogenous policy actors engaged in economic development at all levels of government.
Putting people before the company supports and lifts communities today and is a down
payment on the state’s economic future.
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APPENDIX C: INFORMED CONSENT

EXEMPT RESEARCH STUDY
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TITLE OF STUDY: A Cautionary Tale from the Desert: People Before Place? Comparing
Economic Development in Nevada and Virginia.
INVESTIGATOR(S) AND CONTACT PHONE NUMBER: Ryann Juden, 702-569-2333
The purpose of this study is to analyze whether prospective companies looking to locate an economic
development project prefer government investments in place-based economic development or
investments in people-based economic development and the role of the state vs local governments.
This analysis compares Tesla’s September 2014 decision to build its first Gigafactory for
manufacturing of batteries in Sparks, Nevada and Amazon’s September 2017 decision to build its HQ2
corporate headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.
You are being asked to participate in the study because you have been identified as a local or regional
expert leader who participated in the process to develop economic development tools to attract Tesla to
Nevada, or to attract Amazon to Virginia. If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be
asked to participate in a 45-60 min audio recorded interview. The recordings and any transcriptions for
each interview will be stored in a password protected personal (limited access) Google Drive
specifically dedicated to this project. The length of data storage will be 3 years.
This study includes only minimal risks. The time commitment in full is an estimated 1 hour and 45
minutes total: 15 minute invitation review and reply via email, 15 minute interview question review via
email, prior to interview, 45 minute to 1 hour interview via Google Meet, and a 15 min thank you
message. You will not be compensated for your time.
For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, any complaints or comments regarding the
manner in which the study is being conducted you may contact the UNLV Office of Research
Integrity – Human Subjects at 702-895-2794, toll free at 888-581-2794, or via email at
IRB@unlv.edu.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw at any time. You are encouraged to
ask questions about this study at the beginning or any time during the research study. You can also
choose to have your identity revealed, and your interview responses attributed to you in written or oral
materials that link you to the study.
Participant Consent:
In order to protect your privacy and provide you with ample confidentiality, I will obtain verbal
consent at the beginning of our interview.
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APPENDIX D: IN-DEPTH SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Could you provide your version or a brief history of the legislative process to
attract Tesla to Nevada?
2. Based on your history, could you identify 3 (or more) critical moments in this
timeline? i.e., which events were most pivotal, and how/why? What would you
say was Nevada’s goal for attracting Tesla?
3. How in your opinion did the region’s and state’s investment in healthcare, k-12
education, higher education, mass transit, affordable housing, and other social
service programs drive the decision of Tesla on where to locate their new
venture? Your response can reflect both positive and/or negative contributions.
4. How, if at all, where other public sector or private sector institutions critical to the
Tesla’s decision to come to Nevada? In your opinion, what are the existing
regional or state strengths for business development and how did they drive
Tesla’s decision?
5. How important were Nevada’s economic incentives in attracting Tesla? How
critical were the economic incentives that were created specifically for the
enterprise?
6. What role did geography play in the legislature’s decision?
7. What role did higher education play in the company’s decision?
8. Could you share your perspective on the value Tesla has brought to Nevada?
9. What, if any, are the challenges Tesla has brought to the state?
10. What, if anything, could have been done differently to improve outcomes?
11. How can local governance and policy support or hinder economic development?
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12. From your perspective, what are Nevada’s strengths and weaknesses when
attracting economic development opportunities?
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